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ABSTRACT
THE STATUS OF ECOPHILOSOPHY AND
THE IDEOLOGY OF NATURE
FEBRUARY 1991
NANCY HUFFMAN SHEA, B.S., NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY
M.S., SOUTHERN CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by; Professor Robert Paul Wolff
Ecophilosophy is an attempt to render a new philosophy of
nature, generated by the need to liberate nature from the inherently
domineering disposition of humankind. Although I am sympathetic to
this effort, I believe that the current ambiguity of its content (who or
what is to survive) carries with it the potentiality for new forms of
oppression. I argue that ecophilosophy suffers from a kind of
Habermasian self-deception, taking on a vague concept of nature that
deceptively appears to do the philosophical work of healing the
epistemological gap between nature and humans. My reconstruction
unifies this loosely-defined vision along the lines of an equivocal use of
two key concepts, the domination of nature and nature itself, revealing
the potentially subversive character of its implicitly universalist
philosophy of nature.
Ecophilosophers, rather than disUnguishing themselves, fail to
improve upon Francis Bacon's suggestion that attention to nature will
liberate us. Their satisfaction with ecological solutions indicates that
they miss the essential ideological consequence of the modem
VI
project: the dominatLon by some humans over others has been
covered over by a self-deceptive belief in the liberating character of
scientific methodology. By arguing for the emancipatory capacity of
ecology, they get themselves into a Marcusian-like bind, advocating
this new science while at the same time rejecting scientific rationality
as a pivotal component of their notion of the domination of nature.
Because of this they are forced to argue that ecology is qualitatively
different, offering a new kind of rationality that contains the necessary
ingredients for radically changing society.
Ecophilosophers must reconsider the epistemologically naive
and ideologically negative repercussions of this position as 1
demonstrate with an analysis of the potentially repressive
relationships that exist between fourth world cultures and the
environmental community. I conclude by subjecting the Habermasian,
universalist framework to revision as indicated by the possibilities of a
new eco-vision, emerging from the contextual epistem.e of a reworked
ecofeminist perspective.
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CHAPTER I
THE DOMINATION OF NATURE
Science is increasingly establishing environmentalists' claims
that much of the activity of modern industrial society is risking
humankind's long-term health and welfare. An obvious example is the
recent alarm over global warming, reputedly caused by excessive fossil
fuel use and large scale deforestation that significantly increases the
production of CO2 in the atmosphere. This global climatic shift is
believed to have the capacity to activate catastrophic events including
polar ice-cap melting and world-wide drought. Large scale scientific
speculations such as these, along with widespread air and water
pollution and species extinction, are spawning a variety of new
scientific disciplines (human ecology, conservation biology, "gaia"
research) as well as massive social and political movements (the
Greens, the Deep Ecologists, the Ecofeminists). Tangential to these
movements, yet actively fueling their platforms, is a loosely delineated
group of philosophers who intend to ground and give meaning to the
claims of these social activists with a new philosophy of nature.
Beyond producing a framework for political action, these
"ecophilosophers"! believe that their holistic concept of nature entails
a fresh philosophical perspective. The synthetic character of
ecophilosophy defies straight-forward analysis; therefore it is the focus
of this project to impose order on the field by imputing to
ecophilosophy a handful of shared, operating assumptions in order to
evaluate the field. The outstanding presumption that informs
ecophilosophy is a belief that the general conceptual framework within
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which we think about nature is contaminated by our desire to
dominate nature. Ecophilosophers employ the noUon of domination to
describe the relationship between humans and nature in order to
situate their criticisms within the more traditional arena of human
relations. This way of conceptualizing the problem is important to
ecophilosophers for two reasons: they believe that nature deserves
moral consideration quite like that which humans give each other, and
second, they believe that since the sixteenth century, references to
nature employ political language in order to validate an exploitive
relationship between nature and human beings. While this old
philosophy of nature legitimizes a power relation of man over nature,
the new, ecophilosophical concept, would restore harmony between
men, women and nature.
^
Assuming the defensibility of this characterization of
ecophilosophy (I develop it further in chapter three), one way to
evaluate this field is to determine the outcome of these operating
assumptions. If it can be shown (and I believe it can) that these
ecophilosophical assumptions and the parallel epistemological
perspective from which they are derived complement the very
tradition which ecophilosophers claim to attack, then their theory
fails as a radical critique of the modern age. One way to justify this
assessment is to show that the ecophilosophical vendetta against the
"domination of nature" employs the same conceptual framework as the
modem inclination to defer social critique to scientific knowledge
instigated by the Baconian revolution. A case can be made that while
ecophilosophers read the ideological character of modernity as a
universal disrespect for nature upon analyzing their claim one
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discovers tJiat it is superseded by the dominant tendency of
contemporary thinkers (including ecophilosophers) to unjustifiably
idealize that which can be known. Thus, their new philosophy of
nature (which they proffer as a critique of modem soeiety) contains
the residue of an epistemologieal superiority that matehes the
sixteenth century arroganee which they blame for legitimizing the
mastery of nature.
As a result, in deference to their new philosophy of nature, they
are forced to adopt an attitude which maintains the interests of the
politically powerful, wealthy and educated. This follows if we assume
(as 1 argue) that the cunning nature of modem society is the continued
domination and exploitation of some people over others masked by
faith in the emancipatory capacity of modem science. What begins in
the sixteenth century as a program for human liberation becomes,
with the advent of modern capitalist relationships, an ideological cover
for the coercive behavior needed to provide the amenities promised by
industrialization. Many deluded men and women sacrifice their
autonomy and personal satisfaction (in the factory or in the family),
believing themselves to be free. Since this modern condition is
fortified by the ecophilosophical valorization of nature (as 1 am
characterizing it), their analysis fails to accomplish even their most
clearly stated goals^.
In this chapter 1 advance a perspective from which to launch
such a critique of ecophilosophy by examining the history of natural
philosophy from the ancients to the seventeenth century, initiating an
evaluation of the dominant theme in ecophilosophical literature, the
domination of nature". As my survey shows, historians generally agree
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that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries mark the beginning of
modern4 science, paralleling a new epistemological perspective. Prior
to this point, interest in the philosophy of nature is guarded by ancient
and medieval beliefs: nature embodies Mind or God. The advent of
modern science mirrors radical transformations within philosophy,
positing a new view of nature: mind constructs nature. The
epistemological effect is that all human knowledge comes to be
equated with scientific knowledge. Since this modem epistemological
result^ determines any contemporary attempt to fonmilate a
philosophy of nature, the efforts of ecophilosophers are meshed with
the epistemological arguments of modern philosophy.
Ecophilosophers believe that they can explain the domination of
nature in the light of the transformation of our concept of nature from
an organistic one to a mechanistic® one. My goal for this chapter is to
disentangle this history of scientific theory from the domination
theory of these nature writers by demonstrating that the successful
absorption of the philosophy of nature by the philosophy of science
deludes ecophilosophers (in a long line with other philosophers) to
believe that they can unambiguously know nature. This unjustifiable
philosophical stance is masked in an historical account of shifting
scientific perspectives. Ecophilosophers mistakenly believe that by
rejecting a mechanistic view of nature they reject the reductionist
philosophy that parallels its development.
I employ the thinking and influence of Francis Bacon to reveal
the historical context of this confusion for two reasons: he embodies
the epistemological position that dominates modern accounts of
nature, and he has the reputation among many ecophilosophers as the
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one responsible for legiUmizing the domination of nature. By
considering the Baconian meaning of this concept in this
epistemological context, we find that it fails to elicit the implications
credited to it by ecophilosophers. The characterization of Bacon's
position as justification for the domination of nature prevents
proponents (as well as critics) from recognizing the subtle domination
ideology of the modem period: the continued domination by certain
men and women over others.
A. The Idea of Nature
In his Essay on Metaphysics
. R. G. Collingwood argues that it is
the function of philosophy to bring to light the presuppositions of
human thought in the various periods of human history. He addresses
one such presupposition in his work The Idea of Nature "^ that is of
particular interest to this analysis, as it mirrors a fundamental
ecophilosophical tenet that our idea of nature determines our
treatment of it. This suggestion amplifies to Collingwood's belief that
what we believe about nature determines how we examine it. He
offers three "views of nature" that he believes have, at cmcial
moments, redirected the scientific enterprise.
These three views neatly complement ecophilosophical beliefs
about the power of nature conceptions. To portray their analysis:
ecophilosophers suggest that it is most natural (and ethical) to intuit a
holistic appreciation of nature determined essentially by our
embeddedness in it. Yet when we conjure up an identity independent
of the rest of nature, we are drawn to a mechanistic analogy to
facilitate our newly acquired need to control nature. Then as we come
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to recognize the risk of this mechanistic model (threats to our long-
term health and happiness), we are drawn to. and ethically bound to.
consciously resume our place as mere elements in a web of natural
processes.
This analysis is seemingly absurd when considered from the
perspective of the necessity of natural law. Humans do not chose
whether to obey the law of gravity. Yet in the case of "ecological law"
where the time element is stretched beyond even an entire
generation, the appearance of choice emerges. Furthermore, since
the sustainability of human life in the absence of certain other life
forms currently co-inhabiting the planet is not inconceivable, the
desire for the eco-activist to sustain these other elements must be
driven by a vision of a particular kind of life that presupposes the
protection of these other life forms. It is possible to live and perhaps
even prosper without the black rhinoceros, but is it ethically correct?
Ecophilosophers suggest that these ethical dilemmas, initially masked
by the development of natural science from cosmology through
Newtonian physics are coming to the surface in the wake of profound
changes in our planetary perspective, driven by evolutionary theory
and ecological sciences. The subtle permeation of ethical analyses by
scientific discovery fuels the ecophilosophical enterprise. At stake
here is the ethical implication of these new conceptual frameworks.
An examination of the history of science serves a dual purpose:
it tracks the development of modem epistemology while concurrently
revealing the influence of this result on historians of science
themselves as well as the philosophers of nature. The history of the
rise of modem science, as given by 'writers such as Collingwood.
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presupposes a privileged epistemological position, since each account
begins from an assumption about the nature of history itself that
justifies the rendering of nature as organistic, mechanistic or
ecological. These designations, while intending to explain historical
shifts, carry with them a belief in the scientific project: that one can
ultimately and unambiguously know nature. The epistemological
stance that justifies this judgment is the heart of my critique.
The interpenetration of the philosophy of nature (questions into
the nature of being) and the activity of science forms a complicated
historical web. Recent historians and philosophers of science, in need
of an explanation for the gigantic leap of scientific activity that marks a
period such as the Renaissance, have characterized such change as an
all-inclusive, scientific paradigm (or world-view) shift that occurs
whenever heretofore peripheral data sets exert pressure on existing
conceptual frameworks®. The rapidity of these significant explanatory
shifts and their immediate verification from a diversity of sources
provokes the paradigm explanation. This conceptualization of a
shifting concept of nature is of particular interest to the
ecophilosopher who believes that as ecological data sets are drawn
into the mainstream of scientific explanation, a new vision of nature is
immanent.
A sympathetic analysis such as Collingwood's demonstrates that
the transformation of Greek cosmology into modem systems analysis
has its roots in the Greek fascination with form. He argues that the
Greek's interest in natural events reflects their ontological belief that
the world of nature is permeated by mind. This dominance of mind is
what many writers call the Greek's 'organistic' view of nature.
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"Greek thinkers regarded the presence of mind in nature
3.S tn0 source of th3.t regularity or orderliness in the
natural world whose presence made a science of nature
possible. "9
For the Greeks, any plant or animal participates psychically and
intellectually, no less than materially in the life-process of the world's
'soul', 'mind' and 'body'. Despite the fact that Greek scienUsts do not
have a philosophy of nature interpreters argue that this
"organistic" philosophy of nature determines the thrust of their
scientific inquiry, since they view the world of nature as both alive (in
motion) and intelligent (orderly). Although this notion that non-
human entities share psychical and intellectual kinship distances
Greek cosmology from the duality of modem science, for the
ecophilosopher the Greek perspective foreshadows the dawning of an
"ecological" philosophy of nature.
This ancient view of nature does not survive the transformative
period of the Renaissance as Collingwood describes,
"The central point of this antithesis was the denial that the
world of nature, the world studied by physical science, is
an organism, and the assertion that it is devoid both of
intelligence and of life. Instead of being an organism, the
natural world is a machine: a machine in the literal and
proper sense of the word, an arrangement of bodily parts
designed and put together and set going for a definite
purpose by an intelligent mind outside itself."
thus its relationship to modem ecophilosophy remains unclear.
Although for the Greek thinker, the intelligence perceived in the
orderliness of nature is inherent in nature when Renaissance thinkers
remove intelligence from nature they invent a modem dichotomy that
divides nature from humanity for the purpose of understanding natural
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systems. Yet a relatively straight-forward analysis demonstrates the
roots of this separation in Greek ontology.
The independence of body and mind (as worked out by
Descartes) characterizes this clever shift in thinking about nature. By
the eighteenth century, the center of philosophical thought shifts
from a theory of nature to a theory of mind so that the problem of
nature (for the philosopher) takes on a new form: "How can mind have
any connection with something utterly alien to itself, something
essentially mechanical and non-mental, namely nature?" As a result,
"nature is, so to speak, a by-product of the autonomous and self-
existing activity of mind."^i Immanuel Kant plays a critical role in this
transformation since he redefines ontological explanations of nature by
arguing persuasively that "the mind is the lawgiver to nature" ^2^
Although he avoids the extremes of rationalism by grounding mind in
experience, he does not resolve the problem of observation and
experiment. What is it that the scientist confronts? What about the
thing-in-itself; what about nature? This shifting understanding of
nature has drastic results in philosophy.
The developments in science are less ambiguous; the dawning of
the sixteenth century heralds unprecedented progress in
understanding natural systems. The success of the scientific
enterprise unleashes technological capabilities that change the
character of human life. As a result, science (as redemptive) takes on
a prestige that rivals any ontological system to date. This utilitarian
advantage of modern science (predictions are followed by results)
gradually impinges upon any philosophical reconsideration so that
science comes to be equated with knowledge itself. Although the
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t±ieories of Einstein and Darwin change the face of science, its
ideological prominence exceeds its humble characterization by Kant.
Paralleling the overwhelming dominance of science. Collingwood
suggests that by the nineteenth century the science of history radically
transforms our ideas of nature, providing a new analogy for modern
cosmology. It is important to note that this change mirrors the point
at which the philosophy of nature is overtly absorbed by the philosophy
of science. Although Greek science is based on the analogy of the
organism (like man like nature) and Renaissance science reflects the
analogy of the machine (like man like God). Collingwood correctly
targets history as the modem preoccupation.
"Modem cosmology could only have arisen from a
widespread familiarity with historical studies, and in
particular with historical studies of the kind which placed
the conception of process, change, and development in
the centre of their picture and recognized it as the
fundamental category of historical thought."
For the Renaissance thinker, the unchanging and knowable objects of
natural science are matter and natural law. The modem view of nature
begins when historians are able to think scientifically.
"The historical conception of scientifically knowable
change or process was applied, under the name of
evolution, to the natural world."
Modem science (because of its clear epistemological priority) reveals
that change is not a cycle, but progress: nature is not a mechanism,
but a process. Collingwood believes that this modem view restores to
the philosophy of nature a teleology that was lost in the Renaissance
concept of a machine. Process, development and progress imply
direction even beyond human comprehension. For my analysis, this
modem view crystalizes the modern epistemological dilemma that
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nothing remains outside the boundaries of this all-encompassing
scientific analogy.
The ecophilosopher imputes to a Collingwood-like analysis a
particular evaluative significance, arguing that the shift from an
organistic to a mechanistic interpretation of nature has normative
impact much like the present interest in process analysis. Focusing
on the relationship between humankind and nature, ecophilosophers
expand the historical analysis beyond its descriptive and explanatory
purposes, deducing an ethical element (our description of nature
determines our treatment of it). It is this value-laden analysis that
characterizes the ecophilosophical concept of the domination of
nature. Since a mechanistic concept of nature fortifies a domineering
attitude (we control nature), a ecological perception facilitates (even
necessitates) a welcomed attitude shift (we are tutored by nature).
Therefore, the prevailing concept of nature as process is a
dominant theme in nature writing and the sciences of evolution and
ecology are commonly cited as evidence of not only a new, but a better
view of nature. Interpreting the claim that the modern mechanistic
view of nature encourages the rampant manipulation of nature, Carolyn
Merchant's suggests that although into the sixteenth century, the root
metaphor binding together the self, society and the cosmos is that of a
living organism, by the late seventeenth century, the organicism of the
Renaissance begins to aehieve new synthesis with the mechanical
philosophy of the mid-century.
"Mechanism, which superseded the organic framework,
was based on the logic that knowledge of the world could
be certain and consistent, and that the laws of nature were
imposed on creation by God."^®
She argues that the resulting new perspective on the character of
nature allows for new uses (and misuses) of nature, concluding that
the reconceptualization of reality as a machine rather than a living
organism sanctions the domination of nature.
She (like other ecophilosophers) blames thinkers of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for initiating the rejection of
holism in order to condone the treatment of nature as a manipulable
abstraction. As a result, the most mathematical and theoretical
sciences occupy the most revered positions, exemplifying the
tendency to regard nature as a tool. Since the characterization of
nature as a mechcinism sanctions misuse, to rectify the dire
consequences of misusing nature, writers such as Merchant propose a
return to holism: "The most important example of holism today is
provided by the science of ecology." Merchant believes that the
capacity of the twentieth century view of nature (nature as process)
will be to erase the belief that nature should or even can be dominated.
To quote from another nature writer:
"The ecological^® image of nature is that of an
interconnected network, where seemingly discrete things
arise and decay within a larger "web of nature". On this
view, a more fundamental unity of nature underlies its
apparent separateness. The ecological approach leads to
an understanding of the fundamental unity of humanity and
nature."
At stake here is the correctness of the ecophilosophical claim that a
return to holism is crucial to rescuing humankind from its ethical
quandaries.
A closer examination of the history of natural philosophy will
shed some light on the veracity of this strategy. Absent from the
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histories of science is a thorough-going analysis of the relaUonship
between scientific speculation and social theory. Since this gap fuels
the ecophilosophical delusions, it must be, at least, partially rectified
by this project. Collingwood, in explaining the shift from organistic to
mechanistic philosophies, examines the character of Ionian cosmology
to indicate the way Greek’s conceptualize nature. These philosophers
of the sixth and seventh centuries B. C. who, according to Aristotle,
originate Greek thought, initiate their investigations of nature with a
revealing question: What are things made of ?. As an example, Thales,
in 600 B. C., formulates an explanation of the universe in terms of a
single principle in which he conceives the earth as a living being
floating on water. Everything, he suggests, is contained in water as
the primary substance, linking all things together.
Looking for a universal substance implies that the early lonians
assume that natural things constitute a single world of nature; what is
common to all natural things is that they are made of a single
substance. This conclusion distinguishes Greek cosmology from the
modern focus on natural processes. Since Thales does not construct
his problem as the search for a distinguishing concept of nature, his
inquiries can be called cosmological, a concern for the construction of
all things. By the fifth century, lonians lose interest in the goal of
Thales' inquiries evidenced by Anaximenes' studies into the behavior
of objects. He concludes that the thing out of which natural objects
are made, no matter what they are, undergoes different arrangements
in space, thus he shifts the analysis from substance to spatial
arrangement, foreshadowing modern developments.
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With this shift the lonians abandon their attempt to describe in a
concrete manner the universal primary substance, permanently
shifting their inquiries to the behavior of objects. As a result, the
Greek word for ’nature’ typically means the behavior of objects. Only
later is a second sense used, the sum total of natural things, which the
lonians never apply. For them, nature is something inherent in things
that makes them behave as they do: "the nature of oak to be tough’’2o.
Since this use of the word ’nature’ does not commit the user to a
singular philosophy of nature, the lonians have no concept of nature
which transcends understanding the behavior of particular things.
Greek philosophy of nature issues from this concept of nature.
Yet to understand the direct influence of the Greeks on the
modern idea of nature we must understand the influence of
Pythagoras. The theory attached to his name can be traced to the fifth
century B. C. at which time P3hhagorean cosmology resembles that of
the lonians: a world suspended in an ocean vapor. Like the lonians.
Pythagoras wants to explain the differences in objects, but quite unlike
the conclusions they draw, he surmises that differences in nature are
due to variation in geometrical structure. From this Pythagoras
deduces that the nature of things is geometrical structure or form. It
is ultimately Pythagoras who shifts Greek thinking to an investigation
of form rather than substance.
"The spectacular success of the Pythagorean revolution in
natural science is not difficult to understand, if one
remembers wherein that revolution consisted. It
consisted in giving up the attempt to explain the behavior
of things by reference to the matter or substance out of
which they were made, and trying instead to explain their
behavior by reference to their form, that is, their structure
14
regarded as something of which a mathematical account
could be given. "21
The gestation of this philosophical result, that the essence of things is
supremely intelligible, ultimately gives birth to the raUonal Cartesian
universe.
Influential historian of science E. J. Dijksterhuis22 agrees that
modem science has it roots in Greek thought since emanating from
Greek thought is the idea that all observed change is based on
something permanent and true, the cornerstone of modern
epistemology. Pythagoras registers this noUon in his system of
mathematical entities and their inter-relations, revealing the
rationalist bent of Greek thought which eventually crystalizes as one of
two great pillars of modem science. The other, the importance of
empirical research and experimentation, is only a minor theme in
ancient thought, yet when finally articulated by writers such as Francis
Bacon, the necessary ingredients for the explosion of modern science
are brought together.
To hold to the immutability of being, Dijksterhuis believes that
the Greeks give up their search for unity in a quantitative or qualitative
sense. The resulting theories of matter lay the groundwork for the
modem concept of nature. Following Pythagoras, Empedocles is one
of the first to do this when he establishes his doctrine of the four
elements. Empedocles believes that all qualitative distinctions are
produced by a mixing of earth, air, fire and water; thus since he
assumes that all processes in inanimate nature consist in the motion of
imperceptible corpuscles or particles which persist real and
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unchanged thirough all processes, his is the first example of a
corpuscular theory of matter.
The atomic theory of Greek philosophers Leucippus and
Democritus demonstrates that it is possible to preserve the qualitative
unity of being, sacrificing only its quantitative unity. By imagining
small fragments of being scattered in a void, yet qualitatively equal,
they deduce their intrinsically immutable atoms. Democritus carries
his materialistic conception of the universe to such extremes that he
imagines the human soul, the "vital principle", to be composed of
atoms. According to Dijksterhuis, it is in Democritus' corpuscular
theory that we find the mechanistic root of modern science since his
particles can not affect one another in any way other than through the
action they have on one another upon coming into contact. From this
one concept it is possible to conclude that the motions of atoms are
governed by the laws of a science of mechanics.
Although Aristotle adopts a course that is in complete contrast
to the Atomists, wishing to evolve a physical science of qualities rather
than quantities, his influence on modem science is complex. Aristotle
opposes Platonism by radically rejecting the view that tme being is to
be found in a transcendental world of forms, arguing that the subject
of philosophy in general and that of science in particular is formed out
of the things we perceive by our senses. This sensual element
contrasts vividly with the more influential Platonic vision that
promotes as axiomatic approach to scientific explanation. Yet
ultimately a second and distinct pillar of scientific inquiry emerges,
unequivocally advocating careful observation and experimentation.
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Plato, having accepted Pythagoras' solution to the problem of
change, ponders the location of form in nature. If form is immanent it
means that nowhere in the world is form not embodied in matter, yet
if form is to be understood as transcendent, then form is not in the
world but by itself in a separate world. Plato ultimately rejects an
immanence theory of forms, developing his transcendent theory and
by doing so protects himself from the skeptics who argue that if
everything is always in flux then nothing can be true. Plato protects
the forms in a world untouched by change, leaving to nature that
which approximates form. The transcendent theory of form not only
influences the direction of natural philosophy, opening a gap between
nature and reality, but important elements of this Platonic belief are
evidenced by the rationalist attitude of modern scientists. Sense
experience is trustworthy only if ultimate explanations are intelligible.
Although not an important philosophical system. Neoplatonism
powerfully influences the development of modern science. Plotinus,
its founder, argues that there is no difference between the thought of
Plato and Aristotle, creating a synthesized system all his own. He
conceives of a lower world separate from a higher, arising from a
single original principle, the One. The first emanation of the One, the
World-Spirit, is both the world of ideal forms and the conception of
those forms. Since he displays a supreme indifference towards
concrete natural facts, believing that they are nothing but unreal
manifestations of the spirit that operates in them, he, to a much
higher degree than even Plato, creates all the psychological conditions
for the neglect of, and even contempt for, the empirical study of
nature. On the whole, Dijksterhuis argues, his is the most potent
17
influence, retarding the growth of natural science. His theory
supports the devotion of the thinking facility to the construction of
systems that have no connection with sensible reality and it supports
an ever-growing tendency to rely on magic and demons instead of
learning to understand nature. The retarding influence of Plotinus is
the result of the fact that for several centuries Greek thought is
interpreted as Neoplatonism.
The eventual "conception of the world usually called mechanical
or mechanistic"24 is critical to the advent of the modem scientific
enterprise. Dijksterhuis believes that the mechanical conception of
nature leads to methods of research that engender the great
flourishing of the physical sciences:
"experiment as the source of knowledge, mathematical
formulation as the descriptive medium, mathematical
deduction as the guiding principle in the search for new
phenomena to be verified by experimentation. "25
The success of the physical sciences allows for the incredible success
of technology and industrialization. The conception of nature as
mechanical, Dijksterhuis believes, penetrates all philosophical
thought, redefining the history of culture as a whole. The rediscovery
of ancient science designed to understand the principles and
attributes of being as well as analyze cause, order, truth and
perfection, catapults the Renaissance thinkers into the flurry of
modem scientific explanation. The conditions for the possibility of
such knowledge is assumed in their organistic philosophy and it is
where modern thinkers first find hints of a philosophy of science in
the empiricist and rationalist arguments of thinkers such as Plato and
Aristotle.
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In the Umes of transition between ancient thought and the
renaissance of scientific thinking, the ancient curiosity for natural
explanation is overcome by the awe for the authority of revelation.
Essentially because mathemaUcal invesUgation is abandoned, any
prospect of the development of quantitative physical theory is
diminished. Medieval thinkers abandon the Greek attempt to
understand nature by forsaking any sound methodology for the study of
nature. Not surprisingly, it is the revival of Greek thought that is
responsible for the resuscitation of scientific inquiry.
Initially, Aristotle is the only influential intellectual thinker
retrieved from antiquity by medieval scholars. Yet in the writings of
Aristotle, medieval thinkers discover not a scientific methodology, but
a rational basis for Christian belief.
"Once the Schoolmen had become acquainted with
Aristotle's Metaphysics , the most astute among them at
once felt intuitively that here, ready to hand, was what the
Christian Church from the time of its inception had always
sought: a philosophical system which could be made to
harmonize with the Christian doctrine, and thus furnish a
rational basis for dogmatics and a weapon for
apologetics. "26
The great theologians that accomplish this synthesis are: the English
Franciscan Alexander of Hales, the German Dominican Albert von
Bollstadt, later known as Albertus Magnus, and the Italian Thomas
Aquinas. Due to the work of these men, a unity of the religious and the
intellectual world-conception is brought about to a degree never
before realized. Yet danger to the Church is imbedded in this
synthesis since every blow which autonomous scientific discovery
launches against Aristotelian science is a blow to the Church as well.
The modern separation of faith from fact is rooted in this downfall as
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science overcomes the conflict between itself and religion (a
predominant theme in medieval theology).
A major pioneer in the transition to sixteenth and seventeenth
century science is Roger Bacon.27 Although Bacon is not important for
his contribution to science, he is significant for his criticisms of the
scientific methods of his day and his suggestions for improving them.
His interest in scientific inquiry is ultimately devoted to a religious
end, yet he is one of the first to argue for scientific discovery as
beneficial to material life, as a means for prolonging and improving
life. Dijksterhuis believes that this shift in the conception of scientific
methodology determines the success of modem science. As well, it
anticipates the spirit of Francis Bacon's revolutionary perspective on
the moral necessity of the scientific enterprise.
Although the thirteenth century is typically hailed as the period
of High Scholasticism, the pinnacle of the theological thinking as
exemplified by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon's
break with accepted methodology leads to a important century of
criticism and doubt, the fourteenth century. Dijksterhuis argues that
the theological and philosophical decline of this period is essential to
the rise of scientific development since a wedge between science and
religion is initiated by unease about the rational foundation of faith.
The full development of scientific inquiry is delayed for two centuries
by a scholarly preoccupation with the past and university instruction
that honors oratory over the flourishing of new ideas. Long-refuted
theories are revived time after time to be refuted once again so that
this conservative tendency blocks innovative, scientific investigation.
20
Yet led by Thomas Aquinas, the Church gradually reworks the
physical and cosmological structure of the new Christian universe to
reflect the central stationary earth cosmology of Aristotle. This
preoccupation with Aristotle has mixed results.
"The very intensity with which Aristotelian texts were
studied guaranteed that inconsistencies of doctrine or
proof would be quickly noticed, and these inconsistencies
were often the seeds of important creative achievement."28
"The centuries of scholasticism are the centuries in
which the tradition of ancient science and
philosophy was simultaneously reconstituted,
assimilated, and tested for adequacy. As weak spots
were discovered, they immediately became focus for
the first effective research in the modem world.
The great new scientific theories of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries all originate from rents
tom by scholastic criticism in the fabric of
Aristotelian thought. "29
Kuhn's analysis suggests that despite the conservatism of their
medieval predecessors, modern scientists inherit their boundless faith
in the power of human reason to understand nature.
While ancient and modem science are clearly separated by a
period of great intellectual stagnation, the precise division between
medieval and modem science is not as easily distinguished. While for
the ancients the fact that happiness is equated with a virtuous life (the
pursuit of tmth) nicely conforms with their cosmological pursuits, the
presence of Christianity forces early modern scientists to temper their
scientific enthusiasm with a world-view that accommodates an
omniscient presence. Much of the new science is heralded by signs in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but the first pivotal influence
on the development of modem science is Humanism, the revival of the
ancient heritage. The influence of Plato, in particular, dilutes the
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overwhelming influence of Aristotle as Platonists usher into scientific
discourse a preponderance of mathematical thinking. However, this
reverence for antiquity is not completely conducive to scientific
inquiry since the Humanists' rejection of Aristotle means also a
rejection of sense-perception as a vehicle for knowledge. The
impending philosophical separation of mind from body is necessary for
the modem scientific project to complete itself.
Humanism as a source of resistance to Aristotle and the entire
tradition of university learning, makes use of the mystical philosophy
of Neoplatonism to achieve a comprehensive and coherent world view.
"The Neoplatonist leaped at once from the changeable and
corruptible world of everyday life to the eternal world of
pure spirit, and mathematics showed him how to make
the leap. "30
Although not immediately apparent, this new way of looking at nature
(man and God inclusive) reshapes both religious and political
philosophy so that by the end of the eighteenth century an increasing
number of scientists and non-scientists alike see no need to posit the
existence of God. This tension between religion and science (so alien
to ancient thought), although apparently resolved when science is
separated from religion, continues to plague modem philosophy as a
worry about the status of ethical language.
Endeavoring to explain this "paradigmatic" leap into mechanism,
Kuhn concludes that the Copemican discovery is the symbolic act
which severs the relationship between the ancient and modern views
of nature.
"The conception of a planetary earth was the first
successful break with a constitutive element of the ancient
world view. Though intended solely as an astronomical
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reform, it had destructive consequences which could be
resolved only within a new fabric of thought.
Problems that derive from the Copernican innovation become the
most prominent landmarks in the development of a new universe.
The significance of Copernicus, according to Collingwood, is to deny
implicitly that the world has a center at all. The lack of center
destroys the notion that the world is an organism while the
displacement of the earth vastly enlarges the scope of human power.
This perspective allows one to argue that any natural law discovered
on earth applies throughout the cosmos, thus elevating the supremacy
of natural law, bolstering the modern confidence in scientific inquiry.
Alexandre Koyre^^ believes that it is Nicholas of Cusa in 1440,
the last great medieval philosopher, who first rejects the cosmos-
conception of the world and asserts the infinity of the universe,
predating even Copernicus and Kepler. Cusa argues that in order to
transcend the limitations of rational thought we must recognize the
partial and relative character of our knowledge. Given the relativity of
our position in the universe, we must acknowledge the possible
existence of different and equivalent world-images. In Cusa's
ruminations we find evidence of a very modem philosophical dilemma
that eventually undermines even the solid belief in the undisputed
destiny of scientific inquiry.
The dawning awareness that human knowledge is bounded by a
particular position in the universe constrains modern thinkers to
confine their explanations to the human point of view. Faced with this
limitation, modern cosmology leaps into the forefront as the tool by
which modern thinkers can understand the infinitization of the
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universe. The Copemican discovery (although arguably less radical
th3Ji the criticism of Nicholas of Cusa) spreads skepticism and
bewilderment with a lasting influence. Yet Giordano Bruno is a
primary architect of the cosmology that first dominates modem
thought because Bmno successfully argues that the concept of God
entails an infinite universe, overcoming a major block, preventing the
adoption of such a cosmological perspective. Bmno, by maintaining
the difference between the infinity of God and the world, achieves
stature as prophet of a modern astronomy (according to Koyre).
The overwhelming influence of the theoretical "mechanization of
the world-picture"33, launched by Copernicus' work, De Revolutionibus
Orbium Coelestium
.
and ending in 1687 with Newton's Philosophiae
Naturalis Principia Mathematica
.
produces a radically new
understanding of nature and an enormous advance in men's knowledge
and technical skill. Interest in the stmcture of nature moves
theoreticians away from early Greek cosmology since the
categorization of the world into nature, humanity and God, demands a
distinct knowledge of each. Thinkers of the modern period begin
with an attack on teleology, rejecting any attempt to explain nature in
these terms.
"Typical of the whole movement is Bacon’s celebrated gibe
to the effect that teleology, like a virgin consecrated to
God, produces no offspring."^^
Their new theory seeks to explain all change and process by the action
of material things already existing at the commencement of the
change by representing nature as possessing an intrinsic activity of its
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own. The Pythagorean doctrine of the priority of mathematics is
adopted: change is a function of structure.
Although in the early phase of this new thought nature is still
conceived of as a living organism, this conception is gradually
overtaken by the view of nature as a machine. The mainstream of this
Renaissance thinking moves in a direction led by Descartes. The truth
of nature consists in mathematical facts; what is real and intelligible in
nature is that which is measurable and quantitative. Since both God
and man transcend nature, nature functions as a machine devoid of
Mind or Spirit. Minds form a class of beings outside nature and
qualities become appearances to Minds apprehended by the sense
organs capable of comprehending the union of mind and body. Matter
is separate from Mind, yet both somehow proceeding from God.
This tenuous positioning of God heralds His eventual irrelevance
since by the seventeenth century, science discovers a very different
material world moved by uniform and purely quantitative forces. The
Greek concept of nature as a vast living organism (by its very nature)
denies a material world void of the universal activity by which
everything apprehends the final cause of its own changes (Mind). The
Greeks never confront the duality initiated by the claims of
Christianity; therefore their ontology is similarly monological. As a
result of this struggle between science and religion, by the eighteenth
century, matter becomes the quantitatively organized totality of
moving things; thus it is these eighteenth century thinkers that
inherit the problem of relating matter and mind (an alien notion to
the Greek cosmologists).
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Koyre argues that Henry More, despite his confused philosophy,
gives the new science some of its most important elements. He
succeeds in grasping the fundamental principle of the new ontology,
the infinitization of space, rejecting Descartes' characterization of a
world that denies void space and spiritual extension since it excludes
a space for God. While Descartes' thinking leads to materialism and
the exclusion of God from the world. More establishes to his own
satisfaction the concept of space as distinct from matter and refutes
their equation in the Cartesian concept of extension. More reinstalls
God in the world by separating space and matter, arguing that it is not
matter that supports extension or space, but Spirit or God. Extension
is rendered infinite. He elevates space to an attribute of God, an organ
through which God maintains his finite world.
Koyre argues that it is Newton who carries More's thinking into
the world of science so that by the end of the seventeenth century,
Newton's victory over the materialists appears complete.
"The Newtonian God reigned supreme in the infinite void
of space in which the force of universal attraction linked
together the atomically structured bodies of the immense
universe and made them move around in accordance with
strict mathematical laws."
Although Leibniz conceptualizes a world in which God's power is
reduced to that of winding up the world clock, Newton argues
successfully that such a world is uncomfortably similar to a world
without God, a perfect mechanism moving without God's intervention.
Yet the force of attraction which Newton argues proves his
notion of God gradually enriches mechanism rather than supplants it
as even the material universe becomes infinite in both space and time.
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Since an infinite and eternal world does not need creation, space
becomes more and more the void of the atomists, the frame of the
absence of all being, including God's.
"Every progress of Newtonian seienee brought new proofs
for Leibniz's eontention; the moving force of the universe,
its vis viva , did not decrease; the world clock needed
neither rewinding, nor mending, "36
The Divine becomes less and less important to eonserve the world
until the inevitable separation of faith from science is eomplete,
eliminating spirituality from the purview of scientifie endeavor (and
eventually from knowledge itself).
Dijksterhuis37 argues for the same result beginning in the
seventeenth century through the work of Descartes, Galileo, and
Gassend who conclude that in mathematies and meehanies it is
possible to arrive at an extensive knowledge of nature without any
recourse to sense-experience. These scientists proceed to devise
mechanical systems to aecount for physieal facts even though the
metaphysical problem of the relation between physical and psychic
phenomena remains unsolved. Although Newton seeks to blend a
eonsistent mechanistic philosophy with a belief in God who ereates
and preserves the world, the mechanization of nature leads to a view
of God as a retired engineer. His elimination is inevitable.
By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, modern science is
the root and the fruit of a deep revolution of thinking as humankind's
position in the universe is transformed from spectator into owner and
master of nature. The scientific and philosophical revolution of this
period is the destruction of the Greek Cosmos (as well as that of the
Scholastics), the disappearance of a conception of the world as finite.
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closed and hierarchically ordered. It is replaced by an indefinite and
even infinite universe bound together by laws. Ultimately, Koyre
argues, it means the discarding of all considerations based upon value-
concepts and the divorce of the world of value from the world of fact.
In his book on Thomas Hobbes, Friethiof Brandt^s agrees that
the greatest event in the history of philosophy since classical antiquity
is the birth of modem philosophy in the seventeenth century.
"It is also, we think, universally admitted that this event
was the result of and took place in close interaction with
the appearance of the mathematico-mechanical view of
nature. Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, all the
great names of the seventeenth century, are examples
hereof."39
Descartes and Hobbes, Brandt claims, are the first to recognize that
the disappearance of the Aristotelian world means the rebirth of a new
world. Dijksterhuis also believes that it is difficult to point to a
scientific thought about nature that has more influence than the
mechanical or mechanistic view. It precipitates the great flourishing
of physical science, making the rapid development of technology
possible, thus affecting the history of culture as a whole.
While some regard the adoption of this view as the gradual
clarification of human thought, others regard its general influence as
disastrous on moral philosophy. These thinkers single out the
mechanization of nature as one of the main causes of spiritual chaos of
the technological twentieth century, inspiring many critiques of the
modern period. Representative are ecophilosophers who utilize the
mechanistic interpretation of nature to support their "domination of
nature" theory, arguing that this reconceptualization of nature
sanctions its misuse. Although they characterize modernity essentially
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correctly (as a flagrant exploitation of nature made possible by a
limited moral perspective that allows technological expansion to go
unchecked), they fundamentally misunderstand the ideological
peculiarity of this modem shift when incorreetly charaeterizing its
impact ontologically as a failed philosophy of nature.
My brief survey might suggest that the development of modem
science is the history of a curtailment of knowledge, tracing its
demise from the Greek conviction that their natural inquiries reveal
ultimate reality to the modern recognition that knowledge is limited
by the conditions of the observer. Yet historians generally agree that
the advent of modern science marks increasing human empowerment
through knowledge. The well-ordered, but finite Greek Cosmos pales
in light of the modern infinite universe since the product of this
increased scientific sophistication (modern technology) drastically
alters human capabilities. It is modern science that develops the
effective methodology for understanding and utilizing this expanded
concept of nature; thus it becomes a modern tendency to presuppose
that in order to understand and benefit from nature, one must,
ultimately, defer to the results of science. The history of modern
science is the record of a philosophical reordering: nature ontology
yields to the priority of scientific epistemology. While this
epistemological shift produces the modern scientific and
technological revolution, the conundrum remains: how do we evaluate
the totality of this result when knowledge itself is restricted to its own
activity?
Ecophilosophers negatively judge the success of the scientific
revolution, locating the failure in a disenchanted ontology. Although
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Merchant and others suggest that the resulting mechanism be
replaced by a modern ecological view, believing that his new ontology
retrieves the superior, ancient concept of organicism, they fail to
understand that any 'new' view of nature is nested within the modem
epistemological perspective. The ecologist, like any scientist, explains
natural processes as an outcome of scientific investigation and her
methodology carries with it the limited purview of scientific
knowledge.
The Greeks have no conception of the limits on knowledge,
never anticipating the modern philosophical dilemma (what are the
conditions of knowledge?).
"If the word ’nature’ means the internal source of a thing’s
behavior (as the Greek’s does), a person who uses the
word does not thereby commit himself to the assertion
that anything signified by it actually exists. A man might
say that there was no such thing as ’nature’, meaning by
this...that there is no internal source from which the
behavior of things proceeds.
As Collingwood explains, the use of the word ’nature’ by the Greeks
does not commit them to any scientific or philosophical theory.
Although the lonians believe that nature exists as ’one’, and that the
"thing which in its relation to behavior is called nature is in itself
substance or matter’’^^ these beliefs are not determined by their use
of the word ’nature’. Even the Platonic shift to an explanation based in
form rather than substance does not result in a radical shift in the
Greek concept of nature. Their philosophies of nature are applications
of the word ’nature’. They are ways of explaining the various kinds of
behavior which we find in the world, of explaining a thing’s nature.
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The advent of modem science changes the conception of nature
in a more radical way than the utilitarian shift to a mechanical model
by abandoning any metaphysical appreciation of nature and regarding
natural phenomena as the hardware of scientific discovery.
"Formal and efficient causes were regarded as being in the
world of nature instead of being (as they were for Aristotle)
outside nature. This immanence lent a new dignity to the
natural world itself.
Since the modern scientist presupposes that her results are
determined by the constmct of nature (albeit within the confines of a
paradigmatic model of scientific change), she assumes the veil of
objectivity protects her results from critique outside the bounds of
internal review. This elevated self-understanding, indicative of
modern science, emphasizes that caution is necessary when evaluating
any effort to draw normative conclusions from scientific results. To
suggest that we consider the science of ecology as a philosophical
constmct of 'nature' requires understanding its results under the
constraints of this modern episteme.
C. J. Glacken‘^3^ tracking the abandonment of a holistic concept
of nature, finds most striking in early conceptions of nature a yearning
for purpose and order. He believes that the classical world evokes a
general search for evidence of purpose in human life, resting on their
belief in the unity and harmony of the cosmos and on their conviction
that the cosmos is the product of a creator. This ancient
interpretation of regularity in the phenomena of the heavens as
manifestations of divine interference with natural order distinguishes
Greek wisdom from science of the modern period. Glacken's
reflections, properly interpreted, provide additional evidence that
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Greek epistemology differs greatly from the modern, but in a way quite
unlike that supposed by Glaeken. Modern scientists have not
abandoned a search for cosmic order and purpose (the overarching
theme in most sciences is for unifying theory), but they seek these
answers in the natural processes themselves. Their philosophy of
science precludes addressing these questions anywhere else;
therefore their philosophy of nature precludes any talk about meaning
and value that supersedes discourse on scientific models and
conflicting evidence.
Clearly the valorization of science reduces the critical space
needed to plainly evaluate the products of the scientific enterprise.
Yet by characterizing this modern dilemma as the valorization of a
mechanical interpretation of nature (as ecophilosophers do), they fail
to target correctly the confusion instigated by the modern enthusiasm
for science. Consider the analysis by Merchant of the growing impact
of capitalist economies on the utilization of natural resources.
Merchanb^^ considers the influence that the rise of manufacturing and
capitalism have on the development of scientific thinking. She
believes that the premodem peasant economic system, acting as a
source of instability with its hierarchical structure of landlord
domination, combines with population pressure and technological
innovation to produce significant changes in nature as a whole in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
This impact on resources by different interest groups is
escalated by overpopulation and exacerbated by landlord demands. It
means that eventually there is not enough land per person to ward off
famine in a poor harvest year. The growth of cities creates a bourgeois
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class of entrepreneurs who help fund the development of strong
national states, undercutting the power of regional landlord nobility.
The emerging capitalist society based on nonrenewable coal and
metals ushers in a period of increasing resource exploitation and the
need for continued technological advance. These needs encourage the
flourishing of the scientific enterprise, producing drastic effects on
social events and human welfare.
Curiously she characterizes this change in natural resource
utilization as indicative of a shifting relationship to nature, arguing that
this blatant reconceptualization of nature provokes what she calls, the
"death of nature". By arguing this way she is claiming that scientific
theory (nature ontology) has absolute sway over political ideology,
collapsing the obvious distinctions between a model of nature that
drives particular scientific inquiry, the political utilization of nature for
the benefit of a select few and the practical use of nature by all to
enhance and sustain life. The depletion of natural resources in a
capitalist economy is a grave political consequence not to be overcome
by a new scientific conception. Yet this tendency to draw naturalistic
conclusions from political premises haunts ecophilosophy.
R. Francis Bacon
In the work of Francis Bacon this confusion is most obvious.
Bacon's enthusiasm for science lies at the root of a pervasive modem
belief that the standard for all genuine human knowledge is scientific
inquiry. Dijksterhuis notes that even if all of Bacon's work were lost,
not one scientific discovery or concept would be missing, yet his
impact is his remarkable literary gifts and brilliant aphoristic style.
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Bacon does not confer on humankind new knowledge of nature, but
rather a new political agenda buried in a simple methodology: a
unilateral respect for natural law. When Bacon argues that nature
speaks for itself, that by listening, we are all the wiser, he reveals his
implicit belief that since observation and experimentation disclose the
secrets of nature, we are morally bound to scientific progress. By
privileging the object, he shifts attention away from the rationality of
the ancient and medieval periods, justifying the worldly application of
scientific speculation.
Clearly scientists do not proceed in this simplistic fashion.
Experiments are guided by preconceived ideas; imagination is the
prerequisite of scientific discovery. This dialectical relaUonship of
fact to theory (which Robert Ackermann calls "the motor of scientific
history"45) fuels the modern analysis of scientific activity. If modern
science is heir to both rationalist and empiricist foundations. Bacon's
impact as the prophet of a new science is to redirect attention to
nature itself, convincing others that everything observed in nature is
significant and valuable.
As I suggested above, historians generally interpret the
enthusiasm for science evident in the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries as the beginning of a bold new synthesis of man's
relationship to nature. They argue that man's role as manipulator of
nature is eagerly endorsed as the essential process by which
humankind comes to interpret the significance of ereation.
"...to make the changes of the earth he is capable of
making, and to force the lower orders of life to do his
bidding are those qualities which bring him closet to the
divine and which mark him off most decisively from all
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other kinds of life. The conelusion is irresistible that it is
the uniqueness of man that enables him to preform the
wonders he does preform. "46
Francis Bacon is part of the optimistic trend that man’s accumulating
knowledge is used best to increase his control over nature: human
ignorance is like a second fall of man.
"Bacon's philosophy of man's attaining control over nature
by cultivating the arts and sciences and encouraging
invention is not divorced from religion; it is a vital part of
religion, being closely related to the history of the creation
and to the fall of man. "47
By arguing that the sciences are able to mitigate the physical
consequences of the first fall, Bacon encourages the adoption of
philosophies that advance an investigaUon and understanding of nature
from the assumption that these discoveries prevent man's second fall
from grace. This normative interpretation of scientific inquiry boosts
the Baconian analysis at a time when science is squeezing God from its
fundamental framework.
This general attitude of the seventeenth century is accurately
reflected in the Baconian enthusiasm for observing nature so that by
the end of the century philosophers of nature essentially abandon
metaphysics; natural philosophy gives birth to natural religion, natural
law, natural freedom, and natural equality; morality becomes the right
to happiness; and science ensures the boundless progress of man.48
While nature itself is no longer regarded as the work of a Creator, but
as the upsurge of life as a whole, and of human life in particular, the
desire to gain a better understanding of nature is upheld as a
glorification of God, resulting in discoveries that alleviate the pains of
human error. The pursuit of science and technology is promoted by
these views despite the fact that the actual success of science is in its
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reliance on the language of mathematics. Mathematical formulations
of natural relationships combines with Bacon's enthusiasm for science
and his conviction that science will produce a better world to produce
the fruitful scientific activity of the last four centuries.
It is only recently that growing numbers of people have begun to
question our overwhelming devotion to the scientific enterprise.
Lacking internal feedback mechanisms or criteria for judging the
quality of its results, the vague limits of scientific inquiry are
troublesome. Hilary and Steven Rose:
"Ever since the scientific method became acceptable as a
way of learning about nature (including ourselves), some
people have questioned whether science is an appropriate
road to knowledge. The questioning has deepened and
expanded as science has increasingly been hailed as the
only way to comprehend natural phenomena.
In a similar vein, Jacques Maritain argues that when physico-
mathematical knowledge is mistaken for a philosophy of nature by
becoming the primary center of organization for all philosophy,
philosophical thinking is led astray.
"...from the moment physico-mathematical knowledge of
nature was mistaken for a philosophy of nature and was
asked to give an ontologic^ explanation of the sensible
real, the human mind was bound inevitably to tend toward
a mechanistic philosophy and to endeavor to explain
everything, -in the philosophical sense of the word
explain,- in terms of extension and movement.
Maritain suggests that since the beginning of the seventeenth century,
all great systems of classical metaphysics take as key to philosophical
knowledge a so-called philosophy of nature, the "mechanistic
hypostasis of the physico-mathematical method"^L
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This impact on philosophical thinking is clearly revealed in the
theory of Auguste Comte. The influence of Comte on modem thought
(which I will consider in more detail in the next chapter) is his
fearless articulation of a Positivist Philosophy. Comte describes the
goal of positivism:
"For positivism, science,-and every valuable knowledge,
-is
characterized above all by the elimination of every
ontological preoccupation; that is the privilege of the
positivistic age or state in opposition to the metaphysical
ortheological state. Science must therefore abstract from
the being of things and consider only the connections and
relations which constitute the laws of phenomena. "^2
Comte's belief that the positivist scientist, freed of her own muddled
subjectivity, can confront the corpses of reality has roots in Francis
Bacon’s fascination with empirical science. Bacon's modern influence
is most apparent in his identification of philosophy with empirical
science.
"The substance of learning becomes experimental
knowledge, and the instrument of education becomes
technical information for the satisfaction of man’s need
through the invention of "works"."^^
Although Bacon argues for a materialist scheme of knowledge, unlike
Comte, Bacon assumes that their are limits inherent in the quest for
knowledge. Still the seeds of a Comtian universe are dormant in
Bacon's systematics.
Although Bacon's vision of scientific progress entails a limit
which is absent in modem science, his failure to fortify that other
realm of knowledge endangers his entire scheme. Bacon ardently
believes that nature offers the key to a new kind of life for humans
since the ultimate end of science is a practical one, the ease of human
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suffering. With this he bounds his enthusiasm for scientific inquiry
within the strictures of a revealed theology, acknowledging that
knowledge from God is privileged because moral duties precede
scientific investigation. Yet Bacon feels it necessary to protect the
fragility of scientific investigation from the conservatism of traditional
scholasticism because he believes that our ability to utilize nature's
"secrets" (for the sole purpose of relieving human suffering) depends
upon the autonomy of the scientific process. Therefore, he endorses a
rigid division between science and religion. The dialectic of value and
fact implicit in Bacon’s thought is overwhelmed in the modern period
(by positivism) so that the gap between ethical and scientific
knowledge masks the modern epistemological dilemma. Exploring
this connection between scientific discovery and human morality is
critical if we are to understand the long-standing ideology of nature.
Bacon’s largest work. The Great Instauration. designed to have
six parts: the classification and review of the sciences; the
introduction of a new inductive method; the collection of a natural
history, the "stuff’ on which his new method was to operate; the
construction of tables showing discoveries made through the use of
the new method; the introduction of tentative doctrines gathered
from experiments; and the completion of a philosophical synthesis
based upon tables inductively established^^, although uncompleted,
from 1620 to the end of his life, it drives Bacon’s attempt to initiate a
new scientific methodology. To aid in its completion, he works to
supplant the prevailing Platonic and Aristotelian traditions by
inventing a new method of investigation supported by a large natural
history compendium.
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According to his philosophy of science. Bacon attempts a
complete reconstruction of the sciences through a new method.
Rejecting Aristotle's three sciences (the theoretical, the practical and
the productive). Bacon recommends a unified science divisible into
three parts: history, poetry and philosophy. The variation amongst
the products of human knowledge are the result of distinctions among
the human faculties; memory produces history, imagination poetry,
and reason philosophy.
"...the fact remains that whatever effects are produced by
nature in her own workings, or by man in conjunction with
nature by art, are all natural, the works of God's
creations.
Bacon's philosophy of nature has two main divisions: the speculative
(inquisition of causes, searching the bowels of nature) and the
operative (the production of effects, shaping nature).
Although clear about his two-fold purpose for his new method
(the discovery of the constitution of reality and the production of arts
and works). Bacon adopts a Platonic strategy to explain the
constitution of nature. The immediate purpose of the inductive
method is, for both Bacon and Plato (as interpreted by Bacon), to
discover through the agencies of sense and reason the forms which
constitute things. The form of a thing, according to both thinkers, is
"the very thing itself'^S; it is constitutive of reality and distinct from
appearance. Bacon praises Plato for his recognition of form, but
believes that he "lost the real fruit of his opinion by considering forms
as absolutely abstracted from matter and not confined and determined
by matter". 57 Bacon chooses an immanent rather than transcendent
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theory of form, bestowing on nature the respect that careful
observation will reveal its true character.
A large part of Bacon's work is an effort to demonstrate
Aristotle's errors and to distance himself from the Scholastics who
embrace Aristotle since he believes that the method of investigation
practiced by Aristotelians is ineffective.
"The logic in vogue permits the human understanding to
range at will and then suddenly to fly up to the most highly
abstract "first principles", which, when once enunciated,
dominate all further conceptions.^®
Bacon argues for a new method, an inductive logic, which controls the
understanding, calling his "new organon"; a "clear and radiant light",
the "formular^’^ of interpretation", the "art of discovery and invention",
"the thread of the labyrinth", "the key of interpretation", and a
"machine" constructed to aid the capacities of man.®^
Since Bacon believes that the first purpose of every investigation
is the discovery of nature, submitting the mind to empirical
experience is not nearly so dangerous as is subjecting it to the whirl of
abstract speculation.
"Knowledge begins with particulars, moves by ways of
notions to slightly general propositions, and from these in
turn progresses by unbroken scale of ascent to higher and
more general axioms."®®
Bacon believes that when the mind of man mixes its own nature with
what it confronts, this mingling of mind and object distorts the object.
The result is a false image quite unlike the original divine creation.
"The cure for the mind's waywardness will be found in the disciplinary
rules of a true inductive method of inquiry."®^
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Avoiding t±ie extremes of pure empiricism. Bacon suggests that
since both the mind of man and the senses are able to corrupt a pure
scientific investigation:
"The understanding, therefore, is not to be supplied with
wings but rather is to be hung' with weights. It must at
every stage of its activities be brought "to the particulars
themselves.
Understanding must proceed slowly and by gradual steps from
particulars to lesser axioms, then to middle axioms (the most useful
axioms), and finally to the most general axioms. This method
contrasts most vividly with Aristotelian logic that Bacon argues is a
mere instrument, invented by man, for governing his intellect and for
binding it to particulars. Overcoming the Aristotelian method of
scientific discovery, according to which one takes an intellectual leap
from experience to principle and then deduces scientific principle
from this lesser principle. Bacon's new method requires that the
scientist rise from sense and particulars gradually in an unbroken
ascent, step by step, under proper direction, until finally arriving at a
first principle. The logic of the Aristotelians provides poorly for
human knowledge since it blocks the union of human knowledge with
human power. A properly evolved science matches the ascent of
medicine: It is first 'discovered', then its reasons and causes are
assigned.
Bacon's method is designed to permanently separate
philosophical learning (maxims, deductive demonstration, ontology,
meditation) from experimental philosophy (inductive observation of
fact, primacy of natural history, distrust of logical principles, great
mechanical works). Anderson contends that his influence is
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inordinately successful. Natural philosophy leaves the universities and
does not return until attitudes shift. Educational theorists use the
New Atlantis to shift education to technical training rather than book
learning. Even the language of BriUsh philosophical scholarship takes
on a simplicity promulgated by the Baconians. God is entirely outside
Bacon's natural system that prevents acceptance of any other
ontological doctrine.
Bacon's persuasive attack targets most ancient and medieval
thinkers. He believes that few persons, other than the pre-Socratics,
understand the essence of scientific pursuit.
"The sciences have been torn form their empirical roots.
Had they remained attached to the womb of Nature, they
would not have shriveled and died."®^
Only the early Greeks "have the discernment of the natural
philosopher, and a savour of the nature of things, and experience and
bodies. The early Greek physicists. Bacon believes, by submitting
themselves to the things themselves achieve their greatest
accomplishments, the simple investigations of what Bacon considers
the first and oldest of existing things, namely matter.
Bacon imputes their success to the identification of natural
science with philosophy which gets torn apart by rationalism. From a
modern perspective, Greek cosmologists unconsciously presume this
identification by embedding subject and object in a peculiar unified
concept of nature: all objects share identifiable natures, albeit
different ones. Through his new methodology Bacon heralds the early
Greek attentiveness to nature, but unawaringly he adopts a modem
epistemological position that distances the knowing subject from
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nature. As long as humans are subject to a higher judgment, divine
revelation, the epistemological split is muddled by religion. Yet the
isolation of fact from value that Bacon justifies comes to haunt the
modern atheistic world.
Although metaphysics is the ultimate science of nature, physics,
as a subclass, is concerned with processes in nature and mathematics
becomes the handmaiden of science rather than its master. Ethics is
not a science at all. Dictated by the dogmas of revealed religion,
concerning the will of man^S, moral philosophy is constructed as a
faithful servant to theology. This fundamental division of science from
theology is determined by the chasm between the truth of revelation
and the axioms discovered by the powers of man. The ultimate
outcome of this distinction, lodged in modern thinking, surfaces as a
naive belief that the progress of scientific inquiry necessitates parallel
moral strengthening, so that even the demise of religion does not
render a reconsideration of the radical removal of ethics from the
realm of knowledge.
Bacon's overall scheme is to merge metaphysics with physics in
order to guard science from idle criticism and to ground all scientific
inquiry in nature. He believes he can accomplish this by separating
revealed theology from philosophy, thereby maintaining a sharp
separation between faith and reason, and preserving both. This
cleavage is found in many of his writings.
"The "singular advantage", says Bacon "which the Christian
religion hath (over pagan religions) towards the
furtherance of true knowledge is that it excludeth and
interdicteth human reason, whether by interpretation or
anticipation, from examining or discussing of the the
mysteries and principles of faith."®®
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Bacon explains his work to segregate philosophy from theology and to
extend physics into metaphysics, arguing that in order to protect the
integrity of each he must obtain for each equal, but separate
justification. At the edge of the medieval period, he is keenly aware of
the vulnerability of science to religious attack; therefore he suggests a
daring scheme for safeguarding scientific activity^^^ arguing that is the
naturalistic bent of ancient scientists that freed these thinkers to look
"directly" at nature, uncontaminated by normative explanations. This
belief underlies his own scientific methodology, believing that
unfiltered, nature's "secrets" will ultimately confirm and glorify the
rationality of divine creation.
Bacon believes that this method (an attempt to redeem nature)
promotes human utility and the common good through the careful
observation of nature produces this result.
"To produce works, man must know causes; and these he
can discover only through what he observes of nature's
structures and ways. What in knowledge is the cause is in
operation the rule. The chain of natural causes cannot be
broken. Nature, therefore, to be commanded must first be
obeyed. When this is done, human power and knowledge
will meet in one."
Compensation for human insufficiency is a major end of the new
induction.
"How much better and how much more worthy of human
capacity it would be, if, through a new and adequate
method for discovering nature's activities, secrets for the
relief and benefit of mankind could be "speedily and
suddenly and simultaneously hastened and anticipated.
Such benefit commences with the collecting of natural history and
gradually proceeds, by the controlled observation of things, to the
formulation of general axioms. The summation of this approach is
44
recorded in Bacon's utopian account of the benefits of pure scientific
activity, New Atlantis .
Although I consider, in detail, the laudatory and dilatory
influences of Bacon's new method in chapter two, the outstanding
results are seen in the development of modem philosophy. Locke is
Bacon's first outstanding descendent. Hume carries the empiricist
position to its logical end and successfully "awakens Kant from his
rationalist slumber". Finally, in a thinker such as Comte, the whole
content of philosophical reflection is identified with a universalized
natural science. Metaphysics, as understood by Aristotle, all but
disappears.
C. The Domination of Nature
Before considering these broader implications, a closer analysis
of Bacon's project sheds light on the epistemological dialogue about
the status of both nature and science. If we are to read Bacon's
investigations optimistically, as does J. Weinberger'^^, we would
conclude that careful attention to the Baconian agenda clarifies a
modem dilemma. Weinberger suggests that the most pressing
problem of the modern age is the "problem of technology". As a result
of our technological successes, Weinberger believes, we:
"feel besieged by the very means that grant us power
(science), and we are alternately proud and ashamed of our
impious mastery over nature"^k
Weinberger thinks that Bacon tells us more about the causes and
problems of the modem age than any other thinker. Beyond that,
Weinberger believes that Bacon himself understood the limits and
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problems of his new project beyond "its point of view"72. Although the
truth of this claim is beyond the scope of this project, Weinberger's
analysis of the political nature of Bacon's project is helpful.
Weinberger argues that Bacon's utopia, the New Atlantis while
promising perfect justice and beneficial living, contains "a secret, an
excessively difficult, and unspeakable political teaching"'^^ Weinberger
locates the roots of this secret in classical thought.
"The ancient utopian thinkers took human society to be an
order of several productive arts pursued by persons who,
unlike the brutes, act not out of mere necessity but for the
sake of the good, for self-sufficiency. As it is imaginable by
the rational animal, perfect self-sufficiency is the godlike
freedom from the need to produce.
Weinberger believes that while luxury provides apparent self-
sufficiency, the very existence of ancient society depends upon the
mistaken belief that the productive arts and their objects can provide
perfect self-sufficiency. The continuing thirst for new and better
objects demonstrates that the drive is not essentially practical but
rational. This human longing to be perfectly self-sufficient (like the
gods) becomes the ultimate source of social injustice. Therefore,
since philosophy naturally springs from and supports the rational
pretensions of the arts, only political philosophy can expose its errors.
Weinberger's suggestion that the ancient Utopians use myth to
hide the dangerous link between man's practice of the productive arts
and the rational longing for self-sufficiency while the moderns (from
Machiavelli to Hobbes)^^ believe that religion can be stripped of its
mystery helps to explain the importance of the Baconian agenda. The
elimination of myth reveals that all human endeavors, especially moral
ones, are actually comprised of desires served by technological and
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scientific advance. The modems believe that it is possible to achieve
perfect justice by producing a perfect economy of liberated desire and
physical satisfaction by overcoming classical utopian thought that
impedes the power of men to conquer nature and to discover
demonstrable principles of justice.
Weinberger believes that the mystery inherent in the New
Atlantis reveals Bacon's cognizance of the error inherent in the
"modem project". With it Bacon protects the secrets of knowledge
from vulgar capacities (Machiavelli and Hobbes).
"While recommending the mastery of nature, he doubts
whether the artful conquest of nature's penury can
accomplish its tme go^, which is to overcome mankind's
obstreperous political nature.
Weinberger believes that Bacon is compelled to recommend what he
knows to be problematic; he therefore has no choice but to present
his teaching by way of the ancients' "enigmatical method"'^®. This
explains the peculiar way in which the results of scientific activity in
Bacon's New Atlantis are carefully guarded by ritual and secrecy in the
House of Solomon.
Consider the odd formulation of New Atlantis^^. Bacon believes
that he captures the future of scientific inquiry when he writes it in
1624 (just before his death).
"The description of Solomon's House is the description of
the vision in which he lived, -the vision not of an ideal
world released from the natural conditions to which ours
is subject, but of our own world as it might be made if we
did our duty by it; of a state of things which he believed
would one day be actually seen upon this earth such as it is
by men such as we are; and the coming of which he
believed that his own labours were sensibly hastening.
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Bacon believes boat his utopian institution, Solomon's House, or the
College of the Six Days' Works, embodies the model society instituted
to interpret nature and to produce great and marvelous works for the
benefit of men.
New Atlantis is a tale of a fated ship's crew sailing from Peru to
China. After depleting food supplies and giving themselves up as lost,
they enter the coastal port of an unknown island. The people of the
island entreat them to leave, but upon learning of their plight and
their Christian beliefs, invite the ship's crew to rest and recover in the
city. Taken to a central abode (the Stranger's House), they are asked to
spend three days without leaving their quarters. At the same time
they are given restorative medicine and food and in three days are
astonished by their rate of recovery.
At the end of this time they are visited by the Christian governor
who asks only brotherly love in return for his assistance. Surprised by
his knowledge of Christianity, he tells them the story of the visitation
by the pillar of light. He explains that one of the wise men of the
society of Salomon's House made a prayer;
"Lord God heaven and earth, thou hast vouchsafed of thy
grace to those of our order, to know thy works of creation,
and the secrets of them; and to discern (as far as
appertaineth to the generations of men) between divine
miracles, works of nature, works of art, and impostures
and illusions of all sorts. I do here acknowledge and testify
before this people, that the thing which we now see before
our eyes is thy Finger and a true Miracle; and forasmuch as
we learn in our books that thou never workest miracles but
to a divine and excellent end, (for the laws of nature are
thine own laws and thou exceedest them not but upon
great cause,) we most humbly beseech thee to prosper this
great sign, and to give us the interpretation and use of it in
mercy; which thou dost in some part secretly promise by
sending it unto us."®^
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The wise man is drawn to the pillar and receives from it. in a small
ark of cedar, the Holy Word and other books of the New Testament.
The land is thus saved from infidelity by an ark. but it is lost from the
world by a great deluge which destroys almost all men and beasts.
A few escape to higher ground and slowly begin to rebuild
Atlantis under the reign of King Solamona. He is a generous king.
Intent upon making his kingdom flourish and his people happy, he
seeks to make the land self-sufficient without need to receive
strangers or to travel.
"Ye shall understand (my dear friends) that amongst the
excellent acts of that king, one above all hath the pre-
eminence. It was the erection and institution of an Order
or Society which we call Salomon’s House; the noblest
foundation (as we think) that ever was upon the earth; and
the lantern of this kingdom. It is dedicated to the study of
the Works and Creatures of God."®2
"But thus you see we maintain a trade, not for gold, silver,
or jewels; nor for silks; nor for spices; nor any other
commodity of matter; but only for God's first creature,
which was Light ; to have light (I say) of the growth of all
parts of the world.
The result is the New Atlantis upon which the crew has landed. His
explanation complete, the governor leaves the crew, granting the men
permission to participate in the joys of island life.
Waiting expectantly, on a visitation by one of the Fathers of
Salomon's House, the visitors are eventually tutored in the wonders of
Salomon House. The foundation of the school is the quest for
knowledge, the knowledge of ultimate causes and secrets of motion
for the purpose of enlarging the bounds of the Human Empire and to
effect all things possible. The tutor explains the amazing diversity of
experimental facilities at their disposal; deep caves (for refrigeration.
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conservation of bodies, imitation of natural mines, artificial metals and
curing diseases), high towers (for view of meteors, winds, rain and
snow), great lakes (for trials upon fish and fowl), artificial wells and
fountains, large baths (for the cure of diseases), orchards and gardens
(for experiments and artificial selection), parks (for beasts and birds
for medical research), bake houses and breweries (for nutrition
experiments), shops of medicine, factories, furnaces, perspective-
houses (for experiments in light and radiation), sound-houses (for the
demonstration of the production of sound), perfume-houses (for
imitating and multiplying smells), engine-houses and houses of the
deceits of the senses.
Yet the experimentation continues under the most strict ethical
guidelines.
"But we do hate all impostures and lies; insomuch as we
have severely forbidden it to all our fellows, under pain of
ignominy and fines, that they do not shew any natural work
or thing, adorned or swelling; but only pure as it is, and
without all affectation of strangeness."®'^
Detailing the process of study, collecting information, reading books,
experimenting, organizing information, applying it to man's life and
raising it into greater observations, axioms and aphorisms, he
concludes his explanation; "...upon every invention of value, we erect a
statue to the inventor, and give him a liberal and honourable reward."®®
With that the man entreats the visitors to spread the good news of the
bounties to be had if undertaken in "God's bosom" in the utopia of New
Atlantis.
If we assume (with Ricoeur®®) that utopias serve the useful
purpose of shattering current ideologies, Weinberger's suggestion that
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t±ie New Atlantis captures the "naive utopianism" of modern thought
allows us to recognize the inherent limitations of Bacon's belief (that
only the hope that man, the productive animal, can overcome the
limits of his own material existence redeems human suffering). While
a successful utopia forces its readers to distinguish the import of
political autonomy, the reproductive capacities of human culture,
Weinberger calls the modem scientific project a "sinful version"®'^ of
Bacon's naive utopianism. Yet he believes that Bacon, the father of this
enterprise, shows the way to the older, more realistic utopian wisdom
that has been lost. The temptation of a justice so perfect that it is no
longer political is the real "problem of technology". Weinberger
believes that Bacon realizes that the utopian vision of controlling
nature to meet human need is naive, that the political will always
prevails as a force to reckon with. Since the productivity of nature can
never bring about political justice. Bacon combines the promise of new
freedom with a realistic appraisal of its limits, according to
Weinberger,
Although Weinberger correctly casts Bacon as a harbinger of the
need for a political critique of the modems' philosophy of nature,
whether Bacon 'knew' of the dangers inherent in his project, is not
important here. The modern belief that the unbounded study of
nature will produce an enlightened and just society which Bacon
promulgates and many agree has failed, Weinberger calls a "problem of
technology " (an unease about our mastery over nature) and
ecophilosophers characterize as the "domination of nature". While
they align themselves with the sentiment that modem society has
failed, their concept of the "domination of nature" unfortunately
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serves to conceal the more fundamental failed political agenda of the
modern project: the continued domination of some humans by others.
While the locus of the disenchanted modern agenda is a Baconian
restriction of knowledge, the solution is a poliUcal criUque of this
result.
It is William Leiss®^ that develops a radically different analysis of
the concept of the "domination of nature". By demonstrating the
general social benefits that were thought to accrue as a result of
encouraging the steady growth of science and technology, he shows
how this concept serves as the guiding S3mibol for an extraordinary
social enterprise. Yet, Leiss argues, the utilization of the concept
blinds some users to its results since this concept is rooted in an
illusory distinction between nature and society. Social development is
actually a series of increasingly complex states of nature.
What is needed is a thorough understanding of the concept
itself. Ecophilosophers use the term, the "domination of nature",
already assuming man's wrongful relationship to the rest of nature. In
this way, the concept validates a critical stance which portrays the
relationship between humankind and nature per se as vital to an
evaluation of modern society. They can then argue that since man
conceptualizes himself as the most important being on earth, it is this
"anthropocentric"®^ attitude that allows for and even encourages the
wanton misuse of non-human nature. They believe that it follows from
this that our attitude toward external nature determines the normative
character of our behaviors. While any person may cut down a tree or
kill an animal, an attitude of respect or disregard determines the
appropriateness of the act. The "domination of nature is something
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more than the mere utilization of nature, it symbolizes an attitude of
exploitation, the roots of which are in the mechanization of nature and
the domination talk initiated by Francis Bacon. The results, they
argue, are clearly visible in the current environmental crisis.
Disputing the characterization of nature ^ as a victim of a
human conceptual framework, Leiss believes that the concept of the
"domination of nature" functions ideologically: its use indicates
fundamental social contradictions. Acting ideologically, it serves to
conceal:
"one of the most fateful historical dynamics in modern
times: the inextricable bond between the domination of
nature and the domination of man"90.
By masking the new forms of domination taking shape in the capitalist
society, the goal of liberating the human condition is reversed. The
focus of Leiss’ work is to analyze the dialectic of domination in which a
species that is supposed to conquer nature is itself dominated by the
psychic constitution of its own nature. Leiss suggests that the
dialectical reversal of the goal of mastering nature (a better life for all)
can be seen in the class-based environmental crisis and the extension
of violent conflict to a global setting. The end result is the
internalization of a compulsive character of consumptive behavior
which destroys personal autonomy and negates the effort to win
liberation from external compulsion.
To shed light on this result, Leiss clarifies some of the ways in
which humans represent to themselves the relationship between their
scientific accomplishments and their expectations of social
improvements. Francis Bacon is an example. Like Weinberger, Leiss
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believes t±iat the effort to control nature is linked to modern utopian
ideas. Although this mastery over nature has been essentially
achieved through science and technology, the efforts to master nature
have a close relationship with the evolution of new means for
dominating other men. Thus the rationality of the new scientific
methodology, although considered to be an independent force capable
of liberating society, fails to overcome social development that
continues to defy all attempts at rational control. Sources of
satisfaction of desire become the objects of political conflict. Leiss
believes that modern society is caught in the persistent illusion that
the undertaking known as the "mastering of nature" is itself mastered.
Leiss believes that the terror and desire that fuel early humans'
relationship to technology is recognizable in modem fatalism. While
the ancients believe that the instruments of mining and metallurgical
operations are 'demonic' and mysterious, people continue to accept
the fmits of human ingenuity while, at the same time, dreading the
eruptions of uncontrollable malevolence. The readiness to take charge
is evidenced in the degree to which Genesis is interpreted in political
terms providing the modern notions of mastery, domination and
conquest. The secularization of Christianity results in the extension of
human power in the world. Leiss believes that the acknowledged
dominion of man over nature in Christianity is firmly associated with
the ongoing successes in science and technology.
Yet the lust to command nature's secret energies continues to
arouse emotions of fear and guilt. He believes it is important to
evaluate our modern notion of the mastery of nature in the light of its
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association with evil, guilt and fear. The Faust legend, which
originated in the late sixteenth century and became extraordinarily
popular, obviously struck a powerful sympathetic chord, one which
still resounds today. The dogma of material progress or mastery over
nature lacks a determinate, fixed content.
"Our idea of mastery over nature is formed against this
background by Bacon and others, and the traces of the
struggle to remove its diabolical overtones are still
discernible.
The great idea that possessed Bacon, according to Leiss, is that of
organized scientific research by which he attempts to legitimize and
valorize the scientific enterprise. He captures this idea in the New
Atlantis . By the nineteenth century, although Bacon’s epistemology is
found wanting, his passionate advocacy for the sustained progress in
the mechanical arts and the physical sciences is the heart of his
effectiveness.
Leiss believes that Bacon's concept of the mastery of nature has
not been analyzed critically. Either it is blindly accepted as a modem
panacea or denigrated as a modem curse. Instead, Leiss argues that
Bacon's greatest achievement is his clear recommendation for human
mastery over nature. By severing its connection to megalomaniacal
delusions of the alchemists, he safely weds it once again to
Christianity. To quote again from the New Organon :
"For man by the fall fell at the same time from his state of
innocence and from his dominion over creation. Both of
these losses however can even in this life be in some part
repaired; the former by religion and faith, the latter by arts
and sciences. "92
By taking great pains to stress the innocence of the scientific
endeavor, the separation of natural knowledge and moral knowledge
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gradually becomes a cardinal principle of modem thought. Bacon
establishes it through his interpretation of the fall and seeks to allay
fears that the scientific investigation of nature will shake the grounds
of faith.
Yet there is a hidden dichotomy in Bacon's argument. Bacon
justified the mastery over nature by referring to the condition of man
before the Fall, but the recovery of dominion through arts and science
in no way insures the restoration of innocence which is the domain of
religion. Bacon, by coupling domination and innocence, claims to have
identified a way to achieve both domination and innocence through
science. Yet his method demands that the means of mastery are quite
different from the means to innocence.
Herbert Bernstein in his essay, "Idols of Modern Science and the
Reconstruction of Knowledge"^^, argues that Francis Bacon intends his
work to serve God's ultimate good, that science, by revealing God's
handiwork, will reveal the moral object. Yet Bacon's conviction that
religion can mediate scientific knowledge and moral behavior (science
can not corrupt because scientific knowledge reveals God) sets the
Baconian agenda up for failure in a social climate that abandons
religious constraint. The result of the decoupling of science and
ethics is evident in the positivist agenda.
Throughout the centuries, variations of this theme recurs: the
rationality of science and technology works as an independent force to
infuse rationality into the social process as a whole.
"The measure of Bacon's success is indicated by the fact
that the metaphor of "conquering" nature by means of
science and technology appears everywhere today and
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seems so perfectly opaque both to learned social
commentators and to the general public.
The success of Bacon's agenda is evident in the conviction of many
thinkers that the growth of knowledge brings, not only relief from the
inconveniences caused by the man’s dependency upon nature, but also
those resulting from the tensions between men. Bacon believes that
the mastery of external nature entails the mastery of internal nature.
It is in the New Atlantis . Leiss believes, that Bacon reveals the
mastery of nature in terms of its relationship to social progress. Leiss
contrasts Bacon's vision to More's Utopia , written at the same time.
More appeals to the dedication of individual self-development as the
overriding social objective responsible for the limitations imposed on
the production of goods. Bacon's new society rests on the assumption
that the qualities of scientific research - impartiality,
disinterestedness, and analytic rigor - would be operative in the
scientists' social role. Leiss believes that Bacon unthinkingly assumes
that religion would operate as the primary source of ethical restraint.
Bacon did not detail the social and political arrangements in his
society since the scientific research establishment of New Atlantis
exercised complete control over its own activities.
"In Utopia . ..the "moral progress" of individuals was to be
the mediating link between scientific progress and social
progress, the third term in which is manifest the
rationality of the whole. And it is just this element of
moral progress that is so conspicuously absent in New
Atlantis ."Q^
Leiss suggests that the political component is entirely absent from
Bacon's utopia. Weinberger believes that its absence is consciously
'covered up' by the mysteries of the Solomon House. Either way, no
outstanding thinker after Bacon devotes comparable attention to the
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concept of the mastery over nature. Those who follow find the form of
his concept sufficient for their own purposes.
Leiss believes that Bacon's concept and method supports the
elevation of the mechanical arts alongside the progress of science.
This connection between science and material comfort is at the root
of the great scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. The idea
that the conquest of nature is realized through science and technology
appears more and more self-evident after the seventeenth century and
therefore few think it necessary to analyze it as a separate
phenomenon. The modem epistemological position brings to
completion the idea that a single method can be applied in all the
sciences, a method as valuable to studying society as nature. Leiss
believes that in the transformation of natural philosophy to natural
science and the philosophy of nature, the debates in science turn from
forms and essences to descriptive analyses leading to laws of
observable behavior. Interest in the philosophy of nature wanes after
the middle of the nineteenth century; the philosophy of science and
the sociology of science emerge.
The tenuous status of scientific objectivity has been challenged
by many other thinkers. The epistemological status of modern science
is a direct result of the history of the philosophy of nature. At one
point, all of nature, human and nonhuman, is subject to God's law. The
changing relationship of religion to nature has a profound influence on
the status of scientific discovery. As the relaUonship between religion
and natural science shifts, so does the ethical restraint on scientific
inquiry. This shift is demonstrated in the thought of Francis Bacon.
Bacon wholeheartedly endorses the growing recognition of the power
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of scientific inquiry. He develops a methodology for the sciences
which confirms his growing suspicion that scientific methodology
must be grounded in the observation and prediction of the behavior of
nature. He boldly conceptualizes nature as a distinct from human
morality. Bacon lays the groundwork for removing questions of
technology from the realm of ethics. The important result is the
justification of a radically new epistemology so that the study of nature
is elevated to the preeminent source of objectivity. The unmediated
association of knowledge and science is the residue of Bacon's call to
"dominate nature".
The final result is what Leiss calls the domination ideology of the
sixteenth century. Bacon presses forward his scientific methodology.
He argues that the study of nature will reveal her secrets and that with
this knowledge the manipulation of natural processes is possible. This
project initiates the social enterprise we now call the scientific and
industrial revolution. The ideological component of this enterprise is
its tendency to mask the domination of some humans by others. The
recognition of this result is undermined in three ways. It is lost in the
Baconian fen/or of the mastery of external nature. It is suppressed by
the modern epistemological belief that all genuine human knowledge
is the result of the careful application of the scientific method. And, it
is lost in the misguided attack by ecophilosophers on the "domination
of nature". 1 have traced the Baconian roots of the modem fascination
with science. 1 turn now to critique this result: the restriction of
knowledge to scientific results.
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I will define 'ecophilosophy' in more depth in chapter three. The term is used to
encompass a loosely defined movement as suggested by Alan Drengson in
Ecophilosophy: A Field Guide to the Literature . Donald E. Davis. (San Pedro: R & E.
Miles, 1989), pg. xi: "...ecophilosophy represents a holistic coming together of
environment, activity, and idea; a way of thinking that will concretely aiuminate
humankind's rightful place in the natural world." It is "...a healing movement toward
creation of a new culture of wholeness and harmony with Nature." In contrast. I use the
term according to a more narrow interpretation as defined by David Rothenberg in
Ecology.community and lifestyle . (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pg.
2: Ecophilosophy offers "...the basis of a new ontology which posits humanity as
inseparable from nature. From this ontological beginning, ethics and practical action
are to fall in place."
^Consider a quote from deep ecologist Hwa Yol Jung: "According to deep ecology, the
ecological crisis is the result of thinking about Nature in terms of the extrinsic
rationality of utility and domination, which turned out to be the most glaring and
lethal failing of modem thought since Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon. To overcome
this failing, we need to think about Nature in a radically new way. that is, in terms of
seeing that Nature has intrinsic meaning and value of its own." from "Shallow thinking
on Deep Elcology" The Tmmpeter Journal of Ecosophv 7(Spring, 1990).
^Ecophilosophers agree that the liberation of nature is the vital ingredient necessary
for the liberation of humanity as well. This vision of harmony motivates their work.
place tfie start of the "modem period" at the turn of the sixteenth century, the point of
transition between medieval and modem science.
use the term '"he modem epistemological position or resulf'to refer to the modem
philosophical restriction of knowledge to that produced by the scientific method. The
"modem epistemological dilemma" is the constraints placed on ethical discourse by
this restriction.
borrow this term from E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture .
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pg. 3: "It is difficult to fix upon an
entirely satisfactory terminology. 'Mechanical' smacks too much of automatic in the
sense of thoughtless. 'Mechanistic' in itself has no such objectionable connotation, but
calls for 'mechanism' as the corresponding noun, a word which is, however, also used
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CHAPTER II
THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
The call to dominate nature, initiated by Baconian enthusiasm
for scientific discovery, becomes, by the eighteenth century, a solid
belief in the rational capacities of humankind. The illusory success of
this "domination ideology" is apparent in the paradoxical results of
modern society. Humankind, although capable of eliminating world-
wide suffering perpetrates on itself unparalleled destruction, violence
and oppression. In this chapter I examine the philosophical
underpinnings of this result, continuing to argue that ecophilosophers
misunderstand the root of this modern dilemma. While these
philosophers insist that their program to "liberate nature" is a revolt
against domination ideology, I suggest that by grounding
ecophilosophy in a pre-critical concept of nature (a universally-
dominated, external nature), they demonstrate that they lack the
necessary epistemological insight to avoid slipping into a kind of
counterideology: the ideology of nature. The conservative function of
ideology as suggested by Karl Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia .
"... implicit in the word 'ideology' (is) the insight that
in certain situations the collective unconscious of
certain groups obscures the real condition of society
both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it,"i
supports my contention that without a thorough critique of knowledge
(essential to undermining ideological thinking) ecophilosophers, by
supporting a tyranny of 'one nature', acquiesce to the continued
unequal distribution of power and wealth in our society.
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The potentially imperialist nature of the relationship between
environmentalists of the West and fourth-world^ peoples provides an
example of the conservatism implicit in an ideology of 'one nature’.
Take the case of the Inuit^ who, despite their best efforts at organizing
as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (which brings together
indigenous peoples from around the globe), lack the political and
financial power to fight a well financed media campaign against their
seal hunt. One Native leader explains his frustration this way;
"They came up with a stroke of genius several years ago
when they invented the term 'baby seal', nobody talks
about baby horses, baby cows, baby pigs. Many animals are
routinely slaughtered for food and clothing, yet somehow
when you kill a seal, you commit murder."'^
Technological advance is perpetrated in new forms of oppression;
massive advertising campaigns with world-wide distribution force
arctic peoples to defend and rationalize their use of nature. A critique
of rationality^ will help us to understand the connection between
ecophilosophy and nature imperialism.
A. The Dialectic of Enlightenment
It is the work of critical theorists®, in particular Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who, in their consequential work.
Dialectic of Enlightenment , first address the pervasive and ideological
character of modern thinking. Horkheimer and Adorno determine to
discover "why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human
condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism"^. Not unlike
ecophilosophers, they argue that a fundamental intenUon to dominate
nature underlies and undermines modern society. While
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ecophilosophers are quick to point to the environmental crisis as the
direct result of this intention, critical theorists suggest that the
results are better understood as indicative of a two-fold 'revenge of
nature'. Beyond widespread biospheric deterioration, Horkheimer and
Adorno believe that scientific and technological progress has required
the suppression of critical components of human nature (the erotic
and the playful), resulting in a "terrible anger"8 weakening human
resistance to manipulation by resourceful demagogues.
"Man must subject himself to a terrible discipline, in
which he must deny those aspects of his own nature that
are incompatible with the controls of the scientific
experiment, as well as the order and regularity imposed by
the factory."^
Horkheimer and Adorno's description of the development of modern
thought does not emerge from a constructive view of history; they
oppose all closed systems of thought. From the start, they evoke the
tenuous relationship between reality and truth by recasting the
problem of modern decadence within an historical and dialectical
context.
The relationship of truth to reality colors the history of
philosophy. A standard history of epistemology contrasts a Platonic
theory of truth (according to which propositions are true because they
correspond to a reality independent of human perception) to a
Humean coherence theory. According to Hume, since knowledge is
simply a relation of ideas having no knowable correspondence with a
reality behind our impressions, all that a system of knowledge (a
science) can do is to systematize statements about the way we
perceive and reflect. Critical theorists suggest that as all-inclusive
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conceptions of reality these traditional formulations ultimately deprive
philosophy of its true critical function.
The core of the Horkheimer and Adorno analysis renders truth
as a dialectical relationship between enlightenment and myth; what
begins as myth contains within it the roots of enlightenment thinking
which, supposing itself to have overcome myth, reverts to it.
Beginning with Francis Bacon, this relationship manifests in history as
the rise of the Enlightenment, the belief that through reason
humankind is ultimately capable of asserting itself over and liberating
itself from mythology and superstition. Horkheimer and Adorno locate
the fundamental structure of enlightenment thinking in a concept of
nature: a radical disjuncture between subjectivity and nature which
drives the machinery of the Enlightenment. Nature is useful.
"What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in
order wholly to dominate it and other men. That is the
only aim. Ruthlessly, in despite of itself, the
Enlightenment has extinguished any trace of its own self-
consciousness." ^2
According to Horkheimer and Adorno, enlightened belief in the
possibility of overcoming the power of nature connotes a peculiar
relationship between humans and nature; since anything material is
deemed an object of manipulation, even humans, equally embodying
the natural, are subject to manipulation. This concept of nature
necessitates an all embracing attitude of utility toward natural objects,
explaining the transformation from liberating reason into dogmatism
(or Enlightenment into totalitarianism).
Historians typically associate the instrumentalization of nature
with the advent of modern science (chapter one). Horkheimer and
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Adorno argue that, although it manifests itself in the development of
science and the spread of capitalist economies, this concept of nature
predates the modem period with roots in myth and magic, Greek
deities and the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In Dialectic of
Enlightenment. Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate, using the
character of Odysseus, an early example of the attempt by a subject to
radically disengage from nature. After Odysseus discovers that "only
perpetual presence of mind forces an existence from nature"^"*, he is
able to overcome the forces of nature by cunning. Struggling to sail
past the alluring and deadly songs of the Sirens, Odysseus succeeds by
denying pleasure to his crew and depriving himself of the ability to act.
He plugs their ears with wax and binds himself impotently to the mast.
Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that Odysseus' escape is an allegory of
a delusion propagated by enlightenment (and capitalist) thinking that
the subject is free.
"Odysseus is represented in labor. Just as he cannot yield
to the temptation to self-abandonment, so, as proprietor,
he finally renounces even participation in labor, and
ultimately even its management, whereas his men -
despite their closeness to things - cannot enjoy their
labor, because it is preformed under pressure, in
desperation, with senses stopped by force. The servant
remains enslaved in body and soul; the master
regresses.
Although Odysseus masters "the capacity of representation" and
overcomes nature, at the same time, his o'wn capacity for participation
in the world regresses. Horkheimer and Adorno believe that on the
way from mythology to rationality, thought loses the capacity of self-
reflection. When humans distance themselves from nature to
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comprehend it, they unselfconsciously use the knowledge to
dominate, abandoning their own advance.
In a similar fashion, the mathematization of nature by modem
science, the final manifestation of the Enlightenment, sets forth a
purely rational, ideational world as the only tme reality.
"Man learned to master nature, but only by imitating her
most rigid and routinized aspects. The dimension of
reason concerned with the potential of things to be more
than they are... is split off as idealism, where it remains
impotently confined to higher realms. Reason becomes
powerful only by becoming an instmment."^®
This concept, that knowledge is exclusively accessible through
scientific representation, marks the dawning of the era of positivism
With a radical separation of fact and value, early positivist writers seek
to establish the authority of observation envisioning society to be, like
biology, a complex of facts governed by laws. Auguste Comte, by
stressing that the abstract study of nature is all that is absolutely
necessary for the establishment of unity in human life, "...the laws or
order of the phenomena by which humanity is regulated"^®, is one of
the first to clearly state the positivist belief in the ability of humankind
to permanently transcend mythology and superstition. Comte
imagines a redeemed social world, as the result of his positive
principles, because he believes that the knowledge produced by
following the laws of nature provides the kind of solid proof needed to
free humankind from illusion. Since the positivist regards all order, in
social phenomena, as in all others, as necessarily resting upon the
order of nature, progress is simply the development of that order.
Religion, absorbed by existence, remains within the construct of
positive knowledge as a facet of human life.
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The undisputable benefit of this kind of thinking is the
production of useful, technical knowledge capable of liberating humans
from natural necessity, from the drudgery of work. Horkheimer and
Adorno argue that the moral impetus behind such a program fades
quickly as social programs are absorbed by natural science while the
capacity for critical analysis is undermined. Furthermore, they believe
that since fear is the root of the desire to dominate nature, the
pervasive influence of positivist thinking comes as no surprise.
"Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no
longer anything unknown. That determines the course of
demythologization, of enlightenment, which compounds
the animate with the inanimate just as myth compounds
the inanimate with the animate. Enlightenment is mythic
fear turned radical. The pure immanence of positivism, its
ultimate product, is no more than a so to spe^ universal
taboo. Nothing at all remains outside, because the mere
idea of outsideness is the very source of fear.'i^
Although enlightenment thinkers believe that knowledge disenchants
nature by transcending superstition and unconscious error, the
dialectic of enlightenment thinking is the fact that reason, originating
in the struggle to come to terms with nature by turning against the
subject, initiates the decline of critical thought. Enlightenment
thinkers, w’hile believing themselv^es to be free from the tvTanny of
nature (free of fear), are ov^ercome by the all-consumptiv’e nature of
enlightenment thinking.
The fate and resuscitation of critical thinking is the
preoccupation of Jurgen Habermas vv'ho, in his recent work in
philosophy and sociology, reworks the notions of critical theorv’ as
adv'anced by Horkheimer, Adorno and others. The controv'ersy
surrounding his work is of particular importance to this project
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because it turns on the divergent ways in which critical theorists have
characterized the limits of human knowledge including our knowledge
of and relationship to external nature. Habermas distinguishes himself
by rejecting the mystical notion of the "resurrection of fallen nature"20
alluded to by Horkheimer and Adorno and radically embraced by
Herbert Marcuse. Habermas argues against Marcuse’s suggestion that
a new science and a new technology are possible and necessary to free
humankind from the oppressive character of modern capitalist
economies by maintaining that the only conceivable human orientation
toward external nature is one that understands nature in terms of its
potential for use .21 For Habermas, two essential human interests
determine the way humans come to know the world; interest in the
control of nature (material comfort) and interest in interpersonal
communication (freedom and responsibility). While Habermas rejects
the possibility of a new science, he is aligned with other critical
theorists (in the tradition of Dialectic of Enlightenment) positing
modem science as necessarily one-dimensional and instmmental.
Yet his answer to the resulting "revolt of nature" departs from a
Marcusian pessimism when he suggests the possibility of a dual
concept of reason: the disenchanted concept of modem science and
the autonomous realm of communicative interaction. Although in
chapter four 1 return to this solution (and the debate between
Habermas and the Marcusians), Habermas' denunciation of positivism
is sufficient to justify my own critique of ecophilosophy.22 Habermas'
thorough attack on positivism is his attempt to protect 'reflection'
from the intmsion of scientific reason.
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B. The Spirit of Positivism
While positivism is considered by many philosophers to be a
rather unsuccessful philosophy of science, Habermas believes that by
reconstructing the history and influence of positivism as a general
theory of knowledge he can demonstrate the need for a re-integration
of "knowledge and human interests". As a philosophy of science,
positivism renders the predictive success of scientific observations the
status of objectivity. Habermas demonstrates, through a persuasive
reconstruction of Continental philosophy from Kant to Marx, that this
preoccupation with objectivity that defines positivism, results in the
modern collapse of the philosophical priority of epistemology.
Physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach influences the forming of
the infamous Vienna Circle in the early twentieth century. Robert
Ackermann23 notes that these early positivists feel intuitively that
scientific knowledge is the paradigm example of human knowledge
because of its greater certainty. Mach believes that scientific theories
and imaginative models do not, by themselves, have any claim to truth,
that our thoughts derive whatever truth they have only by their
representation of our experience. Thinking serves merely as a way to
generalize that which we perceive with our senses.
"The positivist suggests that whatever meaning is assigned
to the term explanation beyond the meaning "generalized
description" is going to confuse us, tempt us to go beyond
what we can justify, and lead us to pervert and
misunderstand the proper methods of science.
Mach concerns himself with liberating science from metaphysical
speculations believing that he retains the possibility of knowledge by
allowing science to get on with the job of acquiring knowledge.
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Under Mach’s influence, positivists turn to modern symbolic
logic as developed by Whitehead and Russell in Princinia Mathematic
to demonstrate that all meaningful sentences can be translated into
symbolic expression and judged true or false. Synthetic sentences,
those dependent upon facts for their truth or falsity, are classed by
positivists as either meaningful scientific sentences or meaningless
unscientific sentences (the metaphysical, aesthetic, political...). Since
their goal is to rid science of anything other than the meaningful
synthetic sentences that are precisely the domain of empirical
science, the positivist program is to build up scientific knowledge on
the basis of accumulating simple, verifiable sentences and the
sentences that they imply. The function of a philosopher of science is
to clarify the distinctions between meaningful and non-meaningful
sentences.
Positivist philosophy of science is haunted by its rejection of
explanation because explanation schemes are prior to and different
from mere description in important ways. Ackermann believes that
the roots of positivism are in a confusion within the philosophy of
science: positivists believe that it is possible to "sweep out
everything"25 and to reconstruct a legitimate scientific knowledge
based on undeniable assumptions. Although the impossibility of the
project, given the workings of logic, suggests an obvious objection to
positivism, the "crippling objection"^®, according to Ackermann, is the
fact that positivism itself cannot account for any general sentences.
This limitation leaves no room in its framework for general laws until
the rejection of general law undermines any notion of scientific
explanation, violating all intuitions as to the meaning of science.
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Although the logical positivists fail to provide a promising
schemata for grounding scientific inquiry, the positivist theory of
knowledge lingers in the authoritative character of modem science.
As Habermas suggests, it is possible to project the influence of
positivism beyond its technical recommendations in the philosophy of
science. Roy Bhaskar makes a similar point;
"Positivism is a theory of the nature, limits and unity of
knowledge. But it is not a theory of its possibility.
Knowledge is, for positivism, quite unproblematic - a given
fact, it never inquires for a moment into its conditions or
conceives that it might not be. (In this it is irredeemably
pre-critical.)"27
Under the pervasive positivist influence, the problem of the possibility
of knowledge goes unnoticed.
Policy based on scientific findings is a particularly fruitful arena
for noting the influence of a general positivist theory of knowledge.
Environmental philosopher, Kristin Shrader-Frechette^s agrees that
one of the theoretical ghosts haunting supposedly factual research is
positivism, the belief that wholly neutral and objective science is both
possible and desirable. She believes that claims on behalf of complete
neutrality appear reasonable because they ground the implicit belief
that; "(p)ure science is disinterested, dispassionate, and allegedly has
no value component. "29 Shrader-Frechette believes that while it is
possible to avoid bias values (deliberate misinterpretations and
omissions to serve one's own purposes), since science is laden with
values and normative constraints it is, in principle, impossible to avoid
constitutive values (adherence to values underlying particular rules of
scientific method) and, in practice, it is hopeless to try to avoid
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contextual values (personal, social, cultural, or philosophical emphases
and goals).
It is impossible to avoid these contextual values because all
science takes place in a socially-defined setting. Shrader-Frechette
points to human interferon research (allegedly having therapeutic
value in treating cancer) to suggest that the scientific activity
surrounding such work is often heavily influenced by the profit motive.
Since value judgments are inherent in the adoption of a particular
methodology and interpretation is often required in the absence of
adequate data, politically-determined assumptions cannot be escaped.
Shrader-Frechette argues that the pursuit of the ideal of
neutrality, by avoiding ethical and methodological analysis, implicitly
sanctions the values inherent in the research.
"The most objective thing to do, in the presence of a
fallacious assumption, is often to be critical of it."^®
While some would argue that such criticism is the job of the public and
policy makers, Shrader-Frechette believes that this is not plausible
because research that does not engage in normative analysis serves the
built-in value systems inherent in the work. Shrader-Frechette
believes that the concrete role of the ethical analysis (reflection) is to
show that if certain assumptions are used, then certain consequences
result. Scientists, under the sway of objectivism, fail to recognize the
problematic character of the "possibility of knowledge".
Raskin and Bemstein^i concur, noting that the suspicious
character of modem science is that it exists both as absolute
knowledge and as a particular and specialized result determined by
socially and historically defined choices. Since the goal of science is
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consistency within the experiment, it seems obvious that the
practitioners of science would be sensitive to that which supports
consistency and overlook (if entirely unconsciously) that which does
not. Scientific methodology, as a human creation, is whimsical. Since
the scientist must produce ordered results, how whimsy gets
funnelled into consistency determines the constraints of scientific
practice.
It is the prevalent attitude of scientists and philosophers that,
since science is that activity which leads to disinterested knowledge,
good science takes place on a level that is above criticism (other than
internal). Ackermann32 notes that in the last century the boundary
between science and society has been drastically reduced. While
scientific research has become so expensive that it requires the direct
support of a large portion of the population, the large variety of
potential areas of research for the individual scientist make it likely
that he or she will be influenced by personal success and acceptance
rather than the greatest possible benefit to humankind. The effort to
drive a wedge between science and society is motivated by the desire
to maintain the epistemological purity of science. Ackermann rejects
the suggestion that science, exemplified by irreproachable scientific
activity, is driven by pure motives. Raskin and Bernstein argue, in a
similar fashion, that because science is dependent on capital, the
more capital needed to perform the science, the more scientists are
enmeshed in power structures. Every "knowledge event" replicates
some historical or social event so that the most abstract scientific
endeavor is subject to moral considerations. Even mathematics gets
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bound up with life (WWI might be called the chemist's war, WWll the
physicist’s war, and WWlll could be the war of the mathematicians).
Although there appear to be no ethical guidelines which force
social behavior into particular projects or aims, to be anti-science is to
miss the point since science, through technology, offers the
potentiality of relief from suffering. However, we should question the
world view which prejudices the scientific view and restrains a critical
perspective. Scientific pursuit is originally intended for the
enhancement of life as evidenced by Francis Bacon who admonishes
those who search out knowledge:
"that they consider what are the true ends of knowledge,
and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind,
or for intention, or for superiority to others, or for profit,
or fame, or power or any of these inferior things; but for
the benefit and use of life, and that they perfect and
govern it in charity (The New Organon). ^3
Historically (chapter one), the collapse of religion (and mythology)
breaks the tie between social good and scientific truth while
philosophically the collapse of knowledge into scientism34 has the
same result.
Raskin and Bernstein believe that a new view of science would
break the distinction between pure knowledge and politicized
knowledge and reveal that knowledge is bound up with power. Like
Habermas, they are not willing to throw out rational endeavor, but
envision the reconstruction of knowledge as a rational process that
includes self-consciousness. Science must accept the challenge to
make explicit its own historicity through self-consciousness on the
part of scientists. Although Habermas argues against a 'new science
he believes that an immanent critique of the positivist spirit will reveal
77
that the abandonment of reflection restricts the rational capacities of
humankind.
The spirit of positivism is revealed in Auguste Comte's first great
work, Cours de Philosophic Positive , where he presents a positive
philosophy of the history of the human mind. According to Comte's
history, as the mind progresses to a new system of knowledge, it
overrides and excludes those of its past. When in the theological state,
the mind seeks absolute knowledge and supposes all phenomena to be
produced by the action of the supernatural. Meshed in the
metaphysical, the mind believes that abstract forces inherent in all
beings are capable of producing phenomena. Finally, when in the
positive state, the mind gives up the search for the absolute and
applies itself, through reasoning and observation, to the study of
natural laws.
Comte argues that since Bacon all perceptive thinkers have
known that no real knowledge exists but that which is based upon
observed fact.
"...the first characteristic of the positive philosophy is that
it regards all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural
laws . The goal is to discover natural laws reducing them to
the smallest number possible. Our real business is to
merely analyze accurately the circumstances of
phenomena.
In the pursuit of this positive agenda, the logical laws of the human
mind are revealed so that the sciences may progress from an abstract
to a positive condition, forming a solid base for social reorganization.
Since "...the positive philosophy, in its poliUcal form, will necessarily
lead the human race to the social system that is most suitable to the
nature of man..."^®, the antagonism between moral and intellectual
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desires vanishes when the positive point of view is established as the
only true one.
According to Comte, although positivism consists of an
integrated philosophy and polity, and serves as the basis of the science
of society, such a system is incomplete without the consideration of
the affections.
"The first condition of unity is a subjective principle, and
this principle in the positive system is the subordination of
the intellect to the heart. Without this the unity that we
seek can never be placed on a permanent basis, whether
individually or collectively.
Yet, Comte argues, this unity is insufficient without an objective basis
existing outside of humans in the external world, providing the kind of
solid proof needed to secure a basis for true freedom and union. As
Horkheimer and Adorno suggest, motivating the positivist agenda is a
fear of anything outside of human control which presses forth the
denial of essentially non-rational human capacities that can only be
reaffirmed rhetorically. Since the positivist regards artificial order in
social phenomena (as in all others) as resting necessarily upon natural
laws, moral progress is simply the development of the order of nature.
Habermas launches his critique of positivism by considering the
underlying intentions of early positivism, despite its failure as a
persuasive philosophy of history. Clearly, Habermas argues, Comte's
paradoxical philosophy of history (progression from the theological, to
the metaphysical, to the positive) does not correspond to the status of
law-like hypothesis in the empirical sciences, failing to meet the
positivist standards set by Comte himself. Habermas resolves the
paradox by reinterpreting early positivism as an attempt to justify the
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scientists' scientistic belief in themselves that by constructing the
history of the species as the history of the realization of the positive
spirit, history confirms that which positivists invent. Habermas calls
this intention of early positivism a "psuedo-scientifir propagation of
the cognitive monopoly of science"^®.
Although, Habermas argues, early positivism is boring in its
rehash of commonplaces of the empiricist and rationalist traditions,
"it revolutionized philosophy's position with regard to the
sciences. Its specific achievement is to take assertions of
pre-critical epistemology and pry them out of the system
of reference of the perceiving and judging subject, and to
reduce them to stipulations of a methodology of the
sciences by putting scientific-technical progress, as the
subject of a scientistic philosophy of history, in the place
of the epistemological subject."®®
Since the philosophy of science needs a scientistic philosophy of
history to proceed, an analytic philosophy of science merely rids itself
of Comte's philosophy of history while retaining its metaphysical
residue. Habermas believes that in order for the philosophy of science
to begin the process of self-reflection, it must free itself from its early
roots, since early positivism marks the path that reduces epistemology
to the philosophy of science.
Gertrud Lenzer argues, in a parallel vein, that since it is Comte
who first bridges the gulf that separates the study of natural
phenomena from the study of human phenomena (by providing a
methodology that allows for the application of the positive-scientific
method to the analysis of social phenomena), we can move beyond a
positivist spirit by understanding Comte's intent.
"What Comte in effect did was to intercalate between the
study of biological and social phenomena the study of brain
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functions. It was in this way that he posited the individual
person as being controlled by biological and physiological
mechanisms on the one hand, and as open to control by
means of social forces and mechanisms on the other. "^o
Even the most recent developments in general systems theory,
artificial intelligence and the philosophy of science demonstrate to
Lenzer how powerfully these disciplines of thought are informed by a
tradition in which Comte figures as one of the generative spirits.
Viewed historically, the increasing consolidation and prevalence
of the scientific spirit as the dominant form of modern consciousness,
represents the ultimate realization of the spirit of modem positivism.
With critical theorists, Lenzer believes that the triumph of the
positivist spirit comprises the reduction of quality to quantity in all
realms of existence--in the realm of society and humanity as well as in
the realm of nature. Isaiah Berlin, in 1953, comments on Comte's
methodology;
"He did not say that history was, or was reducible to, a
kind of physics; but his conception pointed in that
direction--of one complete and all-embracing pyramid of
scientific knowledge; one method; one truth; one scale of
rational, 'scientific' values.
These generalizing social theories not only become more and more
elaborate during the course of tme; they also generate and advance
their own practice in the form of methodologies and methods.
The heritage of Comte's philosophy is the reducton of science
to methodological mles and procedures that guarantee scientific
objectivity: actuality, certainty, exactness, usefulness and relative
validity. Habermas points out that Comte's appeal to fact rather than
fancy is advanced in the absence of any ontological definition of the
factual.
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... the delimitation of the object domain of science leadsback to the question of how science is to be defined. At
the only level positivism allows, science can be defined
only by the methodological rules according to which it
proceeds. '"^2
Although from the empiricists Comte adopts a respect for phenomena
and a utility principle, he realizes that the power of control over
nature and society can be multiplied only by following rationalist
principles: only acquaintance with laws allows the scientist to both
explain and foresee facts.
"It is really in the laws of phenomena that science
consists, for which the actual facts...always provide only the
indispensable raw material....
Comte can freely combine rationalist and empiricist principles (theory
and observation) in his scientific methodology because he does not
mean them to function as components of a theory of knowledge. They
are merely the normative rules of scientific procedure through which
science itself receives its definition.
Habermas argues that because early positivism retains, in an
uncritical fashion, the metaphysical separation of the world (one realm
retaining the authentic, unchanging, and necessary character of being
while the other, the all-changing and accidental character of
appearances), the positive status of exclusive reality, the realm of the
accidental, can be claimed for phenomena which had previously been
considered trivial. Habermas believes that the problems of
metaphysics are not adequately dismissed by Comte, but merely
supplanted, since the metaphysical is preserved in a subordinate role.
Habermas argues that being unreflectively put aside, the metaphysical
retains substantial power.
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Knowledge is identified with scientific knowledge that has been
produced by an object domain defined by its own methodological rules
of inquiry.
"Since these rules ... are derived by projecting individual
rules of pre-critical epistemology onto the level of
methodology, they can be suited for a definition of science
only if they have already been selected according to an
implicit preunderstanding of science.
Once epistemology has been displaced, the only system of reference
available to separate science from metaphysics is the very
metaphysical system that has been withdrawn. Habermas explains:
"If science differs from metaphysics in describing facts
and relations between facts, the problem of demarcation
leads to the problem of what the significance of the
positivity of facts actually is. Epistemology, having been
disavowed, revenges itself with an unsolved problem that
now has to be dealt with by an ironically restored ontology
of the factual.
Habermas thinks that Ernst Mach's doctrine of elements is an
excellent example of a positivist's attempt to justify the object domain
of the sciences as the exclusive sphere of reality.
Mach, according to his doctrine of the elements, attempts to
explicate the world as a sum total of facts and, at the same time, to
show that facts are the essence of reality. In order to accomplish this,
Habermas argues, Mach reifies the knowing ego as a fact among facts,
allowing him to avoid the problem of the derivation of facts as related
to an ego. The doctrine of elements, by justifying the strategy of
"thinking nothing of one's ego, and resolving it into a transitory
combination of changing elements"*^®, unmasks the fictions of the
natural life-world and denounces the process of reflection that arises
therein. Since everything is reduced to a complex of facts, we cannot
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go beyond a description of the law-like relations between facts.
Science itself cannot be considered problematic because the object
domain of science is all statements which describe facts and relations
between facts. The function of knowledge itself remains obscure.
Habermas believes that, on scientistic presuppositions,
positivism suspends the theory of knowledge in favor of a philosophy
of science. By measuring knowledge only in terms of the actual
achievements of the sciences, reflection abolishes itself granting
science a legitimate object domain. Even though modem positivism
eventually rejects Mach's solution, the central problem remains:
reflection persists as that existing prior to science.
"Objectivism, which makes a dogma of the prescientific
interpretation of knowledge as a copy of reality, limits
access to reality to the dimension established by the
scientific system of reference through the methodological
objectification of reality. It prohibits discerning the a
priori element of this system of reference and calling into
question in any way its monopoly of knowledge.
Habermas believes that the turn toward positivism can be rectified
only through the restoration of a critical science of man.
From the perspective of critical theory, what appears to the
positivist to be the ultimate foundation for knowledge, the world of
observed nature, is the dependent and derived world of 'our' objects.
Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that the process of knowing cannot
be severed from the historical struggle between humans and the world
because the privileged position of objectivity, which positivists claim
for knowledge, stipulates in advance what is to be ascertained.
(Opinion surveys are designed by sociologists who actually create
opinions where they do not exist by the pre-selection and generality of
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their questions 48) it is intrinsically impossible, according to critical
theory, for science to account for its own objectives or purposes given
the illusory quality of modern science's claim to neutrality.
Alongside external nature is the world of human activity,
Horkheimer and Adorno’s "second nature". When these social and
historical events are given the same status as natural laws this
designation distorts reality, implying a general view of the structure of
the object of social science. Although men and women are of nature,
they create the history that embodies the possibility of nature to attain
self-consciousness. By giving an ontological status to specific historical
relations between individuals and society, positivists bind the only
potentially autonomous realm of reason with the constraints of modern
scientific rationality.
Clearly the goal of the Enlightenment is the liberation of men
and women from both the drudgery of work as well as the illusions of
superstitious belief. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the dialectical
nature of this vision is the element of barbarism that goes unnoticed:
the domination of nature overcomes its intended limits, driving the
continuing domination by some humans over others. What begins as a
radical separation of subject and object with the intent of empowering
the subject becomes increasingly oppressive as the subject is
dominated by a second nature, the reification of the social.
Although this phenomenon is apparent in capitalism's increasing
capacity for social control over men and women who are denied power
over their own work, Horkheimer and Adorno believe that the
ideological consequences of enlightenment thinking can best be seen
in the work of Kant, de Sade and Nietzsche. These thinkers replace
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weakened religious influences with a new rationality. Although Kant
believes his categorical imperative determines an objective criterion
for decisions of the human will, Horkheimer and Adorno agree with
Hegel that Kant's reason is "disassociated"49, it remains indifferent to
the context. Since Kant's only demand is consistency of application, a
justification can be made for any general claim. As a result, moral
reasoning is unable to evaluate substantive goals.
Without any evaluative component to ethical decision making.
Enlightenment thinkers are satisfied to sanction utilitarian or
decisionist (private individual choice) ethics. The champion of such
ethical systems is the Marquis de Sade who "mercilessly declared"^®
the shocking side of Enlightenment thinking. Reason becomes an
organ of calculation neutral to the ends of its productions much as
Nietzsche's claim that any moral belief can claim validity as long as it is
grounded in want or need. Both de Sade and Nietzsche underscore
the unity of instrumental reason and domination. Horkheimer and
Adorno believe that Nietzsche is one of the first to overtly recognize
this result, calling it the instrumentalization of truth. Nietzsche
argues that, since there is no ultimate criterion of truth (nothing is
outside), the subject is dominated by social conditions and truth
becomes that which is imposed as truth. Domination is the "universal
character of reason"^ h
The "revolt of nature" can be prevented only by critical reflection
on the everyday activity of human beings. Positivism, by reifying its
concept of legitimate knowledge, restricts scientific findings to a
technical function. In the name of a separation between fact and
fancy, questions of value are reduced to the province of private
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individuals making philosophical inquiry a meaningless operation. The
debate as to the status of rationality cannot take place because science
is identified with knowledge as such.
"Positivism marks the end of the theory of knowledge. In
its place emerges the philosophy of science.
Transcendental-logical inquiry into the conditions of
possible knowledge aimed as well at explicating the
meaning of knowledge as such. Positivism cuts off this
inquiry, which it conceives as having become meaningless
in virtue of the fact of the modern sciences. Knowledge is
implicitly defined by the achievement of the sciences.
Hence transcendental inquiry into the conditions of
possible knowledge can be meaningfully pursued only in
the form of methodological inquiry into the rules for the
construction and corroboration of scientific theories.
Habermas explains that for the positivist thinker, driven by the
scientistic self-understanding of the sciences, positivist theory
assumes the prohibitive function of protecting scientific inquiry from
epistemological self-reflection.
"Positivism stands and falls with the principle of
scientism, that is that the meaning of knowledge is
defined by what the sciences do and can thus be
adequately explicated through the methodological analysis
of scientific procedures.
A positivist philosopher of science renounces inquiry into the
"knowing subject" by prioritizing the rules according to which theories
are constructed and corroborated. The life of the subject loses
significance because it is reduced to psychological investigation in
which one's subjectivity is identified with the empirical person to
whom the subject of knowledge has been reduced.
Habermas believes that the counterpart of this restriction on
knowledge is the empowerment of logic and mathematics as
independent and self-sufficient formal sciences. When the problem of
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the foundation of these scienees is no longer discussed in connection
with the problem of knowledge itself, the notion that knowledge
describes reality becomes prevalent.
"In Kantian terms, both (positivism and formal science)
ignore the synthetic achievements of the knowing subject.
The positivistic attitude conceals the problems of world
constitution. The meaning of knowledge itself becomes
irrational-in the name of rigorous knowledge.
Habermas believes that positivism has effectively repressed older
philosophical traditions by monopolizing the self-understanding of the
sciences. Although he believes that the illusion of objectivism can no
longer be dispelled by a mere return to Kantian reflection, he offers an
immanent critique "forcing methodology to carry out a process of self-
reflection in terms of its own problems.
I attribute to ecophilosophy this positivist influence because I
believe that the ecophilosophical critique of modern society, rendered
as a critique of the domination of nature, is mired in a positivist
understanding of nature. Since both ecophilosophers and critical
theorists attribute the decay of modem society to the human
disposition to dominate nature, I will distinguish ecophilosophy from
critical theory by employing Habermas' immanent critique of the
positivist spirit thereby supporting my contention that ecophilosophy
fails to respond adequately to the misdirection of modern scientism.
C. An Immanent Critique of Positivism
If modern epistemology begins with Kant's "epistemological
turn" (all knowledge is knowledge by a subject), it is Kant that
recognizes that inquiry beyond the limits of the inherent conditions of
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consciousness is me3.ningless. Thus, he does not so much snswer
Hume's skepticism as to show that Hume, by not recognizing that any
fruitful investigation (ontological or metaphysical) must begin with "an
analysis of the limits and preconditions of knowing"56^ misconceives
the problem of knowledge. Robert Paul Wolff explains;
"It might be meaningful to ask what the character of
experience would be for a creature whose sensory organs
were receptive to magnetic fields or radio waves or indeed
other physical forces of which we are not now aware.
Perhaps we can even consider the possibility of a
sensibility whose basic form differs from our three-
dimensional space. But it is self-contradictory to inquire
what objects are like independently of being perceived and
conceived-what they are like to God, for example, or more
absurdly still, what they are like in themselves.
Kant's task is; "to demonstrate the possibility of non-trivial knowledge
about the world" and "to reintroduce the knowing subject into the
world of objective existence".^®
Kant believes that although Descartes makes the first step in the
process of recognizing the priority of the epistemological, instead of
carrying out the consequences of his initial recognition, Descartes
works at;
"reestablishing contact between the conscious subject,
whose substantial nature he never doubted, and an
independent, objective world order".
Descartes' failure to achieve this reconciliation pivots on his abstracted
definition of 'object'. In order to restore contact between subject and
object Kant redefines the ontological 'object' epistemologically as "the
object of knowledge".
To transcend the extreme subjectivist consequence of this
reconstruction, Kant renders his concept of the object of knowledge
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as no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such
a necessity of synthesis"60. Since there is no object independent of
the conditions of knowledge, the necessity and universality of
knowledge turns on the innate rules of the mind. For Kant knowledge
is not a state of mind, but an activity. While Kant revolutionizes
epistemology by redefining the object of knowledge, his resolution
launches a new era of philosophical thought.
Kant uses the term dialectic to refer to the hopeless attempt to
comprehend the infinite and ultimate structures of the universe after
discovering that any attempt to apply our concepts to the infinite
results in contradictory yet logically valid pairs of 'antinomies'.
"What Kant discovered, according to Hegel, is the dialectic
of reason, which can, at one and the same time, entertain
opposing and even contradictory attitudes toward the
world.
As a result, Kant proposes that as humans we confront the world in
two very different ways: as a knowing self that applies the categories
of understanding to experience and as a willing, rational self which
acts in freedom and stands outside the forms of time and space before
God. Although Kant's two-fold notion of reality, the phenomenal world
and the noumenal world, allows him to account for moral 'knowledge',
the tension that results from the fact that our moral actions are
preformed outside the physical world upon which they have affect
drives the German idealists to attempt to synthesize theory and
practice.
Kant proves that a necessary presupposition of moral
accountability is human freedom; thus, this concept becomes, in the
intelligible world, a parallel to the Newtonian principle of causality in
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t±ie sensible world. His third critique, the synthesis of these two
worlds, has tremendous impact on more 'romantic' philosophers who
want to defend a purposeful, supersensible world. The German
idealists take this image as the centerpiece of their entire philosophy,
using art to synthesize the worlds of understanding and reason.
Although the philosophical interpretations of Kant's
"epistemological turn" are the backdrop to modern positivism, the
story begins, according to Habermas, with Hegel and the German
idealists. Habermas believes that because Hegel fails to properly
interpret the "critical philosophy", he fails to guard philosophy from
the constraints of positivism . ^2 German idealism, taking up
philosophy after Kant, does not move in a single direction. Fichte
shifts the focus of philosophy away from Kant's epistemological
revolution to the Critique of Practical Reason where freedom and
rational autonomy are primary. Since for Fichte Kantian philosophy
represents the search for a better life, he seeks to salvage the primary
status of human morality from the imposing mechanical images of
Newtonian science. Fichte, believing that dogmatism (the belief in
universal causality and the absence of human freedom) is morally
reprehensible, reduces nature to a postulate of practical reason.
"Nature (Fichte argues) is posited by us in order to act out our moral
will. "63 Fichte concludes that both Descartes and Kant miss the fact
that the self is the source of everything, that there is but a single
boundless self, an absolute Ego which is immanent in all of us and
acting through us. This one, active and morally striving self has for its
primary concern moral self-realization.
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The champion of romanticism (the spirit of subjectivism) is
Schelling who, while adopting Fichte's interpretation that everything
must be deduced from our position as moral agents, adds his own
critical appraisal of Newtonian physics and develops a philosophy of
nature which puts Newton at the lowest level of nature interpretation.
From Kant's third critique and the role of art in synthesizing the
natural and the practical, he defends an image of nature as a unified,
living and developing being. Rather than collapsing all of Nature into a
postulate of practical reason (Fichte), Schelling seeks to retain an
objective space for nature while still achieving the identity of Nature
and Spirit.
Although Fichte fails to achieve a space for nature by over-playing
freedom, he does show the way to overcome his incomplete system
with his concept of the absolute Ego. Schelling, assuming that Kant
provided for knowledge of the supersensible world in the third
critique, produces the ultimate unity of the Nature and Spirit (at the
base of our experience) in our intuition of the Absolute. Schelling's
premise (Hegel's too) is that we can understand ourselves only as well
as we understand nature because nature is "slumbering spirit".
According to the German idealists, the correct philosophical
interpretation of nature consists in seeing it as a series of stages which
culminate in a gradual triumph of unity, not as stages in a temporally
arranged, evolutionary picture. This concept of nature, in its
completeness, as an ever-living "Now" of present existence, girds up a
revelatory philosophy of nature that explains how it is that we may
understand the detail of nature as learned from experience. Since we
can learn from experience only within a framework which makes
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learning from experience possible, the natural world has to mean
more to us than the joint existence of a large number of entities whose
classification and arrangement is all a matter of detailed empirical
encounter.
The philosophy of Hegel and classical German idealism is driven
by this philosophy of nature: one must know what sort of thing a
Nature (in general terms) is, in order to come to terms with one's
individual life. Hegel explains in his Philosophy of Nature that physics
and philosophical nature are not to be distinguished from each other,
as perception and thought they are both thinking apprehensions of
nature, partly practical and partly theoretical.
"The practical approach (the physics) to Nature is, in
general, determined by appetite, which in self-seeking
need impels us to use Nature for our own advantage, to
wear her out, to wear her down, in short to annihilate
her." "The cunning of his reason (the theoretical) enables
him to preserve and maintain himself in face of the forces
of Nature, by sheltering behind other products of Nature,
and letting these suffer her destructive attacks. Nature
herself, however, in her universal aspect, he cannot
overcome in this way, nor can he turn her to his own
purposes.
The interest of philosophy is to resolve the tension between the the
subject and the object. How do we, as subjects, come into contact
with nature? If we venture to bridge this gulf and mislead ourselves to
think through nature, "we make Nature, which is an Other than we
are, into an Other than she is."®^ We transform things into universals,
or make them our own, and yet as natural objects they are suppose to
have a free, self-subsistent being.
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One solution to the the contradiction of subject and object is the
"primal state of innocence", the state prior to the fall of man where
Spirit is identical with Nature.
"A natural unity of thought and intuition is that of the child
and the animal, and this can at the most be called feeling,
not spirituality. But man must have eaten of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil and must have gone through
the labour and activity of thought in order to become what
he is, having overcome this separation between himself
and Nature. The immediate unity is thus only an abstract,
implicit truth, not the actual truth; for not only must the
content be true, but the form also. The healing of this
breach must be in the form of the knowing Idea, and the
moments of the solution must be sought in consciousness
itself."®®
It is the study of Nature that liberates the Spirit in her, for Spirit is
present in her insofar as it is in relation, not with an Other, but with
itself. Nature, as Idea in the form of otherness, drives the Hegelian
system. Although the Idea displays itself in nature only so far as it can
within the finitude of that moment, it is able to break through the
limitation of this sphere and necessarily pass into a higher stage. The
goal of philosophy is to reveal this process.
Hegel rejects the notion that it is possible to reconcile Concept
and Reality in a kind of correspondence theory of truth. Rather, he is
convinced that an adequate theory of Truth must show us the
structure of reality (the Absolute) as a whole and all-embracing
coherence of reality. For Hegel, in a narrow sense, the 'problem of
truth' is skepticism; the notion that either no truth exists or that truth
cannot be known. Hegel's epistemology turns on two assumptions:
first, that our contact with truth is in some sense a way of
consciousness (Cartesian starting point) and second, that skepticism
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has been overcome (Kant). Although Kant redefines the problem to
disengage the skeptic, asking not whether our concepts conform to
objects, rather, how our concepts determine the objects of our
experience; even in Kant, who Hegel believes to provide the final
answer to the skeptic, there remains the residue of the "thing-in-
itself, introducing the possibility of a new skepticism. Hegel reforms
Kant's ambivalence by claiming that the objects of our experience are
the "things-in-themselves".
Since for Hegel, objects of knowledge must be wholly within the
realm of consciousness, idealism (the view that objects are in some
sense "in" or dependent on consciousness) becomes the obvious
preference. Spirit produces sensations in ourselves that we share as
perceptions because there is no physical world apart from the
determinations of human consciousness. Since Kant's notion of the
Absolute is as unconditioned, unmediated and undivided, only God
could comprehend such a unity and so for us, this ultimate unity is a
matter of rational faith and not knowledge. For Hegel, the Absolute is
known through the Concept.
Kantian epistemology is an enterprise directed at the whole, yet,
beginning with the intention of Descartes, it appears that
epistemology cannot dispense with the strategy of beginning without
presuppositions. While epistemology presumes to take nothing for
granted except its pure project of radically doubting, in truth its first
presupposition is that of normative science. By presupposing the
statements of mathematics and physics as valid, the critique of
knowledge can use these principles and draw conclusions about the
organization of our cognitive faculty, producing its second
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presupposition: the concept of a completely fixed, knowing subject, a
normative concept of the ego.
By subjecting the presuppositions of epistemology to self-
criticism, Hegel believes he undermines the Kantian ego (split into
the ego as unity of self-consciousness and the ego as free will)
removing from the process of knowing any fixed point of entry. This
critical consciousness, aware of the superficiality of any beginning, is
absolute knowledge.
"A critique of knowledge that has dissolved the normative
conception of both science and the ego in radical doubt is
relegated exclusively to what Hegel calls phenomenological
experience."®'^
Since Kant rejects the common-sensical idea that one simply "sees"
oneself in experience, arguing that one discovers the activity of the
self through reflection on experience, this allows Hegel to argue the
outrageous claim that the self is ultimately not an individual self, but a
general self, common to all of us. And beyond this, this one
consciousness includes not only the totality of human beings but the
whole universe as well.
Hegel recognizes that epistemology is ensnared in a circle: the
critique of knowledge does not possess the spontaneity of an origin; it
is condemned to being after the fact. Hegel justifies the
epistemological circle in the phenomenological experience as the
form of reflection itself. One must have known in order to know
explicitly.
"Only something known can be remembered as a result
and comprehended in its genesis. This movement is the
experience of reflection."®®
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Habermas believes that although Kant's critique of knowledge does not
fulfil the intention of First Philosophy (beginning without
presuppositions), to abandon this intention does not entail abandoning
the critique of knowledge. "The latter has only to cast off its false
consciousness by being turned against itself in metacritique.
Habermas believes that while Hegel rightly criticizes the
unacknowledged presuppositions of epistemology, arguing that
through the epistemological circle the theory of knowledge can cure
its false consciousness, Hegel incorrectly believes this circle is a sign
of the falsity of critical philosophy. Although he successfully destroys
the renewal of First Philosophy;
"... in do doing he imagines himself to be overcoming the
critique of knowledge as such. This opinion insinuates
itself because from the very beginning Hegel presumes as
given a knowledge of the Absolute while indeed the
possibility of just this knowledge would have to be
demonstrated according to the criteria of a radicalized
critique of knowledge."^®
Hegel's theory is half-hearted, according to Habermas. Absolute
knowledge is to proceed with the phenomenological experience, but
because it is absolute, it does not need to be justified by the
phenomenological self-reflection of the mind. Hegel's theory of
knowledge presupposes just what his theory calls into question; the
possibility of absolute knowledge. Hegel, by reinterpreting the
"epistemological circle" gains reflection, but by proposing it as an all
inclusive process, he sacrifices critique.
Habermas believes that, although Hegel correctly locates the
Kantian error, "what is demanded is thus the following; we should
know the cognitive faculty before we know"^^, this 'problematic
97
method’ is still recommended by positivists for methodological
investigations. Hegel’s reconception of epistemology did not rectify
the scientist’s dilemma. Since not all principles can be taken as
problematic, the scientist is forced to assume the frame of reference
of a particular investigation as true for the course of the investigation.
Although the repetition of this process is presumed to guarantee that
all presuppositions will come into question, the choice of the first
frame of reference and the sequence of the additional remain
arbitrary. By abandoning the critical philosophy, epistemology loses
rational autonomy.
Robert Solomon suggests that Hegel unselfconsciously realizes
that all forms of consciousness are part of the same grand tapestry of
human experience, different perspectives of the same reality. What
Hegel has in mind, according to Solomon, is not so much a view of
reality as a view about views. Since we want to "grasp" the world, we
come to understand that reality can only be only comprehended
through the totality of different viewpoints. Total and unified
comprehension is the principle behind all human experience and it is
this that defines reason.
"... here we begin to see the possibility of a deep tension in
Hegel’s philosophy; on the one hand, he is a philosopher
whose main claim is to give us a unified all-inclusive world-
view, which he calls "the Absolute." On the other hand, he
is the philosopher of change, the phenomenologist of
forms, who appreciates, as Kant and most philosophers
did not, the rich variety of forms of experience and the
complex transformations between them. "'72
For the second Hegel, the Absolute is only a distant goal, never to be
reached. It is the motivation of a grand journey. In fact, Hegel is
unable to articulate this larger vision, that the world is an irreducible
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plurality of possible human experiences and consequently, of possible
human worlds.
Rather, Hegel believes that he is making epistemology
superfluous by eliminating Kant. He presumes that the
phenomenological experience terminates in absolute knowledge. Yet,
by following Hegel through an immanent critique of Kant, it is clear
that without the epistemological predispositions of Descartes, the
union between mind and absolute knowledge fails.
"The apparent dilemma of knowing before knowledge,
with which Hegel reproached epistemology, now returns
in Hegel’s thought as an actual dilemma; namely, that
phenomenology must in fact be valid prior to every
possible mode of scientific knowledge.
While Hegel is convinced of the necessity of the progression of
phenomenological experience, Habermas argues that Hegel could
make such a claim only retrospectively from the standpoint of absolute
knowledge.
"Thus the paradoxical result of an ambiguous radicalization
of the critique of knowledge is not an enlightened position
of philosophy with regard to science. When philosophy
asserts itself as authentic science, the relation of
philosophy and science completely disappears from
discussion. It is with Hegel that a fatal misunderstanding
arises; the idea that the claim asserted by philosophical
reason against the abstract thought of mere understanding
is equivalent to the usurpation of the legitimacy of
independent sciences by a philosophy claiming to retain
its position as universal scientific knowledge.
Habermas believes that while the fact of scientific progress
independent of philosophy unmasks Hegel's claim (however
misunderstood as fiction), philosophically it serves as the foundation of
positivism.
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After Hegel’s metacritique of Kant which subjects the critique of
knowledge to un3delding self-reflection, philosophy abandons its
position with regard to science. Epistemology is the subject of
modem philosophy until the threshold of the nineteenth century.
Until this time, modern science does not coincide with knowledge,
and theories of knowledge do not merge with the philosophy of
science. Even when Descartes subjects to doubt modern metaphysics,
or Kant redefines the object of knowledge, philosophy retains a
sovereign role in relation to science.
After Kant, science is no longer seriously comprehended by
philosophy. Science can be considered epistemologically, as one
category of knowledge, as long as knowledge is not equated with
either absolute knowledge or the scientistic self-understanding of the
business of research. If a concept of knowing that transcends the
sciences is lacking, the critique of knowledge reduces itself to the
function of the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science, since the
mid-nineteenth century is the heir to the Hegelian theory of
knowledge. It is a methodology pursued with a scientistic self-
understanding which means that science believes in itself. Knowledge
is identified with science. Positivism strengthens the belief that
science possesses exclusive validity because it excludes the possibility
of self-reflection. Positivist threads in ecophilosophy are apparent in
its Hegelian notion of nature: as an all-encompassing avenue to Self,
nature retains a pre-critical status.
Positivism, by leaping over epistemological reflection, regresses
behind the level of reflection attained by Kant. Since positivists are
blinded to the fact that the methodology of the sciences is intertwined
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wit±i the process of personal and cultural growth of the human
species, positivists erect the absolutism of pure methodology.
Although Hegel's phenomenological self-reflection of knowledge is the
necessary radicalization of the critique of reason, Habermas believes
that Marx, who could have contested the victory of scientism,
misunderstood Hegel. Rather than restoring the power of reflection,
Marx completes the disintegration of the theory of knowledge.
Marx makes explicit the basic assumption of Hegel's
phenomenology: that mind is the absolute.
"For us the mind has nature as its presupposition; it is the
truth and thus the absolute ground of nature. In this truth
nature has disappeared, and mind has emerged as the Idea
Existing for itself: both the object and the subject of the
Idea is the notion.
Habermas believes that Marx is correct in his critique of Hegel: that
nature is the absolute ground of mind.
"Here the mind presupposes nature, but in the sense of a
natural process that, from within itself, gives rise likewise
to the natural being man and the nature that surrounds
him - and not in the idealist sense of mind that, as Idea
existing for itself, posits a natural world as its own self-
created presupposition.
Marx goes beyond naturalism by arguing that man, even as an objective
being, is not anthropological but epistemological. Nature is recognized
as two-faceted: the subjective nature of man which confronts the
objective nature of his environment. As two components, nature
mediates itself through the reproductive process of social labor.
"Marx calls labor a 'condition of human existence that is
independent of all forms of society, a perpetual necessity
of nature in order to mediate the material exchange
between man and nature, in other words, human life
.
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For Marx, labor is both a fundamental category of human existence and
an epistemological category constituting itself as objective nature only
in the mediation between the subjective and objective nature of man
through the processes of social labor. In materialism, labor has the
function of synthesis.
Habermas argues that since Marx never meant labor to be a
general "world-constituting, life activity", social labor is fundamental
only as the category of mediating objective and subjective nature. As
the mechanism of the evolution of the species in history through labor
object and subject are changed. The human species is not
characterized by any invariant natural or transcendental structure, but
only by a mechanism of humanization. This synthesis of man and
nature in social labor to Marx is the empirical and transcendental
accomplishment of a species-subject that produces itself in history.
Unlike Hegel's absolute synthesis, for Marx synthesis takes place in
the medium of labor rather than thought. Unity, which can only come
about through the activity of a subject, remains in some measure
imposed on nature by the subject.
"The unity of the social subject and nature that comes into
being 'in industry' cannot eradicate the autonomy of nature
and the remainder of complete otherness that is lodged in
its facticity. As the correlate of social labor, objectified
nature retains both independence and externality in
relation to the subject that controls it. Its independence
manifests itself in our ability to learn to master natural
processes only to the extent that we subject ourselves to
them. This elementary experience is expressed in the
language of natural 'laws' that we must 'obey'."'^®
Habermas believes that Marx is correct: nature retains a substantial
core that does not reveal itself to us. Although nature retains its
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'otherness', it enters as 'other' into a relationship with humans
through the labor process.
Since nature, as 'other' or 'in itself, means nothing to humans
outside the historical dimension provided by labor processes, the
synthesis which occurs through labor does not generate a logical
structure nor does it create an absolute unity of man and nature.
"This conception has the important epistemological
function of pointing to the contingency of nature as a
whole; in opposition to the idealist attempt to reduce
nature to a mere extemalization of mind, it preserves
nature's immovable facticity despite nature's historical
embeddedness in the universal structure of mediation
constituted by laboring subjects.
The knowledge generated by the synthesis in labor takes on existence
as a productive force, causing nature and the subject to change so that
in labor, the subject forms its own identity.
Habermas, along with Marx, believes that this identity of
consciousness, which Kant thinks is the unity of transcendental
consciousness, is identity achieved through labor. The subject attains
consciousness of itself in a strict sense only if it becomes aware of
itself in its labor as the:
"self-generative act of the species in general and knows
itself to have been produced by the 'labor of the entire
previous course of world history'."®®
It is correct to speak of nature becoming man both as the product of
natural evolution and as the world-historical process of humanization.
Although Marx correctly criticizes Hegel's absolute mind, he is
unable to see the import of his own work, according to Habermas.
Instead, Marx deludes himself about the nature of reflection by
reducing it to the activity of labor. By eliminating reflection as a
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motivator of history and condensing everything into produetive
activity, Marx loses the ability to distinguish between natural seienee
and critique. Habermas believes that Marx's materialism fails to
prevent the positivist atrophy of epistemology by restrieting the
capacity of reflection to the instrumentalism of natural science.
"In his empirical analyses Marx comprehends the history
of the species under categories of material activity and the
critical abolition of ideologies, of instrumental action and
revolutionary practice, of labor and reflection at once. But
Marx interprets what he does in the more restrieted
conception of the species' self-reflection through work
alone.
In this way, he closes the space for critical social theory by mistakenly
classifying the critieal seienee of man with the natural seiences,
rejecting as necessary an epistemologieal justification of social theory.
Marx argues for a single science of man and nature.
"So far as production establishes the only framework in
which the genesis and function of knowledge can be
interpreted, the science of man also appears under
categories of knowledge for control. At the level of the
self-consciousness of social subjects, knowledge that
makes possible the control of natural processes turns into
knowledge that makes possible the control of the social
life process.
Habermas believes that when knowledge, used to steer social
processes, is deemed identical to knowledge produced by natural
science, the power of technical control dominates social activity. It is
against this unfortunate intrusion by scientifie rationality upon
communicative interaction that Habermas builds his case for an
autonomous category of knowledge.
Although technological progress is marked by epochal
innovations, Habermas understands the social self-formative process as
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marked not by new technologies, but by stages of reflection through
which the dogmatic character of domination and ideologies are
dispelled. He contends that, while these two processes do not
converge, they are interdependent. Although Marx tries to capture
this dialectic of the forces of production and the relations of
production, he fails because his materialist concept of the synthesis of
man and nature is restricted to the categorical framework of
production. Habermas believes that reflective knowledge must be
reclaimed from Hegel.
"If Marx had not thrown together interaction and work
under the label of social practice (Praxis), and had he
instead related the materialist concept of synthesis
likewise to the accomplishments of instrumental action
and the nexuses of communicative action, then the idea of
a science of man would not have been obscured by
identification with natural science. Rather, this idea would
have taken up Hegel's critique of the subjectivism of Kant's
epistemology and surpassed it materialistically. It would
have made clear that ultimately a radical critique of
knowledge can be carried out only in the form of a
reconstruction of the history of the species, and that
conversely social theory, form the viewpoint of the self-
constitution of the species in the medium of social labor
and class struggle, is possible only as the self-reflection of
the knowing subject."®'^
Philosophy's position with regard to science would be clear if Marx
had rejected Hegel's substitution of absolute knowledge for
epistemology. Instead, positivism regresses behind the level of
reflection obtained by Kant and successfully sets about the task which
epistemology had abandoned and from which Hegel and Marx believe
themselves exempt, that of elaborating a methodology of the sciences.
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D. The Fate of Nature
The emancipatory possibility of Marx's re-concepUon of the
relationship between theory and pracUce stands in direct contrast to
the conservatism of positivist social theory. Lenzer notes that the
ultimate aim of Comte’s system is to bring about, through the
systematization of individual and social life, the end of history. While
Marx conceives the relationship between theory and practice as aimed
at freedom, positivism fixes the parameters of knowledge and action
within the predominant configurations of the present as reality. Every
other mode of knowledge and action falls into the realm of
"speculation, imagination and the unrear®^. However, Lenzer suggests
that Comte is not a conservative in any ordinary sense. He is, in fact,
the theoretical exponent par excellence of modern capitalism or of
modem industrial society.
'Yet more disturbing still is how well Comte foresaw—
what Mill in turn feared—the capabilities of anticipating
and thereby mitigating, on an ever-growing scale, those
forces in modem societies that threaten to disturb by their
opposition the continued expansion of the predominant
forces."®®
Mill points to Comte's Svsteme as an extreme expression of the
tendency for society to take power over the individual. According to
Mill, the work of Comte put:
"an end to the notion that no effectual moral authority can
be maintained over society without the aid of religious
belief; for Comte's work recognizes no religion except
humanity, yet it leaves an irresistible conviction that any
moral beliefs concurred in by the community generally
may be brought to bear upon the whole conduct and lives
of its individual members with an energy and potency tmly
alarming to think of."®^
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Mill fears that by omitting the influenee of the psychological (the
power of self-reflection), Comte has done little for the science of
society, providing only an historical analysis. Lenzer believes that
Comte’s separation of theory from practice augments the power of the
existing forces and the governing classes so that theory serves an
existing and developing social and economic practice. Ultimately
positivist theorists legitimize these powers by arguing that "for the
final completion of the positive philosophy it (is) necessary to create
the positive science of society- -social physics."®®
By reducing traditional philosophy (epistemology) to a
philosophy of science as its proper domain, Comte achieves the basis
of his grandiose program. Habermas and Lenzer agree that this
restriction of philosophy is explicitly directed against its metaphysical
and critical role, a role that is banned from the realm of proper
conscious activity. Reason is reduced to an instrument of computation.
"Mathematical analysis is the logical instrument and
supreme method of positivism, which in conjunction with
observation of natural and social phenomena would yield
and attain to the highest generalities and laws of
phenomena."®^
Since the positive philosophy recommends the direct study of the
laws of nature, the conception of man is reduced to that of the
external world. Humankind restricts its investigations to the laws
ruling nature, man, and society (the domination of nature), yet, is,
itself, ultimately subject to them.
Already, in chapter one, I suggested that the concept of the
domination of nature functions ideologically, masking its own failure.
With the philosophical manifestation of this failure in place the impact
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of this scientific rationality is revealed in the relationship between
science, technology and social conflict. William Leiss believes that the
"domination of nature" remains a powerful ideology as long as it is
misinterpreted as a universally successful activity. To understand this
modem delusion, Leiss suggests rethinking the problem by
considering separately the relationship of both science and technology
to domination.
While modern science displays an increasing mastery over its
subject matter, achieving greater generality and coherence, this
accomplishment is simultaneously translated into ways to meet human
need, giving rise to the popular belief that nature is being mastered.
Although it is supposed that this mastery over nature is the foundation
for greater rationality in the structure of society, mastery in the first
place (modern science) is never transferred intact to social processes
through the mastery of nature in the second case (technology). Clearly
then, concepts of power and domination, which do not make sense
with respect to scientific knowledge itself, may be appropriately
employed in connection with the technological applications of
scientific knowledge.
"If the idea of the domination of nature has any meaning at
all, is that by such means-that is, through the possession of
superior technological capabilities-some men attempt to
dominate and control other men. The notion of a common
domination of the human race over external nature is
nonsensical. "91
The Enlightenment goal to master nature for the emancipation of
humankind fails because it is driven by the belief that the mastery of
nature is a universally rational process: the domination of external
nature through science and technology.
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While Leiss rejects the notion that science is repressive, he
argues persuasively that social oppression is generated from an
unequal distribution of technological mastery. Leiss, appealing to
Edmund Husserl92, suggests that to understand the life of modern
man we must notice that the world is 'known' in two distinct ways: as
a familiar "life-world" and as a world of natural scientific objects.
Since the mathematization (or instrumentality) of science masks the
relationship of science to ordinary experience, two problems arise:
the life-worid is permanently devalued as the realm of the subjective,
and the abstract-universal character of science makes it impossible for
it to possess a direct relationship to specific goals of human practice.
Habermas explains this phenomenon as the particular character of
scientific rationality. The resulting social dilemma is that increasingly
efficient technical means for controlling behavior are produced in the
absence of rational guidelines and direction. This effect is the result
of a general positivist spirit (as characterized by Habermas), pervasive
in everyday life because the absence of religion conceals the fact that
science has nothing to say about moral life.^^
Husserl distinguishes two realms of nature: the intuited and the
scientific. The familiar and universal idea of nature which transcends
culture and history has been the object of mastery in every stage of
human development, it is the nature that is used, bought and sold. Its
universality distinguishes it from the multiplicity of scientific nature
constructed by man's intellectual and practical activity. For Leiss, the
domination ideology issuing from the sixteenth century is elucidated
when we consider the confusion surrounding the concept of the
mastery of nature. Which 'nature' is the object of Baconian mastery?
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To master scientific nature means that the scientist is able to
"take the mask and veil from natural objects which are commonly
concealed and obscured under the variety of shapes and external
appearances"^^ and reveal the secrets embedded in nature (Bacon).
Yet, from the viewpoint of everyday life, science casts a "veil of ideas"
oyer the nature of everyday experience. Harmony and internal
consistency, the goals of a theoretical structure, have little application
to intuited nature. The ongoing interaction between these two worlds
of nature is manifest in the efforts to achieve mastery with respect to
each. Can mastery in one be translated into mastery in the other?
Leiss thinks not.
"Mastery of nature as the outcome of scientific rationality
operating in the domain of scientific nature, when it is
translated into the mode of mastery in an essentially
different domain (practical action within the natural
environment) cannot and does not preserve its character
intact.
A gap opens between the mastery of nature in world of human activity
and the mastery of nature according to the mathematical
S)anbolization. The mastery of nature is not the project of "science
and technology per but is the product of a larger social task.
Issuing from Marx's notion that human beings share a dialectical
relationship with nature (mediated by labor), Leiss argues that this
relationship is further complicated by the interpenetration of
scientific and technological rationality. The products of scientific
activity (technique) take on a social role quite unlike that of science
itself. From the perspective of this mastery, it makes no sense to
speak of a "nature per ^". Technological mastery is the expansion of
human power in the world, translating the mastery of nature into the
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mastery of man. In the struggle to eome to terms with nature in
everyday life, to establish cin existence, the artifacts of scientific nature
(technology) are applied. The barbarism inherent in positivism (the
dialectic of the Enlightenment) is made manifest in the realm of
technological mastery.
In this context, technological rationality distinguishes itself from
science because the kind of mastery over nature achieved is directly
determined by the immediate connection between technology and
practical life-activity. Technological expansion opens up new
opportunities for economic surplus (the motor of capitalism), leading
to the development and satisfaction of new needs. Particular natural
resources become essential to continued economic expansion, so the
uneven distribution of these resources magnifies the material and
technological imbalance between nations, thereby amplifying the
threat of global conflict. Since the struggle for an expanded market is
extended through intensive propaganda and marketing to the
psychological realm, the rising expectations of the world populations
exert further stress on an escalating potential for global conflict.
Technological rationality, capable of producing weapons of total
destruction, borders on the irrational. The technical, cognitive
function of scientific rationality is impotent in the realm of global,
social conflict.
According to Leiss, the connection between the domination of
nature and domination over man is evident in this unchecked
relationship between technological advance and social conflict. Rising
material demands, supported by massive advertising campaigns,
transplant the struggle to produce these needs from a local to a global
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context, resulting in the need for new techniques for political
domination. According to Horkheimer, social conflict is the binding
element that necessarily ties together domination of nature and
domination over man.
"The link between the struggle for existence and control
of the natural environment is illustrated best by the fact
that the intensity of the possible exploitation of human
labor is directly dependent upon the attained degree of
mastery over external nature."®^
As technological advance intensifies class conflict, the search for new
techniques for political domination is intensified. Self-preservation is
the final product of restricted enlightenment thinking (Horkheimer
and Adorno) where all purposes have been driven out and only one
remains. Since adequate security is never obtained, this goal drives
the struggle for mastery as an end in itself. The domination of
external nature expresses itself as a mastery of internal nature,
individual self-denial and instinctual renunciation for survival, so that
the revolt of nature is never appeased; the rebellion of human nature
manifested in the form of violent outbreaks, arising out of the
irrational structure of social relations. The persistent mastery and
denial of internal nature appears more and more irrational in view of
the extant possibilities for the satisfaction of needs. The unequal
distribution of these skills and products drives the mastery of nature
and precludes the setting of limits.
For Leiss, the mastery of nature has been and remains a social
task, "...the greater the attained power over nature, the weaker the
individual vis-a-vis the overwhelming presence of society."^®
Correctly, Ackermann, (writing against the philosophical effort to
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preserve t±ie epistemological purity of scientific practice] suggests
that the payoff from science for society comes through the application
of science to the mastery of nature. A diminution in technological
achievement is clearly not the route for improving the human life.
Rather, technological inventiveness must be applied on an even wider
scale.
"It is clearly utopian to imagine that at this point a
diminution in technological achievement might make our
lives better. Technological inventiveness might be applied
to problems of wider social significance, and the benefits
of technological achievement might be more widely
shared, but human life would undergo drastic changes for
the worse if technological levels of achievement were to
lessen suddenly.
For Leiss (and Habermas), only collective rational control will liberate
technology from its service in the cause of human conflict since
responsibility for the task cannot be placed under the auspices of
scientific rationality. Until then we remain victims of a dilemma
whereby every victory in science when immediately translated into
technological advance entails the real possibility of catastrophe
because the production occurs in the absence of rational restraint.
The illusion of the "mastery of nature" is the unquestioned belief
that this project produces universal liberation. This delusion, Leiss
contends, is partially the result of the Baconian rendition of the idea
(philosophically assumed by positivist epistemology) which masks the
irreparable gap between scientific rationality and human freedom. It
is also the result of a confusion about which 'nature' is the product of
mastery. The nature of everyday life which contains the potenUal of
liberating humans from drudgery is confounded with the conflicts
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inherent in teehnological rationality. It makes no sense to talk of
"nature per in the eontext of soeial relations.
The indigenous, fourth world peoples of the aretie, they serve as
obvious examples of the conflicts inherent in technological rationality.
Not only are they experiencing increasing internal social conflict as a
result of advancing technology, but their very livelihood is threatened
by the expanding social needs of others. While many recognize the
tenuous relationship between environmental fervor and cultural
integrity, the root cause is glibly proffered as an historically modern
endeavor by humans (primitives excluded) to dominate nature. The
desire on the part of first world nations for wilderness and wildlife is
being served up to native peoples in new forms of technological
mastery as scientifically driven needs. An advocate for native
sovereignty expresses her frustration in this way;
"(It) has gotten to the point where words themselves are
being used to replace weapons. Words, millions and
billions of them, bombard the average city-dweller from
every side as she goes about her daily work. Our love affair
with communication has persuaded us to believe that any
issue can be the right issue IF the right words are used to
defend it, IF the right words can convince the right
people. As a result there is an assumption being made in
certain quarters, that those who do not or cannot
articulate themselves or their feelings have, in fact,
nothing to sav . "
^
When considered in the context of ideology, the alarm over global
environmental health is the ultimate expression of the drive for self-
preservation. The proponents of this alarm believe themselves to be
operating at such a comprehensive level that they can justify the use of
greater and greater techniques of global persuasion. Fourth world
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cultures are likely targets of this kind of manipulation since they lack
the power structures to overcome this influence.
The environmental case is particularly insidious because
proponents of a "biocentric view"io^ of the planet appeal to the
'innocent' relationship between native peoples and nature as a case in
point of a non-utilitarian attitude toward nature: we admire you as
passive and innocuous (nature-loving) natives. These well-intentioned
nature lovers are confusing scientific with technological mastery: they
overlook the fact that while pre-modem cultures developed
sophisticated means of technological mastery, they constrained the
tension between their technological mastery of nature and the
potential for social conflict with a universally applicable, religious
stmcture. Since the power of religion is waning and large scale social
demands are stressing limited and scarce resources, the potential for
social conflict and for new means of political domination is escalating.
Leiss concludes that thoughtless appropriation by both advocates
and detractors fuels the ideological power of the concept of the
"mastery of nature".
"Domination of nature and its surrogates have become
labels for a powerful ideology in modem society, and this
process not only affects the understanding of them, but
also prejudices the meaning of the liberation of nature.
Under present circumstances the latter, instead of
becoming a rational concept, must remain only a
counterideology. " ^
I address the complexities of moving beyond this modern situation in
chapter four; I now conclude my critique of ecophilosophy by
reconstructing the ecophilosophers' concept of nature (historically
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and philosophically) to determine the counterideological tendencies of
their effort.
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9‘^Lelss, pg. 139.
9^Leiss, pg. 141.
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CHAPTER III
THE IDEOLOGY OF NATURE
Let us now consider the ecophilosophical vision as captured by
the title of ecophilosopher Alan Drengson's new book, Bevond
Environmental Crisis: From Technocrat to Planetary Person ^ which
illuminates the paradigmatic effort energizing ecophilosophy.
Ecophilosophers argue that the emergence of an "ecological
consciousness" (a planetary vision) will assure us a happy and
sustainable life. To analyze their proposal in order to determine the
merit of ecophilosophy is justified by this utopian vision which they set
forth. Ecophilosophers argue that the inherent limitations of Western
thinking are running headlong into the restraints of nature, forcing
the emergence of this new awareness. In essence, this means that
ecophilosophers believe that if we adopt this dawning new concept of
nature ("ecological"^ nature), the glaring errors of modem society will
be overcome because natural and social order will reflect the
egalitarian principles inherent to ecological thinking
(interrelationship, diversity, dynamic equilibrium) . Accordingly,
ecophilosophers assume that these ecological concepts, emerging in
human consciousness, are capable of guiding the restoration of
individual, community and planetary health and happiness.
While their attempt to work out this new philosophy of nature
comes from a deep and admirable concern for the status of natural
things (also called "free nature"^) as well as human welfare, their
general theory is inadequate for two reasons: since it is
philosophically positivistic (essentially scientistic in its character);
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t±ierefore. it acts ideologically to obscure current power imbalances.
^
Because both of these charges are directed at the very tendencies
which ecophilosophers believe themselves to have overcome
(scientism and social injustice), it has been necessary to reconstruct
the history of the "idea of nature" (chapters one and two) to prepare
for this critique of ecophilosophy. With the historically Justified
meaning of the domination of nature in place it is possible to examine
more closely the concept of nature operating in ecophilosophy to
reveal its epistemological status and ideological repercussions. At last
it can be shown that since ecophilosophers use philosophical
assumptions about nature derived from the very tradition which they
claim to attack, their theory fails to inspire a radical critique of the
modern age.
I began by considering the impact of the modern concept of
nature on society and suggested that the cunning nature of modem
times is the continued domination and exploitation by some people
over others masked by faith in the emancipatory capacity of modern
science. The advent of modern science radically transforms
philosophy by positing a new view of nature (mind constructs nature),
effectively replacing animistic theories, and equating knowledge with
science. Although ecophilosophers locate the environmental and
moral crisis in modem scientists' mechanistic view of nature, this
suggestion that we can unambiguously know 'nature' demonstrates that
ecophilosophers are as vulnerable to the persuasive influence of this
modem preoccupation (the absorption of the philosophy of nature by
the philosophy of science). It follows that the ecophilosophical
suggestion that a new concept of nature can replace the old view and
121
rectify the modern condition, proffered in the absence of a critique of
scientific rationality, fails to circumvent the domination ideology of the
modern age.
Their agenda mimics the ideological result of the Baconian call
to "dominate nature": the inextricable bond between the domination
(or liberation) of nature and the domination of men and women. Since
modern society deludes itself into believing that the incredible
scientific and technological enterprise that has radically transformed
living conditions has itself been mastered, we believe that we are
ourselves equally transformed by the process when instead the most
vital elements of our psyche are repressed and our rage is vented upon
ourselves. At the same time that the exercise of dominion through
technological advance does not insure parallel moral progress, the loss
of large-scale religious constraints deprives modem society of
direction. Ecophilosophers claim that individuals can restore
restraint with personal ecosophies (individual adaptations of the more
general ecophilosophical world-view), believing that in order to
transcend the Baconian domination ideology each individual must
distance him or herself from the Baconian concept of nature. Yet this
proposal reveals that ecophilosophers misunderstand the subtle effect
of enlightenment thinking: redefining nature will not free us from the
regressive potential of the enlightenment, rather we must overcome
the misappropriation of knowledge itself.
I have suggested that ecophilosophers characterize the problems
of modem society as emanating from a paradigmatic desire to
dominate nature for two reasons: they beUeve that since the sixteenth
century proponents of a mechanistic philosophy of nature have utilized
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political concepts to justify a dominant relationship of humans over
the rest of nature and secondly, they believe that such a relationship is
immoral because of their own conviction that nature is inherently
valuable. They believe that nature, when reinterpreted with a new
ontology, reveals itself to be deserving of the moral consideration
traditionally reserved for human interactions.
Reflecting this theoretical approach, an eco-thinker such as
Andrew McLaughlin^ takes as his point of departure a juxtaposition of
natural images as the foundation of a practical and ethical relationship
between humans and nature. He contrasts an ecological image,
"an ecological image takes the individual entity as nested
within its environment, and takes the relations which a
part has with its environment as essential in constituting
what it is,"®
to an instrumental and mechanical view which he attributes to Bacon,
Descartes and the development of modern scientific thinking.
McLaughlin wants to convince us that as humans we construct images
of nature from "an interested point of view". The view of nature as an
instrument, devoid of intrinsic meaning has dominated, according to
McLaughlin, because of "the increased power it has yielded in our
collective ability to transform the world in accordance with the
interests we bring to it""^.
McLaughlin insists that the profoundly negative result of this
mechanistic view of nature is that any form of manipulation of nature is
acceptable. Yet despite the resulting environmental and ethical crisis,
he glibly overlooks the equally profound material transformation
wrought by modem science and technology. Since it is the profoundly
unequal distribution of the benefits derived from this transformation
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that indicates that the "domination of nature" has come to serve an
ideological function, protecting the interests of particular groups. My
critique targets the ecophilosophical concept of nature as the essential
element of an examination of the ecophilosophical commentary on the
modern age.
Since 1 am characterizing ecophilosophy as a general trend
rather than a specific effort, reconstructing an ecophilosophical
concept of nature involves abstracting from a variety of sources. In a
fashion similar to Habermas' suggestion that we can trace in the "spirit
of positivism" a restricted concept of rationality, 1 propose that in the
'spirit of ecophilosophy' we find a pre-critical (and unsatisfactory)
concept of nature. Focusing on this ecophilosophical concept of
nature allows me to reconstruct the field in a coherent fashion. As a
result, my evaluation of ecophilosophy is first a synthesis of the roots
of eco-thinking (what do ecophilosophers believe about nature) and
secondly an analysis of the concept of nature which emerges from this
synthesis (my construction of the ecophilosophical concept of nature).
Although the history of ecophilosophical thought has been variously
reconstructed by several historians®, these histories themselves are
tainted by an ambiguous concept of nature, making the task of
reconstruction just that more difficult.
A The Spirit of Ecophilosophy
My survey of ecophilosophical thought begins with the
presumption that ecophilosophy lacks the character of a debate on
which a clear and precise order has already been imposed. Although
the newness of the area along with the wide diversity of
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spok6spersons contxibut6S to the failure of ecophilosophers to
establish this coherent, orderly shape on their field, as 1 have
explained, 1 believe a more critical explanation lies in the implicit
assumptions made about two key ecophilosophical concepts: the
"domination of nature" (see chapter one) and "nature" itself. Although
the former has come to serve an ideological function, it is the fate of
the latter than determines the critical success of the effort to liberate
humankind (and nature). After my initial overview, I will impute some
structure to the field by reconstructing it around this latter concept in
order to complete my critique of ecophilosophy.
What is the overarching goal of an ecophilosophy? Although a
characterization of ecophilosophy requires the synthesis of wide-
ranging texts, ecophilosophers agree by and large that the ecologist
Aldo Leopold stands as the modern prophet of this kind of thinking^
because of his influential manuscript, A Sand Countv Almanac . Richard
Sylvan, in his critique of deep ecology^®, refers to Leopold as sacred
text, as does philosopher John Passmore:
"The ecology Aldo Leopold, writing in the nineteen-forties,
was one of the first to suggest that the West now stands in
need of a 'new ethic' - an ethic of conservation."
Since Leopold is trained as a scientist not as a philosopher, he does
not argue his case as an ecophilosopher might; rather, he makes bold
claims about the tarnished relationship between humans and the rest
of nature, believing that nature has been wrongfully dominated by
human interest. Yet, as a scientist, Leopold solidifies the quasi-
scientific^2 language that ecophilosophers use to discuss social theory
and he characterizes the anti-utilitarian intent of eco-thinkers.
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It is Leopold that first argues that since the destruction of
natural things (contrary to survival) is the result of the absence of an
ethical restraint (natural things have no inherent value according to
the current social order), an ethical response is evolutionarily
inevitable if we are to survive. Leopold suggests that "(e)thics are
possibly a kind of community instinct in the making" evolving to
include wider and wider realms of humanity eventually broadening to
include all of nature (the roots of the ecophilosopher’s paradigmatic
"ecological consciousness"). As we multiply, our absolute dependency
on nature is increasingly critical; in response our ethical relationships
evolve in a parallel fashion to insure the appropriate survival behavior.
The sort of ecological ethic that results is one that motivates a limit on
freedom of action in the struggle for existence, recognizing nature as
inherently valuable.
Why attribute inherent value to nature? Since Leopold’s account
of this ethical appropriation is bold and undeveloped, ecophilosophy
is, in essence, an attempt to ground Leopold's vision, to respond to
this nagging question by providing a new view of nature that impels an
ethical response. Beyond Leopold, ecophilosophers believe that the
imperative environmental consciousness replaces rational self-interest
not only with a new sort of ethical restraint regarding nature, but with
a new concept of humanity. As Richard Sylvan explains, this concept
of ethics replaces both the notion of human apartheid (value applies to
humans only) and human supremacy (in ethical situations human
needs are of highest priority).
According to Leopold's "land ethic", humans evolve from a
homocentric view of the world to that of biotic citizen by shifting the
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burden of decision making from the arena of human utility to planetary
obligation. Vital to the Leopoldian analysis is the belief that only by
constructing an image of nature (a new philosophy of nature) to which
humans can respond with appropriate feelings and desires is this
ethical transformation possible.
"No important change in ethics was ever accomplished
without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis,
loyalties, affections, and convictions. The proof that
conservation has not yet touched these foundations of
conduct lies in the fact that philosophy and religion have
not yet heard of it."^^
Borrowing from his training as an ecologist, he images the human-
nature relationship as a biotic pyramid. By placing humans at the top
of this fragile pinnacle, utterly dependent upon the rest of the
pyramid, he hopes to evoke feelings of both contingency and
connection. This delicate tension between a scientific appraisal of
nature and the means to inspire the appropriation of scientific
principles by each individual as a commitment of love (an importaint
element of ecophilosophical thinking) is basic to the ecophilosophical
vision and is essentially resolved by widening ethical boundaries to
include nature.
Ecophilosophers applaud the growing trend to confront science
with ethical accountability and to lay over all scientific activity the 'fact'
of ecology: everything is interconnected. Believing that ecology has
had impact on the common person unlike other sciences, eco-
thinkers are in a long line of believers beginning perhaps in the
eighteenth century who reflect a general trend in ecophilosophy to
embrace the principles of ecology while berating the scientific world
view. The general trend is to give to ecology an epistemologically.
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"quasi-transcendental status" suggesting that ecological knowledge
contains a new form of rationality (ecological rationality^'^). By
delineating a new and essential way we can know the world beyond
the scientific and technological rationality that appears to dominate
our world view, ecophilosophers believe themselves to have provided
the grounds for a 'new science' motivated by other than a technical
interest over nature, but by a desire for unity with nature.
While I am suggesting that ecophilosophy remains rooted in the
Baconian tradition, eco-thinkers trace their revitalized concept of
nature to a discontinuous, pre-modem holism^®. They argue that this
ancient concept of nature has been recently resuscitated exemplified
(as one historian suggests) by naturalist and writer Gilbert White who
in 1789 made a quasi- scientific effort to argue an ecological
perspective. According to an ecophilosophical account, this
renaissance of holistic thinking has characteristically mn contrary to
conventional thought. It is suggested that even White's rudimentary
concept of nature as the great economist (nature converting the
activity of one organism to the support of another) ushers into the
scientific literature a vital 'ecological' vision. Although White is clearly
utilitarian, believing that the goal of scientific study is to support
human life, his protectionist views of nature (written in the safety of
pastoral England) carry a romantic flavor, setting the mood for the
anti-utilitarian bent of ecophilosophy.
Although White's work is elementary, by the early nineteenth
century (perhaps as a response to industrialization) eco-historians
record a revival of this kind of thinking, reflecting a longing for the
pastoral lifestyle described by White in what comes to be known as the
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natural history essay . Writers in the last half of this century return to
White’s kind of writing, this time increasing its impact by placing it in
a growing scientific context. These writers, unlike White, both praise
science as tool and blame it as an impediment (the restricted
mechanistic view of nature) to the search for a more pleasing
relationship with nature. John Burroughs, as a prime example,
suggests that it is necessary to reintroduce into science a view of
nature as organismic (and holistic) rather than mechanistic (and
mathematical) to reclaim the original wonder of scientific discovery.
This longing for holism most recently articulated in the
ecophilosophical concept of "ecological consciousness" is argued to
reappear throughout history as a solution to the alienation and
fragmentation of modem capitalist society.
The development of the "imperialist''^^ view of nature, derived
from Francis Bacon, the father of nature domination, has great
influence in the ecophilosophic tradition. Eco-thinkers suggest that
while the extreme consequence of a' preference for mechanized nature
is the elimination of any transcendental qualities in nature, the
inevitable response to this outcome is the reintroduction of an
organismic ecology that restores to nature its ancient 'life spirit'.
Although the development of this kind of ecological thinking dovetails
with utilitarian thinking (every element of nature is designed to have a
particular use), the primarily utilitarian view of ecology parallels an
anti-utilitarian mood that culminates in the biocentric view of
ecophilosophy.
Consider the work of Henry David Thoreau who, in the
ecophilosophical tradition, suggests that to understand nature we
129
must listen to her: "would it not be well to consult with nature in the
onset, for she is the most extensive and experienced planter of them
all"2i. Thoreau argues that since we cannot live in harmony with the
land until we accept nature as our guide, we must accommodate to the
natural order. Interpreted by eco-thinkers as the desired anti-
utilitarian position (by expressing our alienation from nature we can
transcend it with a new nature philosophy), the necessity for personal
transformation underlies ecophilosophical theory. In response to his
spiritual emptiness, brought on (Thoreau believes) by his alienation
from nature £ind his disillusionment with science, he insists that real
knowledge of nature is obtained by an inward, profoundly ethical
process that produces a pure, untainted view of nature. Although
Thoreau remains sadly scientific in his own estimation, his own
ambivalence is the root of an ecophilosophical trend toward a more
holistic understanding of nature both inside and outside the confines
of traditional scientific activity.
As science takes on ever increasing influence, the concept of
ecology is reintroduced in a new form by scientists such as Charles
Lyell (Principles of Geology) who introduce time, history and change
into the scientific model. The word "oecologie"22 appears in the
literature in 1866, coined by Ernst Haeckel who suggests that many
branches of study can be brought together under a single scientific
discipline to capture the relationship of living beings to the non-living
world. The geographers are some of the first to take up this new
concept, linking forms of vegetation with their climatic determinants
(biomes). For some this interest in linking branches of science
represents the return to generalities and the renaissance of the
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Gilbert White -like 'naturalist'; for others the study of auteeology (the
physiology of organisms) complements the growing trend toward
specialization in the sciences. These parallel attitudes highlight the
equivocal character of the concept 'ecological' in ecophilosophical
thought.
The normative bent of the science of ecology develops as
modern ecologists begin to describe the destructive potential of
human activity in stable, yet dynamic natural biomes (concerns
recently systematized in a new branch of life science called
conservation biology). While reaffirming that human intervention into
nature's processes is potentially disastrous, and that obedienee to
natural principles is essential to human survival, this scientific analysis
suggests to some (in the ecophilosophical tradition) the necessity of a
radically new way for humans to view their relationship to nature. The
ecophilosophers are not satisfied to interpret ecological results
pragmatically since their larger goal is a utopian reorientation of
society along the lines of a Thoreau-like self-transformation.
Clearly Bacon made similar observations about human
dependency upon the whims of nature which would suggest that the
only change from a Baconian analysis to a modern one is that
ecological research offers a fresh understanding of natural processes.
Ecophilosophers insist on a stronger claim, believing that the
emergence of a new "ecological consciousness" transcends the
instrumentality of a Bacon. That the pragmatic shift toward the most
efficacious response to ecology (the desire to help farmers learn how
to respond to new principles of nature) is regarded as a shift away
from true ecological consciousness highlights the attempt by
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ecophilosophers to distance themselves from what they perceive as
the devil of Baconianism: human-centered, utilitarian ethics.
This perception is recently reaffirmed in Arne Naess’ distinction
between "shallow” and "deep" ecology23 where Naess separates the
efforts that focus on environmental regulation from true ecological
consciousness-raising work. Although deep ecologists insist that their
principles do not oppose the practical concern of people by
redirecting the process inward,
"(t)he appropriate framework of discourse for describing
and presenting deep ecology is ... one that is fundamentally
to with the nature and possibilities of the self, or, we
might say, the question of who we are. can become, and
should become in the larger scheme of things, "24
they paint the fundamental modem dilemma as a struggle between
two moral courses captured by two views of nature: the organismic-
holistic and the mechanistic-utilitarian.
To demonstrate that eco-thinking has very little to do with a
concern for the survival of the human species, regard the American
fervor around predator defense sparked by debate in the 1930's and
culminating in the current debate over the reintroduction of wolves
into the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. Since both predator
defenders and opponents appeal to scientific evidence to support
their opposing positions, the issue appears to transcend the
boundaries of a scientific debate. In the 1930's Aldo Leopold, a game
manager himself, reconceptualizes the issue as a moral one, arguing
that since the presence of the wolf is not essential to human survival
to claim that it is wrong to eliminate the wolf is a proclamation for a
new moral perspective regarding nature. While his persuasive
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influence marks the end of massive wolf and coyote extermination in
the United States, Leopold's normative ecological argument comes to
represent a romantic regret present in the history of eco-thought.
currently being developed as ecophilosophical thinking.
Although the current proposal for the reintroduction of the wolf
is argued as sound ecological management (biologists argue that if the
wolf, having been essentially eliminated from the lower forty-eight,
were reintroduced into large, intact ecosystems the character of
ecosystemic health brought about by a healthy predator-prey balance
might be restored), ecosystemic health is an insignificant aspect of
this fiery debate. To eco-thinkers the controversy represents the
antagonism between nature imperialism and the desire to reclaim and
restore harmony with nature. For them the wolf symbolizes the
parallel loss of wildness and the growing insatiable human appetite: for
others the restoration of the wolf represents the irrational elitism of
nature lovers.
It is most likely because of its holistic orientation that ecology
becomes a fertile field for this kind of thinking. As Aldo Leopold
writes: "All ethics rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a
member of a community of interdependent parts. The emergence
of the ecological sciences impels Leopold to suggest that the
"complexity of the land organism" is "the outstanding scientific
discovery of the twentieth century". Initially Leopold grounds his
theory in intuition, using the work of Peter D. Ouspensky (1878-1947)
to support his notion of a living earth. Later he switches to ecology to
develop his idea of "biotic right" the ingredient that sets his thinking
apart from the traditional conservation movement in the United
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States. By 1948, Leopold refines his land ethic from a species
perspective to the realm of ecosystemic processes into his most
widely quoted precept:
a land-use decision is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It
is wrong when it tends otherwise. "26,
This concern for systems preservation changes the character of eco-
ethics.
The effort to establish the intrinsic value of nature reflects two
distinct concerns: the desire by humanitarians to end animal suffering
and the vision of the ecophilosophers to free all of nature from
domination. The adamant arguments by ecophilosophers to distance
themselves from animal rights activists highlights the ecological
character of their agenda. Although even John Locke includes some
animal protection in his work because of their status as property,
committed spokespersons against animal mistreatment surface
beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Initially it is
their interest in the character of men and women that spurs their
comments on the treatment of animals; therefore it is a mistake to
read into the seventeenth and eighteenth century organicists the kind
of environmental ethic which produces ecophilosophy. Eco-thinkers
suppose themselves to be motivated by an expanded self-interest
which places humanity in a more correct ethical position.
While utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham argue for an end to
cruelty toward animals, suggesting that animals useful to people
occupy a superior position (below slaves but above to other life forms),
some of Bentham's contemporaries advanced a more radical position
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by attributing rights to all animals. The idea of an extended moral
community reaches its peak in the nineteenth century when Henry S
Salt argues for a common bond of humanity to unite all Imng beings.
"What was lacking in English and American attitudes. Salt
felt, was "a true sense of kinship" with nonhuman beings.
The community had to be widened. "27
Since Salt suggests that the liberation of animals depends upon human
beings rethinking their relationship to the rest of nature, he combines
the concern for animal rights and the paradigmatic ecological
rationality to which eco-thinkers refer.
This kind of holistic thinking is also reflected by Edward Payson
Evans in "Ethical Relations between Man and Beast" (1884) where he
develops a remarkably full case against "the anthropocentric character
of Christianity"28. Evans, developing the commonality of humans and
animals on "strictly scientific grounds" carefully deflates the argument
that mistreatment of animals is wrong merely because it degrades both
men and the animals they mistreat, arguing instead for the intrinsic
rights of non-human life forms (including inanimate objects like rocks
and minerals). Along with Evans, John Howard Moore (1862-1916)
makes significant contribution to the idea of ethical extension, arguing
that "earth life is a single process... every part related and akin to every
other part. "29
Leopold's term "thinking like a mountain"30 finally culminates
this ecological imaging. In his essay by that name from the Sand
County Almanac
. Leopold suggests that only the mountain has lived
long enough to listen objectively to the howl of the wolf. Leopold
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hopes that humans would somehow obtain sueh a mountain
perspective.
"One who could listen objectively to that howl (wolf), who
visualize the wolf in relation to the total life process of the
ecosystem through time, not as it might affect one's own
immediate interests (is) thinking ecologically, like a
mountain. "31
This vision of humankind transcending its limited ego-centered
perspective to obtain an almost god-like view, reverberating
throughout the ecophilosophical literature, represents Leopold's most
enduring contribution. The suggestion that obedience to, rather than
utilization of, nature offers a more life-affirming existence betrays a
disturbing dilemma in ecophilosophy which I take up below.
Despite Leopold's vision, since traditional moral philosophy
professes little concern for the human relationship with nature, only
very recently does the intensity of environmental concern coupled
with a dissatisfaction with philosophy itself result in the creation of a
new field: environmental philosophy32. As philosophers begin to
delineate it, environmental philosophy comes to have several
meanings, although the heart of ecophilosophy revolves around the
reinterpretation and magnification of the work of several philosophers
(Spinoza, Whitehead, Heidegger), transforming environmental
philosophy from its original ethical focus to ontological concerns.
For the ecophilosopher, ecology's holism matches other
philosophical and theological inquiry: Alfred North Whitehead's
(1861-1947) argument that the identity and purpose of every object in
the universe arises from its relationship to everything else and Albert
Schweitzer's suggestion that the taking of life should only happen
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when absolutely necessary and only with a compassionate sense of
responsibility. These theories are evidenced as heralding the
profundity of the ecophilosophical approach. Although Schweitzer's is
a mystical holism, it coincides with the eco-thinkers’ concept of a
biotic community: every being has a place in the ecosystem.
Interdependence, as a description of nature and a basis for
determining human conduct toward nature, rises with the growing
interest in ecology.
These developments spring from initial disagreements over the
character of an environmental ethic. Is an environmental ethic
possible and should it be utilitarian or derived from the intrinsic value
of nature? While the belief that we ought to protect the natural world
is the common element of any kind of eco-thinking, philosophers
begin to elucidate this growing body of work by differentiating primary
from secondary environmental ethics^^. Primary environmental ethics
(that which derives the obligation to protect the natural world from
the needs and interests of nature alone) comes to dominate
ecophilosophical work in contrast to secondary environmental ethics
developed from a commitment to the welfare of the human
community. Such a 'pollution ethic' requires human beings to sacrifice
personal gain when it interferes with the health, pleasure or survival of
other members of society. Accordingly, either utilitarian or egalitarian
theories can serve as a rational foundation for environmental
protection. Utilitarian pollution ethicists would argue that prescribing
environmental health arises from a sense of duty to protect future
generations while egailitarian pollution ethicists would insist that all
human beings deserve equal protection from environmental hazards.
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Ecophilosophers. rejecting the adequacy of any pollution ethic
argue that an appropriate ethical inquiry leads us to conclude that
since nonhuman entities ought to be free to attain their own good, we
are forced to adopt a biocentric world view (the recognition that
natural enUties have value other than in service to humankind) in
order to obtain a correct relation to the natural world. In 1964,
lawyer Clarence Morris publishes an essay arguing for the legal rights
of nature, but it is Christopher Stone^^ in 1972 personifies nature
to an unprecedented extent by arguing that the legal system is capable
of expansion to include nature. Eco-advocates within the women's
movement are instrumental in redirecting environmental thinking
along broader lines by suggesting that "(t)he hatred of women and the
hatred of nature are intimately connected and mutually reinforcing."35
These ecofeminists^s argue that while women have traditionally been
viewed 'closer' to nature than men, permitting the subversion of
women's interests, the ecological perspective can now benefit from a
feminist perspective. In her book Why the Green Nigger?. Elizabeth
Dodson Gray argues that since a new understanding of life (reflecting
the earth) must be systematic and interconnected rather than linear
and hierarchical, women are in a better position to understand nature
because of their tendency to de-emphasize the individual self in a
network of relationships. Similarly, Carolyn Merchant^® argues that
since the reconceptualization of reality as a machine rather than a
living organism sanctions the domination of both nature and women, a
new conception can put an end to oppression.
Appearing alongside the work of the ecofeminists is the work of
the deep eeologists®® whose roots are Norwegian. In 1941, Peter
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Zapffe outlines a nonanthropocentric theory of human-environment
relations which in 1974 Sigmund Kvaloy coins 'ecophilosophy'. It is
Arne Naess who suggests the term 'deep ecology' to define the rise of
ecology which entails philosophical and religious principles,
undermining traditional ways of understanding nature. While the core
of deep ecology is a belief in ecological egalitarianism, biocentrism and
anti-anthropocentrism (the right of every organism to function
normally in the ecosystem), the foundation of such belief is the
inherent value of nature. Thinking in terms of processes and systems,
deep ecologists distinguish themselves from animal liberationists,
arguing that since some organisms because of their undesirable nature
require enlightened self-interest to be preserved, we are required to
accept a new sense of Self as the basis of an ecological perspective.
The deep ecologists and animal liberationists continue a heated
debate.'^o
Deep ecologists and ecofeminists are involved in a separate
debate as to the character of the ethic proposed by each. Although
they concur that the treatment of nature is ultimately at stake,
ecofeminists argue that the deep ecological agenda retains
fundamental domination structures. Ecofeminists belief that their
commitment to ecological humanism distinguishes them from deep
ecologists. As Ynestra King explains:
Deep ecology ignores the structures of entrenched
economic and political power within society,
concentrating exclusively on self-realization and cultural
transformation, taking the side of nature over culture...
Although ecofeminists recognize the implicit ideological consequences
of the deep ecologist's position, the debate is currently unresolvable
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because both theories are implicitly grounded in a positivist concept of
nature. Although not the focus of this project, my re-examination of
the concept of nature in the ecophilosophical context is useful to
resolving this debate.^2
The implication of any biocentric thinking is that the whole is at
least as important as any of its parts. James Lovelock’s Gaia
hypothesis, according to which he reconceptualizes the earth as a
living being whose rights are primary to any lesser being^s is the most
well-developed attempt to scientifically support this kind of thinking.
Some have charged that such thinking is "environmental fascism",
resembling a totalitarian government where the good of the
community outweighs the good of any individual. Ecophilosophers
argue that an environmental ethic pushes traditional liberal philosophy
past its conceptual limits, calling into question the legitimacy of the
rights of the individual upon which liberal thinking is based. It claims
to have reinterpreted the individual, the Self, in terms of a biophysical
matrix that creates and sustains life.
Murray Bookchin'^'^ (as early as 1952) is the champion of the
social and political implications of ecophilosophy, advocating a radical
environmental theory sympathetic to critical theory. He argues that
since the domination of nature by man stems from the very real
domination of humans by other humans, the obsession with hierarchy
and power has justified gross injustice. Bookchin regrets the faddish
nature of environmentalism and deep ecology, arguing for a direct
confrontation with the mechanism of domination in society. He is
probably the first to argue that "the science of ecology itself
constitutes a major anomaly for Galilean science'"^^ since the
140
generalizing character of science opposes the specificity and
uniqueness of each ecosystem. Even Bookchin’s political solution that
"an anarchist community would approximate a (normal) ecosystem; it
would be diversified, balanced and harmonious"46 while addressing the
political nature of ecophilosophy fails to adequately locate the
apolitical character of the philosophy of nature underlying eco-
p
thinking.
To transcend our current ethical dead-end, ecophilosophers
argue that we need either a new science or we need to reject the
scientific approach all together, that by quantifying ecology we
regrettably remove nature from the ethical realm. Yet if scientific
rationality is inherently motivated by technical cognitive interests
(Habermas), the dilemma faced by nature ethicists is whether to reject
science and with it the ecological vision that it supports or to accept it
and by that to absorb its instrumental nature. Ecological rationality
which ecophilosophers argue transcends the instrumentalism of
scientific rationality is not free of its scientific roots as long as eco-
thinkers continue the historic appeal to ground their theory in
'ecological' nature.
"(Ecophilosophy) is the utilization of basic concepts from
the science of ecology - such as complexity, diversity, and
symbiosis - to clarify the place of our species within nature
through the process of working out a total view. "47
Since the belief that it is right to protect and wrong to abuse nature
(nature is intrinsically valuable) is both compelled and confirmed by an
appropriate appreciation of the ecological character of nature,
ecophilosophers are haunted by the scientistic character of their
theory.
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B. The Ecophilosophical Concept of Natnrp
The character of ecophilosophy (portrayed above) springs from a
shared belief in the wrongful domination and misapprehension of
nature and coalesces around the attempt to recUfy the situation by
redefining nature. Yet this characterization of ecophilosophy leaves
many unanswered questions, the most confounding; how and by whom
are life and death decisions made according to an eco-ethic? As 1 have
indicated, I believe that the absence of a critical analysis of nature fuels
this glaring gap in ecophilosophical rhetoric. Although the literature
is filled with attempts to redefine and protect nature, the discourse
needed to place the concept of nature in a larger philosophical
dialogue is rare. As a result, concepts like "the domination of nature",
"the liberation of nature" and the "redefinition of nature" lack a
meaningful context. Likewise it is impossible to follow the
ecophilosophical arguments for a new science (ecology) without a
supporting critique of the overwhelming arguments for the
instrumental character of scientific nature. I am hard pressed to
justify the general ecophilosophical claims despite their intentions
since the entire ecophilosophical enterprise is weakened by an
incoherent explanation of nature.
Therefore, if we narrow the ecophilosophical agenda by asking,
"what do ecophilosophers mean by 'nature'?", a reconstructed
ecophilosophy emerges lodged in the philosophical tradition where
the character of such knowledge plays a pivotal role. Since
ecophilosophers believe that they have radicalized philosophy with a
new concept of nature (econature"^®), an analysis of this concept should
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support their contention. Although their are (at least) three different
philosophies of nature that could underlie the ecophilosophical claims
about nature, the kinds of requirements that ecophilosophers want to
make about the revolutionary character of ecology wed them to one
philosophical position in particular. Attributing this philosophy of
nature to ecophilosophy, my assessment turns on an expanded
critique of this view.
Ecophilosophers could argue that nature is merely whatever
"we" define it to be (nature is entirely fictitious). According to this
view scientists/technicians merely choose a model of nature that
works and political theoreticians select one that supports the way they
want to see the world so that natural philosophy is crafted according
to larger philosophical and political agendas. This analysis would tend
to support the ecophilosophical contention that sixteenth and
seventeenth thinkers supplant the holistic view of nature with a
mechanistic one in order to promote technological expansion. Yet
this concept of nature goes against the tendency in ecophilosophy to
advance the ecological view as indicative of the true character of
nature.
On the other hand, ecophilosophers could argue (in Hegelian
style) that nature is identical to consciousness. Matching a Leopoldian
vision of the evolution of human consciousness, according to this view,
the project of nature would encompass the project of humankind in a
"grand tapestry of meaning". Ecological consciousness becomes the
next expression of nature in a ever expanding project of Self
understanding. Although some ecophilosophers express the inevitably
of a dawning consciousness in this evolutionary way, the universal
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fascination that ecophilosophers have with the character and
treatment of nature itself (apart from human activity) supersedes this
concept of nature.
Rather we can better understand the framework within which
ecophilosophers work if we define nature as having a truth separate
from human consciousness. On this perception, nature’s ultimate
character is knowable (ecologically) and this knowledge (the
knowledge that nature is fundamentally a pattern of integrated and
interdependent relationships) acts as a kind of "self-knowledge",
stimulating new patterns of being. According to this universal
characterization, since nature does not change, we must change in our
ability to recognize its (our) genuine character by following its dictates.
Ecophilosophers would argue that their ecological rationality
transcends scientific rationality, serving to repair the gap between our
scientific knowledge and our moral behavior. Yet their philosophy of
nature, as I have characterized it, places a limit on the scope of
ecophilosophy. Other scientifically inspired work such as that of
Herbert Spencer, intending to unify knowledge, foreshadows the
ecophilosophical effort and exemplifies the influential character of the
belief that scientific theory can be reworked and applied to unrelated
fields. Spencer's picture of human history is a utopian one. Capturing
the long process of human 'adaptation' to the requisites of perfect
social life (Leopold?), Spencer describes the elimination of all
structures of domination in the final form of adaptation: altruism.
Spencer biologizes the modern faith in human progress with his belief
in the uniformity of natural processes, "the necessity of adaptation is
proved by its universal occurrence in nature"'^^, by drawing upon
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Charles Lyell s Principles of Geology and his own Larmarkian views of
evolution (Spencer predates Darwin and holds a more ancient view of
the inheritance of acquired traits) to substantiate his philosophical
views.
Although Spencer emphatically rejects the labepo. there is a
Habermasian sense in which he is a philosophical positivist because he
argues for a universal foundation for ethics derived from science. In
this era when traditional religion no longer commands authority, he
calls his work the "secularization" of ethics.
"...for Comte and Spencer the appeal of science was that it
had authority, that it could and did compel assent, which
was just where existing systems of ethics failed. As
science was the knowledge of nature, an authoritative
analysis of the moral realm was only possible if its subject
matter were shown to be pairt of nature; and this was
Spencer's fundamental assertion about society.
Although Spencer's 'essential principle of life' pivots on his
teleological concept of adaptation,
"(p)rogress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity.
Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature;
all of a piece with the development of the embryo or the
unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have
undergone, and are still undergoing, result from a law
underl5dng the whole organic creation; and provided the
human race continues, and the constitution of things
remains the same, those modifications must end in
completeness, "^2
the ecophilosopher's vision of an emerging ecological consciousness
carries with it the same flavor of inevitability implicit in any discussion
of natural processes.
Ecophilosopher Arne Naess^^ is well aware of the dangers of
what he calls "ecologism"54, arguing carefully that ecophilosophy
although inspired by ecology is not derived from it. He distinguishes
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ecophilosophy from what he calls Spencer’s scientism as well as other
attempts to systematize scientific principles by arguing that these
attempts fail to address the inadequate ontology of a scientific
appraisal of nature ( the whole Earth is not the Earth plus its maps").
Ecophilosophy, Naess contends, transcends such attempts because it
appeals to a "broader" and more "profound" concept of nature
(Spinoza’s concept as an example) rather than the limited concepts
available from natural science. Distancing ecophilosophy from
ecologism, Naess explains that ecophilosophers work with
"ecologically defined thought models’’^^. these models, serving
heuristic rather than ontological functions, are never comparable to
larger philosophical theories of knowledge.
These larger philosophical systems to which Naess alludes are of
particular interest because although Naess acknowledges the faulty
nature of any attempt to derive a normative principle from a scientific
fact, his larger concept of nature is imbedded in ecological principles.
To argue that normative statements are philosophically prior to and
not derived from a network of supporting non-normative statements
which he calls h}q)otheses (since these normative judgments
presuppose a 'total view’), he must first corroborate Spinozian ’nature’
with an ecological perspective. This process resembles Hegel's
critique of the "epistemological circle": knowledge does not permit
knowledge prior to any other. In order to know we must assume that
which we want to know. For ecophilosophy this means that in order
to know nature as seamless we must presume the holism of nature.
Hegel abandons the problems of "first philosophy" phenomenologically
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(experience is knowledge), but by doing so he abandons critical
philosophy (choosing knowledge without critique).
Naess rejects as uninformative the idealists' argument that all
qualities of nature are projections of human consciousness, arguing
that it is critical that we "try to get the qualities back into nature"^®.
Naess believes that he can turn an Hegelian idealism on its head and
yet not retreat into positivism (retain the knowledge of nature outside
scientific rationality). Although Naess acknowledges that all attempts
to describe the "thing-in-itself (nature beyond human apprehension)
have failed, he argues that "relations" obtain an objective quality:
nature is "that which is in relationship to".
"We arrive, not at the things themselves, but at networks
or fields of relations in which things participate and from
which they cannot be isolated.
Naess believes that this concept of nature transcends any single
natural science description of nature since it transcends constantly
changing renditions of nature, representing instead "descriptions of
certain conditions of interdependence ... universal (and) common to
all cultures"^®. Understanding nature relationally radically transforms
the way we typically speak about nature since the identity principle
cannot be violated. Not only are secondary qualities (the fact that a
thing is cold or hot) apprehended as genuine qualities of nature, the
fact that something is both hot and cold is not a contradiction but
rather perception within a relational field. A thing can be warm in one
relation and cold in another since all statements about nature are
relational statements.
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Naess prefers this reconstructed concept of nature because it
lends itself to reconceptualizing all aspects of nature as inseparable
from the total view. People are relational junctions within the total
view, participating in a process of identification in which the
"relations which define the junction expand to comprise more and
more. The self grows toward the ’Self."^^ Since the concrete
character of nature is in its relations, the mystique of things in
themselves is removed. Not only does it make no sense to speak of
the projection of sense qualities (secondary and tertiary qualities), the
primary qualities (geometric-mechanical qualities) are reduced to the
characteristics of abstract structures, having nothing to do with reality.
We do not project qualities onto nature; the qualities (the relations)
are themselves nature. Ontologically, according to Naess’
reconstruction, ecophilosophers believe themselves to have overcome
the mechanistic descriptions of nature that they believe have since the
modem period removed nature from the everyday activity of human
beings by restoring nature in the form of relationships.
This solution curiously resembles the Hegelian one. Hegel
overcomes Kant's ambivalence by claiming that the objects of our
experience are the things themselves. Since for Hegel, objects of
knowledge must be wholly within the realm of consciousness, idealism
(the view that objects are in some sense "in" or dependent on
consciousness) becomes the obvious preference. Absolute knowledge
is to proceed with the phenomenological experience, but because it is
absolute, it does not need to be justified by the phenomenological self-
reflection of the mind. Hegel's theory of knowledge presupposes just
what his theory calls into question; the possibility of absolute
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knowledge. Hegel, by reinterpreting the "epistemologieal circle" gains
reflection, but by proposing it as an all inclusive process, he sacrifices
critique.
Habermas believes that, although Hegel correctly locates the
Kantian error, "What is demanded is thus the following; we should
know the cognitive faculty before we know"^o, this "problematic
method" is still recommended for methodological investigations.
Hegel's reconception of epistemology does not rectify the
philosopher's dilemma. Since not all principles can be taken as
problematic, the philosopher is forced to assume the frame of
reference of a particular investigation as true for the course of the
investigation. Although the repetition of this process is presumed to
guarantee that all presuppositions will come into question, the choice
of the first frame of reference and the sequence of the additional
remain arbitrary. By abandoning the critical philosophy, epistemology
loses rational autonomy.
Since for the ecophilosopher conventional scientific rationality
destroys gestalt®^ experience by isolating phenomena, the possibility
that ecology might introduce holism into science represents for
ecophilosophers evidence of revolutionary thinking. Ecophilosopher
Naess suggests that philosophically the terms 'fact' and 'value'
distinguish themselves only if tom away from the gestalt of holism.
While our spontaneous experience of reality is more or less
comprehensive since experience captures the gestalt of "all things
hang together", the philosophical import of this relational knowledge
is the possibility of absolute knowledge (Naess argues that relations
transcend culture and history). Yet to conclude that nature is
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relational Naess must presume a relaUonal mind (the relational
eharacter of nature). Although Naess believes he has overcome the
subject-object split by absorbing both in the relation, he has lost, like
Hegel, a space for critique which itself becomes just one more
relation. The inevitability of a positivist philosophy is insured when
the philosophy of nature is undeniably pre-critical.
Does Naess succeed in distancing ecophilosophy from a
Spencer-like agenda? Compelled by a similar vision of integration and
holism, Spencer explains in his First Principles62 that the
relationship between science and philosophy reflects the fact that
while philosophers desire knowledge of the highest generality,
science is merely the sum of knowledge formed of their individual
contributions, lacking the knowledge constituted by the fusion of all
these contributions into a whole. Science consists of truths existing
more or less separated, and does not encompass these truths as
entirely integrated.
"But when, having been severally reduced to a simple
mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular physics, and a
law of social action, they are contemplated together as
corollaries of some ultimate truth, then we rise to the kind
of knowledge that constitutes Philosophy proper."®^
Spencer believes that the widest generalizations of science
comprehend and consolidate the narrow generalizations of its own
division. In the same way, the generalizations of philosophy
comprehend and consolidate the widest generalizations of science.
While Spencer also believes that the relativity of our thought
debars us from knowing or conceiving Absolute Being, he argues that
this very relativitv of our thought necessitates the vague consciousness
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of Absolute Being. The connectedness of our thought implies the
Absolute.®'^
"The reduction of the generalizations that have been set
forth to a completely integrated state exemplifies once
more the process of Evolution, and strengthens still
further the general fabric of conclusions.
Spencer believes that we may be certain, a priori , that there must be a
law which holds of every change and by unifying all changes it must be
the basis of Philosophy. Like Naess, Spencer argues for a quality that
transcends traditional concepts of nature, arguing that
interconnection underlies phenomena. Thus, Spencer's argument
that the process of Evolution is the fundamental principle of the
Unknown and the most general principle of the Known which
underlies all human consciousness (subjective) and all of nature
(object) parallels the ecophilosophical effort to rebuild an ecological
ontology in the wake of the Kantian "epistemological turn".
C. The Idea of Nature Reconsidered
1 have intentionally reorganized ecophilosophy around a pre-
critical philosophy of nature in order to examine the ideological
consequences of this kind of framework. This way of analyzing
ecophilosophy prioritizes the epistemological debate in which 1
believe the field is embedded. Although 1 consider in chapter four the
larger implications of this debate on the potentiality of a new scientific
rationality, the point here is to substantiate my characterization of
ecophilosophy and to underscore the negative implications that result.
While the intent of ecophilosophy is to move from ethics to
ontology and back (Naess), this ontological emphasis shifts the
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attention of ecophilosophers away from a more primary concern for
the problem of knowledge itself. This philosophical disposition
divulges the positivist proclivity of its advocates by removing nature
from the arena of human politics. Although ecophilosophers are
concerned with the political implementation of ecophilosophy, they
avoid deeply unresolved issues by underlying their political discussions
with a universal concept of nature. The 'total view' predisposes
ecophilosophers to believe that the possibility of knowledge of nature
is non-problematic and that with the correct view the appropriate
social and political agenda immediately follows.
Take as a current and relevant example the AIDS virus. From
the perspective of a universal, ecological framework, the survival of the
virus is worthy of consideration since in the larger planetary system
the virus might serve a valuable purpose (population control, etc.). Yet
the political reality of carrying out a policy based on this "fact" is
overwhelmingly racist and class-based. The ecophilosophical agenda
(as I have characterized it) is impotent to respond to this dilemma in a
concretely positive manner since it has sacrificed its critical stance to
a larger evaluation scheme (the good of the planet).
If ecophilosophy is so obviously ineffectual, what are the roots of
this confusion? An explanation of ecophilosophical thinking is
essentially the product of three historians®^ whose work serves the
ecophilosophical community's need to explain what Nash calls "one of
the most remarkable ideas of our time: the belief that ethical standing
does not begin and end with human beings"®^. It is possible in these
histories to substantiate the pre-critical philosophy of nature that I
have attributed to ecophilosophical theory. Although these histories
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reflect disparate influences, they serve to affirm the ecophilosopher's
universal concept of nature. (Merchant argues that the parallel
dominations of women and nature match the loss of a more
feminine /holistic concept of nature while Worster traces the idea in
the context of the development of the science of ecology and Nash
situates environmental ethics in the liberal tradition of inherent
rights).
Nowhere in ecophilosophical literature (Leiss excluded) does a
suggestive philosophical discussion of the political implications of an
acceptable concept of nature occur, yet from these three histories we
can abstract the trends that underlie ’econature’. Ecophilosophical
nature is pre-critical (the possibility of knowledge is non-
problematic), its character is idealistic (our idea of nature determines
our social interactions) and from these two it follows that the
ecophilosopher's call to liberate nature is counterideological since
nature bears the same relationship to all men and women. Paralleling
the histories written by early positivists the histories of ecophilosophy
reinforce its belief in itself.
Historical analysis reflects the idealism embedded in
ecophilosophical theory: our Idea of nature transcends nature's
externality and materiality. Although Naess, in an attempt to remove
nature from mind, tries to materialize this Idea by arguing that natural
qualities are not the product of human perception but the result of the
relational character of nature, his effort merely reflects the ambiguity
of econature. It is a goal of ecophilosophers to instaurate nature (to
reveal nature as it really is) in order to model our behavior on it and
yet, unlike the early positivists, eco-thinkers such as Naess are fully
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aware of the impact of modem epistemology on the tenuous nature of
such knowledge. Although the fate of ecophilosophy turns on
resolving this tension, on adequately addressing the problem of
knowledge (since ecophilosophers insist that the reconceptualization
of nature is vital to their theory), ecophilosophers circumvent the
issue by focusing on the revolutionary quality of a new (unproblematic)
image of nature.
Much of the confusion revolves around the use of the concept of
a 'paradigm'®®. Ecophilosophers argue that since paradigms or world
views determine historical epoches, a particular view of nature
determines the culture's social interactions as well as its interactions
with the rest of nature. Carolyn Merchant's analysis reflects this belief
that not only have ideas of nature dominated human actions, but their
idealistic quality meike it possible to revolutionize society with a new
concept of nature. Merchant argues, tracking concepts of nature from
primitive holism to mechanicism, that since the mechanistic image of
nature (closely bound to science and patriarchy) has failed to elicit its
original social vision, the roots of change must lie in reconstructed
pre-modem images of the earth as a living organism. This vision is
unabashedly stated by ecophilosopher Alan Drengson.
"We believe that constmcting an environmental ethic in
the absence of getting at the deeper stmctures of modem
Western consciousness will not penetrate to the roots of
our current problems." "We undertake to do this by
comparing and contrasting what we call the technocratic
mind-set with the pernetarian (persons in networks of
planetary relationships) approach. The first is shallow in
its ecological understanding, the latter is characterized by
deep and deepening insight into the diversity of ecological
values that characterize our world and Nature as It is in
Itself."®®
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While for Merchant the failure of this mechanistic image of nature is
reflected in the flagrant domination of women and destructive
manipulation of nature, she makes the deeper, ecophilosophical
argument that our Ideas about nature take on both a normative and
paradigmatic character, directing human behavior. The deterministic
quality of these ideas. Merchant argues, is to be found in an historical
analysis of our attitudes toward nature.
How does the evidence hold up? Merchant's reconstruction
from the perspective of people's attitudes toward nature reveals that
into the sixteenth century, the root metaphor binding together the
self, society and the cosmos is that of an organism.
"In general, the Renaissance view was that all things were
permeated by life, there being no adequate method by
which to designate the inanimate from the animate. It was
difficult to differentiate between living and nonliving
things, because of the resemblance in structures.
Merchant suggests that this Idea of nature limits what is acceptable
Renaissance behavior as evidenced in the sixteenth century debates
about mining; the restraining force of beneficent mother Earth
restricts access to precious metals.
"The earth does not conceal and remove from our eyes
those things which are useful and necessary to mankind,
but, on the contrary, like a beneficent and kindly mother
she yields in large abundance from her bounty and brings
into the light of day the herbs, vegetables, grains, and
fruits, and trees. The minerals, on the other hand, she
buries far beneath in the depth of the ground, therefore
they should not be sought.
Merchant believes that this perception reveals the normative force of
the image of nature as a nurturing mother under whose influence men
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and women of the pre-modern age carried out their interactions with
nature.
Merchant characterizes the core concepts of the modem world,
mechanism and the domination of nature paradigmatically by arguing
that these images carry the same normative force as pre-modern ones.
Since paradigmatic shifts occur when stress is put on the old
framework (as ecophilosophers characterize paradigm change), the
locus of stress in this case. Merchant argues, is the advance of science
and technology and the resulting commercial revolution. Moral
restraint affiliated with the Renaissance image of the female earth is
overcome by greed and is vindicated by a new framework (Bacon's
reconceptualization of nature), reversing constraints. Finally she
suggests that the growing dissatisfaction from dominated women and
the increasing concern for the destruction of nature can act as the
present counterforce against this mechanistic view, heralding a new
view of nature ('econature').
Where do our changing ideas of nature come from? Merchant's
analysis of the transition from holism to mechanicism reveals that she
believes herself privy to an ecological perspective, an earth's eye view
of history. Consider again her analysis of industrialization; since the
premodem peasant ecosystem carried a source of instability (the
hierarchical structure of landlord domination), this, combined with
population pressure and technological innovation, results in significant
impacts on resources by different interest groups and changes in the
whole ecosystem. Population growth exacerbated by landlord
exactions means that eventually there is not enough land per person to
ward off famine in a poor harvest year, resulting in the growth of cities
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and a bourgeois class of entrepreneurs who help fund the development
of strong national states, undercutting the power of regional landlord
nobility. The emerging capitalist society bases itself on the
exploitation of natural resources condoned by a utilitarian view of
nature -with dramatic effects on social events and human welfare.
Although Merchant correctly characterizes the influence of
capitalist structures on social relations, her preoccupation with natural
images betrays her underlying idealism. Merchant argues that
mechanism by eliminating from the description of nature concepts of
value, purpose, harmony, quality and form which are central to the
older organic description of nature (replacing them with material and
efficient causes, matter and force) becomes the vital principle for
restructuring society. Things rather than relations are conceptualized
as ultimate reality. Francis Bacon: "By art and the hand of man, nature
can then be forced out of her natural state and squeezed and molded.
In this way, human knowledge and human power meet as one."
Merchant argues that this Idea of nature, serving as a foil for
mankind's manipulative activities can be undermined with an
enlightened Idea of holism. However, her analysis directly contradicts
the historically ideological function of the 'mastery of nature' to mask
the continued domination of some men and women because of an
undisputed respect for nature.
By arguing that nature imperialism is the Baconian heritage,
ecophilosophers are led to believe that the liberation of nature is
merely the repudiation of the Baconian enthusiasm for its
manipulation. Yet the ideological power of Bacon s position is to be
found in the positivist elements of his concept of nature (since nature
157
has the same relationship to all men and women, everyone will profit
from increased knowledge and technological manipulation). Clearly
everyone has not. The revolutionary capacity of a critique of Bacon is
to be found not by supplanting his 'view' of nature with another, but by
reexamining the way a universal concept of nature threatens continued
unequal distributions of power.
To characterize the ecophilosophical and historical
reconstruction (as characterized by Merchant); the pre-modems
inherit a world view (the sanctity of nature) from which emerges
sanctions on various activities (the sacred character of mother earth).
Since the idea of nature functions normatively, moderns distinguish
themselves when they break with this paradigmatic holism, replacing
sanctions against the manipulation of nature by wanton enthusiasm for
"probing the secrets of nature". In doing so, they mask the tme
desires of this shift in a new ontology of nature (nature as machine).
Since the driving force behind this shift is a patriarchal need to
dominate and a capitalist drive to exploit, the fruits of the modern
paradigm are the domination of women and the destmction of nature,
producing incessant greed and unhappiness. The dawning new
paradigm, "sustainable technology practices, wholeness of self, healthy
communities and gentle life styles"^^^ depends upon the conscious
restoration and recreation of a new image of nature that may function
normatively to constrain once again the kinds of activities which
dominate and coerce.
The epistemological status of these historical images is
troubling. Clearly the pre-modern sanctions on particular uses of
nature issues from a sanctified fear of disturbing natural processes. It
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is against unrealistic superstition that sixteenth century thinkers
begin to reconceptualize the relationship between human life and the
drudgery of work. As critical theorists Horkheimer and Adorno argue,
although the human desire to separate from nature is an old one, it
expresses itself most clearly in Enlightenment rhetoric. The
undisputable positive goal of liberating the human condition is
dialectically related to the overwhelming tendency for instrumental
thinking to dominate all spheres of life.
While ecophilosophers believe that the possibility that we can
reconceptualize ourselves as 'reabsorbed' into nature radically shifts all
philosophical thinking, their suggestion merely circumvents without
responding to tlie tyranny of knowledge. It prevents them from
observing that it is the success (not failure) of the modem science and
technology which underlies the reconceptualization of econature since
it is the material comfort of late moderns coupled with the increasing
potential for widespread satisfaction of need that has allowed the
wealthier to 'risk all' in a not so new utopian vision. This not so new
vision has a not so new component (the ideology of nature) that
continues to jeopardize the autonomy of the less powerful as it gains
influence.
Before I conclude with an analysis of the insidious character of
such an ideology of nature in order to better understand the
paradigmatic idealism of ecophilosophy, Donald Worster's analysis of
the connections between the science of ecology and econature
highlights the ecophilosopher's epistemological bind. In a Kuhnian
tradition, Worster records how the use of metaphor in science73
reflects social and historical events. Since science is not sealed tight
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against the influence of culture, despite its claims to neutrality,
science is not invulnerable to radical social shifts. He argues
correctly'^4 ^hat since science is always involved in matters of value and
moral perception, scientific facts are interwoven with the general
fabric of thought (the goal of his inquiry). Worster argues that although
ecology does not have an easy identification with any particular moral
philosophy (an ecophilosophy), radically shifting in its historical
affiliations and goals, true "ecological consciousness" although inspired
by ecologists, comes to have a tenuous relationship with the advocates
of the modern science of ecology.
Worster argues that the longing for holism found in
ecophilosophical thought reappears throughout the history of ecology,
reflecting an on-going tension between empiricist and romanticist
elements who both claim ecological evidence to support their
positions. The stunning fact of the history of ecological thought is that
the appeal of holism leads many to impute to ecology a normative
character unlike any other science.^® For the ecophilosopher it means
having to sort through the delicate relationship between fact and value
that has plagued ethical thought. How does a thinker both embrace
ecological results and utilize those principles to create a new vision of
nature ethics?
D. An Ecophilosophical Response
The various ways that ecophilosophers have wrestled with this
question determines the variations as well as the controversies in
ecophilosophical theory. Clearly ecophilosophers would reject my
characterization of the philosophy of nature that underlies their
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broader claims. They would argue that ecological rationality, evident
in a new conceptualization of nature, transcends all old
epistemological categories (including positivism). Ecophilosopher
Holmes Rolston77 suggests that an environmental ethic is in principle
ecologically formed because it serves as the basis of the moral values
that guide each human generation in exercising its stewardship over
the earth. While the boundary between science and ethics is precise if
the two categories are accepted as distinctly descriptive and
prescriptive, Rolston argues that it is eco-ethics that bridges the gap.
Following Aldo Leopold: A thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise. You ought to recycle, for recycling preserves
the ecosystem, and you ought to preserve the integrity of the
ecosystem because the integrity of the ecosystem has value.
Rolston argues that evaluative principles and descriptive ones
simultaneously emerge in ecological thought, so that while the
ecologist 'discovers' stability and diversity, these principles are located
because we are inclined to search with a (natural) disposition to value
them.
"What is ethically puzzling, and exciting, in the marriage
and mutual transformation of ecologies description and
evaluation is that here an "ought" is not so much derived
from an "is" as discovered simultaneously with it. "78
The mood of ecological ethics is to dissolve the boundary between
humans and the world in order to expand one's Self into the system,
collapsing the distinction between self interest and ecological
consciousness. Enlightened human interest is no longer recognizable
as anthropocentric because the world is radically recast, partly
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tJirough new realization of fact (interdependence, environmental
fitness, hydrologic cycles, population rhythms, and feedback loops)
and partly through the ecophilosophical transformation of these
concepts. Ecology represents the occasion for recreating the world.
Rolston;
"The perils of transposing from a new science to a new
world view, patent in the history of scientific thought, are
surpassed only by the perils of omitting to do so. Granted
that we yet lack a clear account of the logic by which we
get our values, it seems undeniable that we shape them in
significant measure in accord with our notion of the kind
of universe that we live in. Science has in centuries before
us upset those values by reappraising the character of the
universe. One has but to name Copernicus and Newton, in
addition to our observation that we have lately lived in the
shadow of Darwin. The ecological revolution may be of a
similar order; it is undeniable at work reilluminating the
world. There would be something magnificent about an
evolution of consciousness that circumscribed the
whole.
Rolston's suggestion that Barry Commoner's third law of ecology,
"nature knows best" captures the effort of ecophilosophy highlights
the curiously normative character of this science.
If nature knows best, Rolston contemplates what it would mean
to "follow nature". He suggests that while the notion of following
nature in an "absolute" sense is unsatisfactory (meaning that all human
conduct is natural inasmuch as the laws of nature operate on us; we
cannot help but follow nature), following nature in an "artifactual"
sense means that humans do things for reasons, thus distinguishing
themselves from a nature that runs automatically. Yet following nature
in this "relative" way means human acts, although always deliberate,
may be designed more closely in line with nature and thus be more
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"natural" so that it is possible to distinguish between natural and
unnatural human acts. With this distinction it is possible to follow
nature in a "homeostatic" sense, recognizing that some actions help to
retain stability in the ecosystem and others do not. Still, the moral
element emerges only from human interest. Following nature in an
"imitative" ethical sense is to argue that nature itself is moral and we
can look to nature as more than a realm of facts, we can follow nature
to make its values one among our goals, guiding our conduct by these
values. This leads us to follow nature in a "tutorial" sense in order to
share the gestalt of a larger moral virtue of natural attunement. This is
the "ecological consciousness" about which ecophilosophy is
concerned.
Yet Rolston’s analysis does not undercut the ambivalent lure of
ecology which underscores the pre-critical status of ecophilosophy.
He must assume that which he wishes to demonstrate, the universal
character of nature. Although the potentially disastrous consequences
of human intervention into nature's processes in the absence of
ecological knowledge is having profound impact on world-wide policy-
making, to use this data to support the contention that we are ripe for
a radically new view of nature confounds the issue. While many
scientists would argue that the only change is a new understanding of
natural processes brought about through advancing scientific research,
ecophilosophers make the claim that the emergence of the new
"ecological consciousness" paradigmatically replaces the
instrumentality of a Bacon. Yet Bacon himself made similar
observations about the tenuous relationship between human
development and our knowledge of nature.
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Although the "Age of Ecology" surrounds us. the suggestion that
it brings with it a new human consciousness underscores the
assumption that human consciousness is the result of a series of
paradigmatic shifts thereby demonstrating that ecophilosophers
assume that which they want to believe. Although ecophilosophers
back away from the suggestion that nature offers any kind of absolute,
the implication is that in the absence of God, the return to nature may
be our only choice. While they support the effort to recreate our
relationship to the earth, they are ambivalent about the process. If it
is science that points us to a new view of nature, we must be wary
because not only is science by nature always shifting ground, its
character has contributed to the immediate crisis.
This reflects a general trend in ecophilosophy to embrace the
principles of ecology while berating the scientific world view. As 1
suggested, the general tendency is to give to ecology an
epistemologically quasi-transcendental status, to suggest that a new
form of rationality is emerging (ecological rationality) which can
determine a new way by which we can know the world. Although
ecological rationality is offered as a 'new science' motivated by
something other than a technical interest over nature, it does not
transcend its scientific roots until a new philosophy of nature sorts out
the ambivalence created by the use of 'ecology' out of its accepted
context. Knowledge of nature remains problematic, trapped in an
epistemological circle. Ecophilosophers refuse to lodge nature in the
technical and cognitive character of science and yet are dependent
upon its results to verify that which they assume to be true.
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As Roderick Nash suggests, although the liberation of nature
appears to merely extend the growing expansion of rights to an
increasingly inclusive community, the result of expanding rights to
nature turns traditional liberal thinking on its head since in the final
analysis the status of human life is suspect (trees = spotted owls =
humans). The expansion of the community of ethical agents to include
all of nature muddles all previous attempts to render intelligible the
process of ethical decision-making. In the most radical cases eco-
activists abandon the attempt altogether, perceiving themselves as
soldiers in the defense of free-nature.®^ The almost fascist doctrine of
some of these eco-groups (the needs of natural systems shadow that of
the individual) highlights the reactionary dilemma facing an
ecophilosophical ethic (nature ideology). Although the radical fringe
are essentially dismissed as misunderstanding the efforts of the eco-
movement, the problem is central to ecophilosophy and derives from
the universal character of the ecophilosophy of nature.
The interpenetration of knowledge and morality plagues
ecophilosophy. As I suggested, although ecophilosophers believe that
a new construct of nature will fit both our growing scientific
understanding of natural processes and our growing need for global
sensitivity, due to an insufficient analysis of nature, a positivist
proclivity informs their philosophy. 1 examine below the kind of
confused thinking that results when nature takes on an ideological
function, obscuring the real conditions of society and stabilizing
dominant power relations.
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E. The Ideology of Nature
The fate of the Native peoples of the circumpolar arctic is
particularly suggestive (as any fourth world culture) of the
inadequacies of an ecophilosophical policy rooted in an ideological
nature philosophy. This is not to suggest that the kinds of solutions
being worked out between Native peoples and others necessarily
reflect the pitfalls 1 am describing. 1 only wish to suggest that an
ideological nature theory tends to retain current power structures
despite its reworked rhetoric due to its underlying contention that
nature bears the same relationship to all people. Although devised as a
vehicle for global unity and identification, 1 believe holism
(biocentrism) acts to fortify entrenched barriers between interest
groups. Let me begin with a short, personal narrative.
Based in the Brooks Range on one of the largest tracts of truly
wild terrain left in the United States, the arctic tundra of Alaska, in
the northernmost mountains in North America, our study site is a Dahl
sheep lick two hours from our camp. Our goal is to use a short term
scientific research project along with intensive 'classroom' instruction
to expose a group of college students to Alaskan natural history,
resource management and environmental issues. We establish a 24-
hour observation post near the sheep lick to record the activity
pattern of the sheep as they use the lick to enrich their diets with salt
and mineral rich rock. The sun barely dips below the horizon during
the arctic summer night; we must approach the lick with the same
silence that matches the desolation of the arctic.
As our group huddles around spotting scopes one dusk (about
2:00 am), watching and dutifully recording the activity of the sheep.
166
almost simultaneously we become aware of being watched. Searching
the horizon, 1 spot a lone wolf, not fifty meters away. It is not our first
sighting of a wolf and yet its ghostly presence and mild curiosity
produces an almost universal effect on the group. We feel an
overwhelming sense of intimacy with this animal, a kind of kinship,
and then, as it strides silently out of sight, a feeling of gratitude for the
privilege of being in the creature’s presence. Reflecting on the
experience at various times since then I have come to believe that the
feelings so easily aroused by these natural encounters disclose a
curious combination of compassion and desire in my psyche. While I
admire the vulnerability and 'otherness' of the wolf, at the same time I
crave to transcend the boundary that keeps us apart.
On our return from our observation post we spot two caribou
carcasses shot out of season and hung to dry on a hand-fashioned
drying rack. We speculate that they are the cache of two Inupiat we
had met doing work in the same area. Climbing up to their caribou-
hide tent situated on a shelf above the tundra, they invite us to join
them for tea. In the course of a short conversation surrounded by
their animal skins and CB radios, I am aware of the distinct possibility
that they do not share our feelings about nature. My inclination to
impress upon them the ecological consequences of uncontrolled
hunting pressure wanes in the wake of my dawning realization that
because my experience of nature is inextricably interwoven with
theirs, the gap between myself and my new friends is more daunting
then that between myself and the wolf. What bearing could my
experience of nature have on these people?
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This incident is even more disturbing on a larger scale, as
evidenced by the growing pressure on Nabve peoples to defend their
use of nature. Called subsistence by non-Nabves, this traditional use of
nature is being called into question by both those who desire the same
sort of special permit access to game resources and those who carry
on the fight for the protection of wildlife. Yet Natives contend that
subsistence is not simply an issue of access to a resource, it is the
continuation of a lifestyle and a culture.
"The culture and the life of my native people are the
subsistence way of life. It goes hand in hand with our own
culture, our own language, and all our activities."®^
Some non-Natives argue that Native lifestyles are rapidly changing as
the cash economy spreads, improving access to efficient forms of
technology to capture game and widening the possibilities for an
easier life on the harsh tundra. Natives contend that wage
employment remains low in most villages and money that comes into
the community is used to improve the success of the hunt which
benefits everyone in the community.
Since Native peoples have neither aboriginal rights to utilize the
land (they are subject to outside regulation by state and federal
organizations) or political power. Native autonomy over their use of
nature is non-existent. This contrasts sharply with non-Natives who
understand the political realities of land use accessible only through
various political channels. Traditionally internal 'regulation' of the
utilization of nature in Native cultures works for the simple reason that
the utilization of nature is a cultural rather than political event.
"It begins when children first accompany their parents in
search of wild foods, and learn that their is always a
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practical way to do things and an elder's story to provide
meaning. Myths and tales tell of the origins of land,
plants, animals and people and of the necessary
relationships among them that must be honored and
observed.
Yet this peaceful, relatively apolitical existence is uprooted when land
rights are reassessed by outside governmental decree. In 1971, Alaska
Natives are 'given' title to forty-four million acres of land (about one-
tenth of Alaska), but rather than leaving land use in the hands of tribal
governments, ANSCA (Alaska Native Settlements Claims Act) requires
that Native corporations be established to administer and hold title to
the lands. As expected, the corporations flounder. Native sovereignty
dwindles and the use of nature is increasingly politicized. Feeling the
victim of this kind of cultural invasion. Native peoples network to set
up their own circumpolar organizations to try to meet on equal footing
the entrenched power structures of the 'first-world'.
The particularly insidious character of this confrontation which
in essence inspired my analysis of eco-thinking is the rhetoric around
the 'conflict' between Native peoples and environmentalists. At issue
is the ecophilosophical dogma that suggests that nature itself is
apolitical and transcends cultural boundaries. The religion, values and
beliefs of Native groups are repeatedly used as evidence of a more
harmonious view of nature. J. Baird Callicott paints a particularly
romantic view of these people:
"I have claimed that the typical traditional American
Indian attitude was to to regard all features of the
environment as enspirited. These entities possessed a
consciousness, reason, and volition, no less intense and
complete than a human being's. One blood flows through
all; one spirit has divided itself and enlivened all things
with a consciousness that is essentially the same."®^
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Callicott argues that the 'world view' of the American Indian matches
the new view of nature suggested to us by ecological concepts which
we can use as the necessary conceptual framework for embracing a
biocentric perspective.
In contrast, ecophilosopher Tom ReganS4 argues that for
Western thinkers the Native American's relationship to nature will
always be ambiguous. No matter what the historical fact since we have
already defined the nature of the problem, we will always be able to
ask: Does it mean that Natives viewed nature as inherently valuable or
was nature simply a storehouse of resources? The character of this
debate highlights the underlying ecophilosophical stance that since
views of nature can be evaluated, an absolute perspective is obtainable.
This uncompromising ecological perspective places people such as the
Native Alaskans in an uncomfortable position. Either they must
acknowledge their pantheistic roots and behave accordingly or they
are patronized by an attitude of distrust.
The real enemy, the political and economic realities by which
they stand to lose whatever is left of their shrinking autonomy are
covered over by this powerful, large-scale eco-rhetoric. Most
particularly the media takes on the character of an instrument of
domination because of its persuasive nature, the access to which is so
dependent upon wealth and power. Although acknowledged as the
primary tool of manipulation used by developers and capitalist
advertisers, eco-thinkers fail to analyze the manipulative effects of the
first-world countries' environmental campaigns.
The situation of aboriginal peoples illuminates the inherent
danger in a philosophy of nature which claims itself privy to a universal
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ethical position. Failing to understand the impact of the 'problem of
knowledge' on the political character of philosophical positions, the
ontology of nature adhered to by ecophilosophers is essentially
identical to that of Bacon and other sixteenth century thinkers. To
present the dilemma of domination ideology as the conflict of two
views of nature is to miss the fact that universality is the reason that
traditional ethical discourse has failed. The political neutrality of
ecophilosophers’ nature philosophy hides its oppressive content.
Since the theory lacks any contextual clout, it cannot respond to the
plight of fourth world cultures where the bond between cultural
integrity and the use of nature is inseparable. In the absence of a
undistorted communication between Natives and their oppressors, I
agree with 'Phomas Berger that in this unfolding struggle, "Alaska's
subsistence peoples occupy the moral high ground"®^.
As I have already acknowledged, while the impetus for this
project comes from my own Alaskan experience, the philosophical
inspiration derives from a suggestion by William Leiss that the risk
implicit in any caU to the liberation of nature is that rather than
becoming a rational concept, it remains a counterideology. As Leiss
points out, since the ruling ideology (the domination of nature) is a
visible indicator of far-ranging social contradictions,
"...(i)f this contradiction is not comprehended and
transcended, the ideology itself comes under increasing
attack from counterideologies; and most importantly of all,
its genuinely progressive aspects may be engulfed in the
hatred aroused by the negative conditions with which it
becomes associated."®®
Although the mastery of nature is formulated in universal terms as the
great human task that benefits all, in fact it becomes less a grand
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universal enterprise than a means of upholding the interests of
partieular ruling groups. This failure, 1 have argued, is implieit in the
universal status of nature (the absorption of the philosophy of nature
into the philosophy of seienee). Talk of the liberation of nature when
expressed as merely a displeasure with the prevailing behavior and
thought patterns in the absence of a critique of nature ideology is
counterideological or, as Leiss points out in the case of fascist dogma,
a dangerous weapon against rationalism (the means to evaluate a
political agenda). Since the mere substitution of ideas
(counterideology) is purely abstract, the result cannot of itself improve
social relations.
Historically the idea of the mastery of nature instigated an attack
upon outmoded scientific and philosophical dogmas. As Leiss explains
and 1 have argued, its lasting positive aspect (as formulated by Bacon)
is "to break the tyrannical hold of despair over the consciousness of
human technical possibilities and to encourage the conviction that
men could fundamentally alter the material conditions of existence.
Its negative dimension (so well disguised in Bacon's New Atlantis) is
its exclusive focus on modem science and technology as the
designated instruments for the mastery of nature and its ability to
mask the connection between their development on the one hand,
and the persistence of social conflict and political domination on the
other.
Ecophilosophers argue that the idea of the domination of nature
is the result of; (1) modem philosophy's epistemological support for
viewing scientific thought as the basis for the human mastery over
nature (positivism), (2) modern science's fundamentally
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instrumentalist conceptual structure and thus a priori technological
character, and (3) capitalist society's greed. Yet none of these views
adequately portrays the historical function of mastery over nature as a
crucial ideology in modem society. The flaw in the ecophilosophical
formulation of the concept of the mastery of nature is that it presents
it as a static image rather than an intensely dynamic historical process.
Clearly the Baconian rendition makes sense only in a religious context.
Since neither reason or religion are capable of preventing the search
for power over nature from becoming self-destructive, they do not
account for the change in the subject as the subject actively commands
nature. The illusion fostered is that the activity through which the
mastery of nature is pursued is itself "mastered" (under the control of
an enlightened social interest).
"The idea of the mastery of nature must be reinterpreted
in such a way that its principal focus is ethical or moral
development rather than scientific and technological
innovation.
This transition from domination to liberation more correctly concerns
the gradual understanding and self-disciplining of human nature
rather than the reconceptualization of external nature.
Liberation of nature is liberation of human nature. I agree with
Leiss that the liberation of science and technology from the thrall of
positivism is a task that primarily involves the reconstmction of social
institutions.
"The present secular context requires a very different
interpretation, namely, one in which mastery of nature is
understood as an advanced stage in human consciousness
wherein intelligence is able to regulate its relationship to
nature (internal and external) in such a way as to minimize
the self-destructive aspects of human desires."®^
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While much of nature ethics are either romantic and vacuous or
analytic and uninteresting, the general problem motivating theories
such as deep ecology and ecofeminism is provocative. How do we
decide what to do with our scientific and technological know-how? As
Hannah Arendt suggests in The Human ConditionQo this is a political
question of the first order, not to be answered by professional
scientists or politicians. We need a political theory that allows us "to
think about what we are doing". E.O. Wilson described this human
dilemma in Biophilia^h As human beings we are drawn to both nature
and machine. Since our machines tame nature and deprive it of
control, we come to regret the loss of untamed nature. A vision of how
ecophilosophy might positively respond to these larger questions
completes this project.
^Alan Drengson. Beyond Environmental Crisis; From Technocrat to Planetary Person,
(New York: Peter Lang, 1989).
^The use of the term ecology is an important aspect of any examination of the work of
ecophUosophers. On the outset, it would appear that 'ecology' is used equivocally by
ecophilosophers. An examination of the way in which ecophilosophers make use of the
concept is a sub-theme of this chapter. Ame Naess describes the situation this way:
"The expression 'ecology' is infused with many meanings. (By it I mean) the
interdisciplinary scientific study of the living conditions of organisms in interaction
with each other and with the surroundings, organic as well as inorganic." "...the aspect
of the science of ecology that is most important is the fact that it is concerned first of all
with relationships between entities as an essential component of what these entities
are in themselves." "This approach can have application in many fields of inquiry -
hence the growing influence of the subject of ecology outside its original biological
domain." 'This (the approach of ecology that 'all thmgs hang together') has application
to and overlaps with the problems in philosophy: the placement of humanity in nature,
and the search for new kinds of explanation of this through the use of systems emd
relational perspectives." "The study of these problems common to ecology and
philosophy shall be called ecophilosophy." from Ame Naess, Ecology , community and
lifestyle
.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pg. 36.
^A term introduced in ecophdosophical literature (see Ame Naess, Ecology, community
and lifestyle
.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)) to describe nature that is
free of human domination. The precise character of 'free nature' is the focus of this
chapter.
^H. J. McCloskey in Ecological Ethics and Politics (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield,
1983) on page 25 makes a case for the conservative nature of eco-thinking: "Although
the ecological crisis movement advances radical proposals regarding resource use.
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population control, pollution, and protection of the environment, it is essentially
conservative in the sense of seeking to sustain the status quo." He compares his
analysis to Karl Marx's condemnation of Malthus. Marx; 'The hatred of the English
working class against Malthus - 'the mounteband parson' as Cobbett rudely calls him-istherefore entirely justified. The people were right in sensing instinctively that thev
were confronted not with a man of science but a bought advocate a pleader on behalf oftheir enemies a shameless sycophant of the ruling classes"(from Marx and F.n^pl*; nn
Malthus
.
ed. RL. Meek. (New York: New York International. 1954K
^
^see Andrew McLaughlin, "Images and Ethics of Nature". Environmental F.thie«i 7
(1985). ’
^McLaughlin, pg. 311.
^McLaughlin, pg. 299.
®These eco-historles include: Carolyn Merchant. The Death of Nature (New York:
Harper & Row, 1980), Donald Worster, Nature's Economy
. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1977) and Roderick F. Nash, The Rghts of Nature: A History of Environmental
Ethics
. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
^For an overview of 'ecophilosophical' literature see Donald E. Davis. Ecoohilosophy:
A_Field Guide to the Literature which lists relevant authors and includes a list of both
environmental and ecophilosophical periodicals, journals and newsletters.
l^see Rchard Sylvan. "A Critiaue of Deep Ecology". Fiadical Philosonhv. 40 and 4 i
(1985).
^
^John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature
. (1974), pg. 3.
^^This is my term to describe the character of ecophilosophical thinking: the use of
scientific concepts to Inspire a social agenda.
^^Aldo, Leopold, A Sand County Almanac
.
(New York; Ballantine Books. 1966), pg. 239.
^
"^Sylvan, pg. 5.
^
^Leopold, pg. 246.
borrow this term from Habermas.
^^This is my term which I use to Indicate the epistemological character of
ecophilosophy.
1®A particularly complete analysis of this disposition is found In Carolyn Merchant's
Death of Nature .
^^Donald Worster traces eco-thinking to Gilbert White (The Natural History of
Selbome (1788) . New York, 1899), suggesting that he is one of the first to express what is
now come to be known as "ecological consciousness".
2CHvorster. pg. 29.
21Worster, pg. 71.
22”The Greek word oikos, meaning house, is the root of both "economics" and "ecology".
Over time the significance shifted from the house itself to what it contained: a living
community, the household. Economics, the older of the two concepts, concerns the
study of how the community manages its time, labor and material resources. Ernst
Haeckel, the German Darwinian, coined the term "oecologie" in 1866." (from Nash, pg.
55)
23Ame Naess. "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A
Summary" Inquiry 16; pp. 95-100.
24Ame Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle (ECL) . (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), pg. 19.
25Nash, pg. 58.
26Nash, pg. 71.
27Nash, pg. 28.
28rhis is a common theme is ecophilosophical literature fully developed by Lynn
White. Jr. who in 1967 wrote a scathing attack on the ChrisUan attitude toward nature:
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"The Historical Fioots of our Ecological Crisis". Science 10 (March. 1967). Vol. 155, pp1203“ 1207.
^%fash, pg. 54.
3^Susan Flader. blinking Like a Mountain: Aldo Leopold and the Evnlution of an
^974)^ Wolves and Forests . (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
^
^Flader, pg. 2.
^^Environmental philosophy is a broader compilation of philosophical work
including ecophilosophy.
^^see Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Ethics
.
(Pacific Grove: The Boxwood
Press, 1981).
^"^see Should Trees Have Standing?. (Los Altos: William Kaufman, Inc. 1972) Earth
and other Ethics
. (New York: Harper & Row. 1987).
^^nestra King, Nash. pg. 144.
^®Ecofeminist literature is broad. See the following: Susan Griffin, Woman and
Nature
.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1978); Carol3m Merchant. The Death of Nature . (New
York: Harper & Row, 1980); Patricia J. Mills, Woman. Nature, and Psvche
. (New Haven;
Yale University Press, 1987); Judith Plant, editor. Healing the Wounds: The Promise of
Ecofeminism
.
(Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1989); Ynestra King
"Ecofeminlsm; On the Necessity of History and Mystery", Woman of Power . 9(Spring
1988), pp. 42-44; Val Plumwood, "Ecofeminism; An Overview and Discussion of
Positions and Arguments", Australian Journal of Philosophy
. Supplement to 64(June
1986), pp. 120-137; Val Plumwood, "Women. Humanity and Nature", Radical
Philosophy
.
48(Spring 1988), pp. 16-24; Rosemary Ruether, "Women, Ecology and the
Domination of Nature", The Ecumenist . 14(Nov.-Dec. 1975), pp. 1-5; Charlene Spretnak.
"Ecofeminism: Our Roots and Flowering", Women of Power . 9(Spring 1988). pp. 6-10;
Karen Warren, "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections". Environmental Ethics .
9(Sprlng 1987), pp. 3-20; Karen Warren, 'The Power and Promise of Ecological
Feminism". Environmental Ethics . 12(Spring 1990), pp. 125-146.
^^'Fhere is a growing body of work that supports the contention that the female way of
knowing the world is in marked contrast to the traditional male view; Carol Gilligan,
In a Different Voice
.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) is a good example.
^®see Merchant. The Death of Nature
.
(New York; Harper & Row, 1980).
^^Deep ecology literatuie is vast. It includes the following; by Bill Devall: Simple in
Means. Rich in Ends
.
(Salt Lake City; Gibbs-Smith Publisher, 1988); with George
Sessions, Deep Ecology
.
(Salt Lake City: Gibbs-Smith Publisher, 1985), "The Deep
Ecology Movement". Natural Resources Journal . 20(April 1980), pp. 299-322; Alan
Drengson, Bevond Environmental Crisis: From Technocrat to Planetary Person . (New
York: Peter Lang, 1989); Warwick Fox. "Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of our Time?",
The Ecologist. 14(1984), pp. 194-204; L. E. Johnson, A Morally Deep World . (Australian
National University, 1987); by Ame Naess: Ecology, community and lifestyle .
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1989); "A Defense of the Deep Ecology
Movement", Environmental Ethics . 6(Fall 1984), pp. 265-270;"The Shallow and the
Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary", Inquiry . 16(1973). pp. 95-100;
George Sessions. "Shallow and Deep Ecology; A Review of the Philosophical Literature",
from Ecological Consciousness , editors, R. C. Schultz and J. D. Hughes (University Press
of America. 1981); Michael Tobias, editor. Deep Ecology . (San Diego. Avant Books,
1984) plus articles in Trumpeter (Journal of Ecosophy), LlghtStar Press. Victoria. B.C.
40john Rodman, against the animal right activists, argues that extending rights to
'them' (animals) is offensive since by doing so we categorize 'them' as inferior creatures.
Instead we need to respect everything in nature as having its own integrity and
grandeur. The animal rights activists argue that eco-activists practice 'speciesism',
prejudicing species over Individuals. In response, Rodman charges them with
'senUentism'. J. Baird CalUcott declares that the animal liberation movement is not
even allied with environmental ethics, arguing that the land ethic is holistic and has as
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an objective the community as a whole. Holmes Rolston distinguishes 'duties to soecies'and duties to ecosystems', believing that the rights of the whole outweigh the rights ofany individual. Paul Taylor, arguing for a life-centered moraUty. suggests that killing
a human is no more a moral wrong than crushing an insect or uprooting a plantRespecting nature means according to all beings an opportunity for them to fuimi their
various potentials. See also. L. Westra. "Ecology and Animals; Is There a Joint Ethic of
Respect". 1 l(Fall 1989). pp. 215-230.
^lynestra King. The Nation
. (December 12, 1987). p. 730.
"^^See the following: J. Beihl, "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology: Unresolvable Debate"
Green Perspectives. P.O. Box 1 1 1. Burlington. VT 05402; J. Cheney. "Eco-Feminism and
Deep Ecology". Environmental Ethics . 9(Summer 1987), pp. 1 15-145; W. Fox, 'The Deep
Ecology - Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallels", Environmental Ethies i {(Spring
1989), pp. 5-25; M. Kheel, 'The Liberation of Nature; A Circular Affair", Environmental
Ethics, 7(Summer 1985), pp. 135-149; A. K. SaUeh, "Deeper than Deep Ecology"
Environmental Ethics
. 6(Winter 1984), pp. 339-345; M. Zimmerman. "Feminism. Deep
Ecology, and Environmental Ethics". Environmental Ethics . 9(Spring 1987), pp. 21-44.
^^James Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia
.
(New York: Norton. 1988).
'^^see Toward an Ecological Society
.
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980), The Ecology
of Freedom
.
(Palo Alto: Cheshire Books, 1982).
"^^Joel Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas", Telos, 40(Summer 1979), pg.
55n.
^®Nash, pg. 164.
47Naess. ECL, pg. 3.
^^This is my term to describe the new vision of nature suggested by ecophilosophers.
D. Y. Peel, editor, Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution
. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1972), pg. xxi..
^^Peel, pg. xxiii.
^^Peel, pg. xxiii.
^^Peel. pg. 13 (from Spencer's Social Statics) .
^^Ame Naess' analysis of ecophUosophy in Ecology, community and lifestyle is the
most comprehensive in the deep ecology literature.
^'^Naess, ECL
. pg. 39 he defines 'ecologism' as the danger of seeing ecology as the
ultimate science.
^^Naess, ECL, pg. 40.
Naess, ECL, pg. 54.
^^Naess, ECL, pg. 49.
^®Naess, ECL, pg. 50.
^^Naess, ECL
. pg. 56.
®%Iabermas, KHI
. pg. 7.
^^An experience is different if in the context of a known whole. Naess uses the example
of hearing the first notes of a sonata. The experience of the first notes will be different
if the hearer is familiar with the whole.
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^see footnote 7.
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Although ecophilosophers pay their homage to Thomas Kuhn as the 'father' of
paradigmatic thinking, they have clearly taken the metaphor way beyond Kuhn's use of
it. While Kuhn uses it to describe the conservative nature of the scientific community,
ecophilosophers use it to describe major historical shifts. Alan Drengson suggests
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otherwise: "...nothing critical turns on our blanket use of the word "paradigm" FromKuhn we take primarily the insight that it is possible to shift our basic way of
'
perceiving and experiencing the world through a restructuring of basic paradigms Herethen, shifting paradigms can be the result of a conscious effort to alter our stmidpoint
as well as through the less intentional processes of conversion." (Bevond
Environmental Crisis
, pg. 46) 1 beUeve that ecophilosophers have yet to adequatelydelend the far-reaching character of their use of this concept.
^^Drengson. pg. xl.
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results of rigorous scientific activity with the more philosophical speculations of the
naturalists.
^^worster, pg. 12.
^^Worster places his work in the tradition of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of
Enlightenment as an analysis of larger social trends rather than as a mere history of
one branch of science. Although he does not provide an adequate explanation of what
he believes is the regressive potential of enlightenment thinking, calling it simply the
quest for the domination of nature (his text is not philosophical), he appears to agree
with eco-thinkers that the instmmentality of nature by such people as Bacon is the
cause of modem barbarism.
^®For further discussions of the relationship between ecology and environmental
ethics see: J. B. Callicott, 'The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology". Environmental
Ethicg. 8(Winter 1986). pp. 301-316; F. B. Golley. "Deep Ek:ology: An Analysis from the
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^^Rolston, pg. 20.
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®^he actuality of eco-guerrilla action has drastically increased since the incident on
July 10, 1985 whereby Greenpeace made headlines when its ship, the Rainbow Warrior,
is bombed at a wharf in New ^aland. A crew member is drowned and the
environmental movement is brought to the brink of violence. Greenpeace philosophy:
"Humankind is not the center of life on the planet. Ecology has taught us that the whole
Earth is part of our hody' and that we must learn to respect it as we respect ourselves.".
Although Greenpeace maintains its nonviolent stance, Paul Watson (the most famous
eco-radical) leader of his own group, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, advocates
a philosophy of violence against property. On one historic occasion his boat, the Sea
Shepherd, crashes into the whaling ship Sierra and leaves a eight-foot gash in her hold.
On another front, the Animal Liberation groups take action. Cleveland Amory's Fund
for Animals emerges in the 70's as a leading defender of wddlife. Wealthy and powerful,
Amory has wide influence protesting hunting and the use of furs. The Laboratory
Animal Welfare Act in 1966 is an initial attempt to outlaw the use of pet animals for
experimental purposes. Expansions strengthen the Act to include the research itself.
But many come to believe that the legislation is not enough and direct action becomes
more common. Beginning in March 1982 an American organized Animal Liberation
Front (a state-side version of Ronnie Lee's English group), begins breaking into
laboratories and releasing animals. While these groups concentrate on the rights of
individual animals, others eco-activists prefer to act on the basis of a more holistic
philosophy. Earth First! leads the way in translating the biocentric paradigm of Deep
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Ecology into political action. One time spokesman. Dave Foreman, argues that
environmentalism is too closely linked to anthropocentrism and utilitarianism. The
Earth Firsters determine to be as radical as necessary to achieve their ends.
Monkeywrenching (the symbol of destruction of property) tacitly becomes their
password. Earth Firsters are blatant in their lack of concern for the impact of their
activities on human welfare, (from Roderick Nash. The Rights of Naturel
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CHAPTER IV
THE RESURRECTION OF NATURE?
Although I have rejected as positivistic the attempt by
ecophilosophers to ground their theory in a new ontology of nature,
merely arguing that ecophilosophers are 'barking up the wrong tree'
does not compel me to redefine the eco-territory. I am not
particularly inspired by ecophilosophical literature, but I am drawn
into the debate by critical theorists who argue that because of the
vastness of the "ecological crisis" they are suspicious of any blanket
rejection of a Marcusian-like vision of radical transformation. The
romantic and poorly-defined character of Marcuse's vision has
dampened enthusiasm for the successful completion of the original
critical project, yet many theorists are unwilling to abandon his
utopian vision of the liberation of nature. If, as Ricoeur suggests,
utopias legitimately function to shatter prevailing conditions ("to
expose the gap between the authority's claim for and the citizenry's
beliefs in any system of legitimacy" ^), then perhaps the work of the
utopian writer to stress existing power structures is essential if we are
to "impassion society" (Ricoeur). Is, as Habermas suggests, the
completion of Enlightenment goals (the restoration of emancipatory
reason) enough to overcome both social and environmental problems
or is it the case, as ecophilosophers argue, that human consciousness
must be transformed in a grand "resurrection of nature"?
While traditionally dualism has characterized epistemology
(object-subject, empiricist-rationalist, ideal-material, fact-value), does
the possibility of the historical continuity of pre-human and human
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knowledge strain these traditional conceptions? Ecophilosophers
argue that the continuity of all natural things transcends any
differences. Consider the odd quote from ecophilosopher Judith
Plant:
"Feeling the life of the "other"-literally experiencing its
existence-is becoming the new starting point for human
decision-making. "2
If it is our literal (life and death) existence that we share with all
natural things, is it possible that we share a form of knowledge that
transcends intraspecific limitations? If it is not a new vision of nature
that contains revolutionary capacities, will the mere "de-ideologization
of the norms of bourgeois society"^ offer as compelling a result?
The rising constellation of events (the fact of global
environmentalism, the demise of totalitarian regimes, the growing
enthusiasm for global solutions) that many herald as indicative of a
radical change in human consciousness suggests to some an
eschatological shift. Do these turnabouts merely reflect a global media
explosion that continues to inform isolated peoples of a variety of new
desires while at the same time challenging insular regimes with the
consequences of their actions? Is it simply the case that buried in this
global rhetoric hides the old Baconian dream of mastery? I have
argued that ecophilosophers embody this confusion; while they believe
themselves to have launched a major critique of western rationalism,
their theory remains within the tradition itself. Assuming I have
demonstrated the dubious character of their claims, the influence of
this kind of "global thinking" remains muddled.
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The revolutionary capacity of such thinking is in the tradition of
modem utopian writers who have stmggled with the promise and
peril of the Enlightenment dream. Since essentially every utopian
vision includes the conviction that the world is on the edge of a
sudden transformation that will establish peace and justice forever,
the ecophilosophical dream of a "new age"^ parallels closely the
utopian dreams of Enlightenment visionaries. Sir Thomas More
(Utopia)
, even before Sir Francis Bacon (New Atlantis) is among the
first to suggest that respect for nature can advance remarkable social
progress.
"A century before Bacon. More advanced the argument that
natural philosophy was to be considered, not as a form of
evil and anti-religious "conjuring", but as something
acceptable to God, a part of religious duty, and an essential
instmment of social advance."^
While I have argued that the inextricable bond between the Baconian
"mastery of nature" and the ecophilosopher's call to liberate nature is
the ideologized Enlightenment agenda, at stake remains the
provocative character of the ecophilosophical vision as it confronts
modem thinking. If utopias serve to stress existing ideologies with
visions of emancipation, then the success of an ecophilosophical future
depends upon the outlook it inspires.
Consider the revolutionary quality of More's Utopia in contrast to
Bacon's vision. Although the Baconian image more adequately captures
the actual character of modem society. More's vision (as Robert
Adam's argues) anticipates the uncontrolled enthusiasm for science
and technology with social constraint. Foreshadowing life in New
Atlantis, More's Utopian residents attempt to bring about social
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progress by applying scientific reasoning to social problems in order
to derive happiness from living "according to nature". Since Utopians
impute major social ills to the irrational actions of men opposing
nature, Adams suggests that More's Utopians capture the germinal
idea of Enlightenment thinking: the methodical use of reason to
understand natural law through observation and experiment and the
utilization of this the knowledge to benefit human society.
"Whatever was, according to the Utopian standards,
"according to nature" must of necessity be morally sound,
since natural law was taken to represent God’s or
"nature's" will."®
Utopian ethics (like those of the New Atlantians) launch the modem
fascination with natural law ethics; those social actions that produce
healthful pleasure are presumed to be "according to nature".
Since it is not clear that humankind is, by nature rational or
morally good, or that the power of science is in itself beneficent, and
while Adams argues that More and Bacon respond differently to the
need "to prevent scientifically-produced power from over-riding man's
ability to control it", at stake here is the ultimate character of the
Enlightenment dream. Although Bacon's agenda has failed in that we
have not equably achieved both moral and material progress, does it
mean that the Enlightenment vision is inherently flawed? If the
Utopian alternative to the dangers of scientific rationality is
conceivable, then we have added support for the notion that our
solutions to social and environmental chaos are immanent rather than
eschatological. Adams suggests that in Utopia the achievement of a life
according to nature through self-discipline (humans are born with the
capacity for such a life) contrasts sharply with the unbounded faith in
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scientific rationality in New Atlantis. There, restraint against abusive
power is assumed by the implicit belief that enlightened community
leaders are immune to coercion, that the natural power unleashed in
their many inventions is in itself beneficent and that men of science
are virtually incapable of wrongdoing. While Bacon’s belief that
material progress is somehow positively tied to moral progress has
permeated modern society, Adams argues that it is More and not
Bacon who offers great positive insight into the healthy growth of
civilization.
More's Utopian life contrasts with life in New Atlantis in two
respects. The Utopians restrict their material production to the
austere simplicity of necessity.
"...the right use of reason leads the members of the
commonwealth to "true" pleasure and consequently to
physical and moral health when employed to produce what
is naturally "necessary" for man."^
Secondly, in Utopia there is no separation between natural philosophy
and ethics since Utopian science is a form of practical worship. As a
result, their social relations dominate their economic ones through
the prohibition of private ownership and wealth. In stark contrast, the
main purpose of science in New Atlantis is to bring forth endless
usable inventions that promote human happiness which Adams argues,
"has regularly tended to generate social corruption and
disintegration’'^.
Although the failure of the Baconian ideology of nature is arguably
clear, the fate of the Utopian model to institutionally eschew wealth as
a form of social control is equally troubling since the gap between
knowledge and ethics is overcome by external coercion. Yet the
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Utopian vision is suggestive of the possibility that in order to prevent
knowledge from overcoming human interests, we need only to
empower the community since the dream of autonomy and
responsibility (the good life) are already elements of Enlightenment
thinking. The Utopian solution, as reworked by Habermas,
recommends that the epistemological separation of science from
communicative interaction enables politics to rise up from the
confines of scientific rationality. In Habermas' framework, it is not the
rationality of the Enlightenment that is suspect, but rather the overlay
of capitalist desires on the vision of a new society whereby capitalist
society "adopted and distorted genuinely universal norms for its own
purposes"^.
A. Knowledge and Human Interest
We could characterize the critical debate over the fate of
enlightenment thinking as one over the fate of nature, since the
essential departure point in Hegel's analysis is to historicize nature (as
human beings we are embedded in nature) which Marx materializes
with his concept of labor (we come to understand ourselves and nature
through our labor). This analysis casts doubts upon the Enlightenment
belief that in order to understand nature and ourselves we must
achieve a superior position to the rest of nature. Some (including the
most sympathetic) argue that this pessimistic assessment of the
Enlightenment (worked out by early Critical Theory) is essentially
irreconcilable. Habermas' resolution of this tension distinguishes
itself. Although his theory emerges from a persuasive account of the
corrosive influence of the positivist spirit (that erroneously
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disassociates knowledge from values), he does not abandon the
Enlightenment project altogether.
His attack on classical philosophy targets the positivistic self-
understanding of the sciences and traditional ontology that
characterizes knowledge free of human interest as that knowledge
which can truly orient action, arguing that because the search for
knowledge is not grounded by legitimate human interests, ethics is a
tiresomely impotent field of philosophical inquiry. The result
according to Habermas is;
"a theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from
dogmatic association with natural interests of life and their
irritating influence; and both (science and ontology) share
the cosmological intention of describing the universe
theoretically in its lawlike order, just as it is."^®
This analysis leads Habermas to suggest that even the historical-
hermenuetic scientists (while recognizing the embeddedness of
knowledge and interest) do not escape this scientistic consciousness
exemplified by their attempt to describe a structured reality within
the horizon of a theoretical attitude (historicism) . Thus he
distinguishes a third form of scientific activity, conceiving of a critical
(and rational) activity which supersedes in a "quasi-transcendental"
way the embeddedness of all other scientific activity (communicative
competence).
Habermas presses this perspective, arguing that since (at this
point) all sciences share a distorted concept of theory, we have lost
the classical connection of theory to value: the conception of theory as
a process of cultivation of the person. In Knowledge and Human
Interest . Habermas uses Husserl to demonstrate this loss. Although
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Husserl is right (in The Crisis of the European Scienresl when he
criticizes the objectivist illusion of science which conceals the
construction of facts and the interlocking of knowledge with interests,
Husserl succumbs to another form of objectivism by trying to retain for
phenomenology a pure position outside interests. By not recognizing
that traditional theory uses cosmology to direct human action and
derives "psuedonormative power" from the concealment of its actual
interest, Husserl overlooks the fact that the release of knowledge from
interest for the Greeks is not to purify theory from subjectivity, but to
provide the subject with purification through theory, allowing ego
identity to take shape. The price of individuation (the thrust of the
Dialectic of Enlightenment) is the separation of knowledge from
human interest.
Habermas believes that the "suspicion of objectivism" remains
because of the ontological illusion of pure theory that the sciences still
deceptively share with the philosophical tradition after casting off its
practical content.
"As soon as these statements are understood in relation to
the prior frame of reference to which they are affixed, the
objectivist illusion dissolves and makes visible a
knowledge-constitutive interest."^
^
Habermas' concept of knowledge-constitutive human interests joins
the two elements whose relation still has to be explained: knowledge
and interest. We know from everyday experience that ideas often
serve to furnish justifying motives in place of real ones; therefore,
Habermas believes that rationalization at this level is ideology at the
level of collective action. In both cases the manifest content of
statements is falsified by consciousness' unreflective tie to interests.
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despite its illusion of autonomy. Since scientists must secure the
objectivity of their statements against the pressure and seduction of
particular interests, they delude themselves about the fundamental
interests to which they owe not only their impetus but the conditions
of possible objectivity themselves.
Habermas believes that the "achievements of the transcendental
subject have their basis in the natural history of the human species" ^2-
therefore human interests that have emerged in man's natural history
derive both from nature and from the cultural break with nature.
"What may appear as naked survival is always in its roots a
historical phenomenon. For it is subject to the criterion of
what a society intends for itself as the good life."^^
Habermas takes from this break with nature a theory of knowledge
that serves equally as an instrument and as that which transcends
mere self-preservation. Reinterpreting Marx. Habermas argues that
knowledge-based interests take form in the medium of work, language
and power, suggesting that knowledge and interest unite in a society
where the development of a non-authoritarian and universally
practiced dialogue support autonomy and responsibility. The unity of
knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic that takes the
historical traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has
been suppressed (Freud).
Positivism leads to the substitution of technology for enlightened
action; thus it directs the utilization of scientific information from an
illusory standpoint. Only a critique of objectivism will counter the
consequences of a positivist understanding of knowledge since this
includes a critique of classical ontology (a rejection of the power of
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renewed theory). We must reveal that which theory conceals: the
connection of knowledge to interest. Since it is Hegel who destroys
epistemology (the movement from doubt to knowledge) by arguing
that the move is impossible because doubt is already a form of
knowledge (forcing one to start with knowledge and then critique or
reflect on it). Habermas suggests a return to Kant to determine both
the error and potential of epistemology. For Hegel, the process of
continued clarification culminates in absolute knowledge or self-
knowledge. In contrast, Kant begins with the a priori mind (with self-
knowledge) and from it produces knowledge of the world. Habermas
believes that Hegel's critique of Kant fails because he loses the
distinction between theory (science) and practice (morality) when he
drops the Kantian distinction between man and nature.
It is Marx who reestablishes this distinction when he argues for
its mediation through labor. Marx argues that since we come to know
nature through sensuous human practice (not merely by thinking),
labor stands between the objective and subjective forms of nature and
constitutes the motor of change in society. For Hegel, all activity is of
the mind. For Marx, all activity is in nature. Habermas retrieves
reflectivity from Hegel and retains the material description of the
natural sciences from Marx in order to synthesize reflection and labor.
It is this reflective component of thought, free of external domination,
that directs the movement to an emancipated society. By claiming
that Marx could have done better had he included reflection as the
internal element of self-understanding (the essential component for
ending social conflict), Habermas creates a space for his theory. Since
critical rationality serves as the reflective component of knowledge
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and protects the dominaUon of nature from its ideological impact (the
domination of human nature), self-reflection brings together
knowledge and interest in the form of a universal pragmatics
(communicative competence).
Although Habermas' framework places language over operational
thought, his critics suggest that this structure lacks independent
backing since it is merely derivative from his assertion that rationality
is both operational and linguistic. They believe that the character of
his argument is vulnerable to empirical criticism since he has not
demonstrated that an "unsurpassable instrumental relation to nature is
rooted in our species endowments and is therefore inevitable" nor
has he developed a philosophy of science that rules out all sciences
that are not constitutively technical. According to Habermas' theory,
since science is instrumental, communicative ethics is the only realm
of value interaction open to humankind: "good-for-nature" is derived
from "good-for-man".
While Habermas contends that since the world is made
knowable to humans along two lines of "species interest" (the
technical-cognitive interest in the control of nature and the practical-
cognitive interest in communication), that these two forms of
knowledge are not subject to historical change, he acknowledges that
his quasi-transcendental grounding:
"provides us with plausible, if not completely compelling,
foundations for our knowledge. And while this type of
theorizing may not offer the satisfaction held out by first
philosophy, it does nonetheless avoid the despair of
skepticism.
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Habermas conceives his project as a "research program"; therefore he
does not pretend that he has produced ultimate results, only outlines
and guideposts. Yet as he has developed his "three tiered research
program" ^6, he has tenaciously defended his original vision of a
dualistic rationality; "What raises us out of nature is the only thing
whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure,
autonomy and responsibility are posited for us."^^
Habermas believes that his critics^® confuse epistemological and
ethical issues:
"Because the only "theoretically fruitful attitude" toward
nature is one bounded by the technical cognitive interest
means neither that other noncognitive (e.g., aesthetic)
attitudes are impossible nor that man must run roughshod
over nature."
The character of social "truth" is yet to be determined. Clearly
discourse (Habermas' vehicle of critique) has the capacity to justify
such ecophilosophical values as compassion for nature by redefining
human desire. The truth status of Habermas' position is dependent
(even as he acknowledges). The more compelling question to ask (in
the context of a new eco-vision) is whether the Habermasian vision is
too narrow to inspire environmental goals.
I have rejected the ideological schemes of ecophilosophy and
used the Habermasian framework to launch an immanent critique of
ecophilosophy. Despite many of the criticisms directed at Habermas'
communicative theory, for the most part I accept his dualistic
framework as instructive since I am sympathetic with Habermas'
quasi-transcendental solution when faced with the alternatives
(naturalism, relativism or the outright rejection of philosophy's role as
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tli0 §uardi3ji of rationality ). This means that I accept the
conservative nature of his analysis (that the elements of emancipation
are immanent) and its dualistic quality (humans are epistemologically
distinct from the rest of nature). Concurrently I believe that the
critical stress on his vision offers an opportunity for a reconstructed
eco-vision to assert itself.
B. The Problem of Nature
As might be expected, because of its persuasive content,
Habermas' resolution has stirred disagreement from a variety of other
quarters. Some dismiss his view categorically, arguing that his
persistent belief that the fundamental problems of modem society are
epistemological is an illusion of modem philosophy. Habermas;
"...Richard Rorty has undertaken the most ambitious
project: he wants to destroy the tradition of the philosophy
of consciousness, from its Cartesian beginnings, with the
aim of showing the pointlessness of the entire discussion
of the foundations and limits of knowledge.
Lyotard, in line with Rorty's position, argues that the failed modern
agenda is evident in any science that attempts to legitimize itself with
an appeal to a "metadiscourse", advocating a postmodern view that
distinguishes itself by its "incredulity toward metanarratives"2i.
Rejecting modern epistemology as a feeble attempt at building an
adequate representation of the world (given that we have no access to
the world-in-itself), Lyotard argues (as characterized by Benhabib) that
"the episteme of representation allows only one option, namely, a
recognition of the irreconcilability and incommensurability of language
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games, and the acceptance that only local and context-specific criteria
of validity can be formulated"22.
Lyotard rejects both instrumental or critical reason as an
alternative to the decline of the failing episteme of representation;
therefore the "polytheism of values" with which he is left either
prevents the kind of critique that he wants to level or his philosophy
subverts its polytheist character and privileges one domain of
knowledge over others. Benhabib argues that his position is clearly
the latter since he privileges "a discontinuous, fractured, and self-
destabilizing epistemology, said to characterize modern mathematics
and natural science"^^.
Despite its apparent failure, admittedly the challenge that
thinkers such as Lyotard and Rorty present to critical theorists is
immense (to find a non-foundationalist justification for their claims).
Avoiding the epistemological bind of Lyotard, a thinker such as Hans
Gadamer argues persuasively that Habermas fails to demonstrate that
we can overcome our historically embedded condition: we lack any
perspective from which to comment on the character of knowledge
(other than to say that we are inextricably bound by our historical
constitution). However, the conservative character of a language
games analysis (its political indifference) forces us back to the claim by
critical theorists such as Habermas that a communicative, discursive
concept of reason is defensible, and that it will serve moral autonomy.
Habermas claims to have surmounted both the extremes of pure
historicism and pure transcendentalism by arguing for his "quasi-
transcendental" posture, suggesting that our epistemology derives
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from nature as well as our break from nature (the emancipatory
character of reason is two-fold rather than monistic).
Yet Habermas' solution troubles even those who agree that his
reconceptualization is compelling. Two versions of this criticism are
relevant to my attempt to determine the legitimacy of the
ecophilosophical vision. First, the critique leveled by Seyla Benhabib
iri Critique. Norm and Utopia , holds Habermas accountable for the
universality in the normative agenda of Critical Theory. She attacks
the change agency of the Hegelian heritage, suggesting that its
"philosophy of the subject"^^ undermines the normative constructs of
Critical Theory. Immanent to the social critique of both Marx and the
Critical Theorists is the Hegelian notion that social change is the
result of a collective singularity. Although Marx overturns Hegel's
idealism and replaces it with the "work model of activity", he retains
an image of a collective, individual effort which Critical Theory
subsumes. Benhabib argues that the critical success of modem society
is contingent on our willingness to replace this model with a "more
intersubjectively oriented and pluralistic conception of self, society,
and politics"25
This critique by Benhabib against Habermas' philosophy of the
subject is particularly useful in our attempt to judge the legitimacy of
the ecophilosophical vision and serves to distinguish between the two
dominant streams of this kind of thinking. In a seemingly different
mode, Joel Whitebook suggests that in Habermas' attempt to overcome
the limitations of Critical Theory, he betrays the original vision:
"(w)hile providing a superior theoretical grounding for
Critical Theory, Habermas' transcendentalism necessarily
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precludes any reconciliation with nature. Theoretical
rigor is obtained at the expense of the original utopian
ideal. "26
Whitebook’s critique, that Habermas loses the autonomy of nature by
adamantly arguing that knowledge of nature is exclusively technical,
restates what I believe to be the predominant concern of
ecophilosophical writers (but which they fail to articulate clearly). For
Whitebook, although Habermas has "undoubtedly rectified some of the
most glaring theoretical defects of his predecessors, he has also
markedly altered the spirit of their project"27. in contrast, Benhabib
suggests that since the critical project is from the beginning flawed,
Habermas' project merely evidences this difficulty.
Arguably Habermas could be right about the emancipatory
capacity of rationality and merely wrong about the details (Benhabib)
or he could be (as some critics suggest) co-opted by his own desire to
retain a philosophically imposing position. For many serious critics, it
is the fate of nature that stresses Habermas' vision. Originally it is
against Herbert Marcuse's contention2S (since science and technology
are historically relative activities, a change in the economic
organization of society could bring about a new body of science and
technology), that Habermas29 presses his own conviction that
technological achievement is fundamental to human existence as we
know it and cannot be surpassed.
Habermas successfully transforms Critical Theory (gives it a
voice) by redefining the character of rationality. Recognizing that
Marx's framework is incomplete, he opens up a new realm of
intersubjectivity by acclaiming the emancipatory character of language.
Yet he maintains that our knowledge of external nature is
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instrumental, offending those who see the resurrection of nature as a
solution to the modern predicament. Although (for some) he
demonstrates that emancipation is not overrun by technological
advancement, he fails to go far enough (according to Benhabib), leaving
the plurality of individuals and cultures embedded in a collective vision
of humankind. 1 believe that the fate of the ecophilosophical vision
hinges upon its relevance to this controversy. Only in such a context
is it legitimate to ask; what is (or even should be) the relationship
between men, women and nature?
Superficially, the critiques leveled by Benhabib and Whitebook
resemble the complaints of ecophilosophers. Assuming that
Habermas’ position takes on the character of the "established view",
the kinds of criticism leveled at Habermas by Benhabib and Whitebook
resemble the concerns of both the deep ecologists and ecofeminists
(in the midst of a serious debate themselves) over the character of an
ecophilosophical vision. I have used the substance of these Habermas
criticisms to guide our evaluation of the ecophilosophical vision, as
Benhabib and Whitebook capture two pivotal issues in the eco-debate;
the fate of nature and the fate of the individual.
Others have done the work of demonstrating the theoretically
satisfying nature of Habermas’ theory in contrast to early Critical
Theory. Yet Whitebook and others reflect a kind of ’romantic regret’
(couched in a practical concern over the fate of the earth) that
Habermas’ preoccupation with reason cuts off a philosophical
consideration of a reconciliation with nature. As conceptualized by
both these critics and ecophilosophers themselves, at stake (both
philosophically and practically) is the "relationship between humans
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and nature" since the technical/cogniUve approach to nature impedes
our growing need to live in harmony. Their concern (although issuing
from the context of the critical debate) parallels the ecophilosophical
claim that in order to "save nature and save ourselves", human beings
must forsake their technical orientation to nature. The important
distinction is that opponents in the critical theory debate assume from
the start that the ideology of nature is as suspicious as (what these
critics characterize as) Habermas' reductionist position.
The constitutive status of technical-cognitive interest is a source
of concern for these critics for the simple reason that Habermas'
framework appears too narrow. C. Fred Alford argues that the
fundamental problem with Habermas' dualistic concept of rationality is
that by restricting the domain of human knowledge with regard to
nature, he prevents growth and change. While endorsing Habermas'
solution, Whitebook suggests that perhaps
"the scope and depth of the social and ecological crisis are
so great that nothing short of an epochal transformation on
the scale of world views will be commensurate with
them. "30
Thomas McCarthy believes that a divided rationality evokes a
fragmented world, asking Habermas: "how can we put our fragmented
world back together again?"3 1
.
Habermas attempts to support (in his well-developed
framework) a theory of communicative action that encompasses the
different dimensions of rationality that are opened up by a modem
understanding of the world. These are essentially three: the
cognitive-instrumental knowledge of objective nature, the moral-
practical knowledge produced in social interaction and the aesthetic-
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practical knowledge of self and world. Troubling a critic such as
McCarthy is the "norm-conformative atUtude toward the objective
world" contained in Habermas' framework that prevents "a philosophy
of nature that could compete with the modem sciences of nature"32.
McCarthy suggests that such a rival philosophy is not only possible
(consider Kant's early attempt in the Critique of Judgmentl but would,
"provide a view of our place in nature that could complement and
relativize the objectivating view of nature to be dominated"^^.
According to ecophilosophers, exemplified by Habermas critic
Henning Ottmann^^, environmental problems are provoked by this
framework. However, both Alford and Whitebook acknowledge that a
strictly instrumental orientation toward nature does not necessitate an
environmental crisis. Habermas himself argues that "my conception is
less rigid in respect to mediations between reason and nature''^^ than
my critics suppose.
"...while we can indeed adopt a performative attitude to
external nature, enter into communicative relations with
it, have aesthetic experience and feelings analogous to
morality with respect to it, there is for this domain of
reality only one theoretically fruitful attitude, namely the
objectivating attitude of the natural-scientific,
experimenting observer... "^6
Habermas argues that if we attempt to gain access to "nature-in-itself
either theoretically or ethically, problems assert themselves that lead
us back into the metaphysics of a re-enchanted world. Yet despite the
reassurance, a concern lingers that Habermas' vision limits the
relationship between humans and nature.
The debate between Habermas and Marcuse reflects the
disjuncture in Critical Theory over the fate of nature. Alford develops
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McCart±iy’s concern that after analyzing the philosophy of science of
both Marcuse and Habermas, and although the critique of instrumental
reason (science) is central to the work of both, Habermas and Marcuse
differ considerably in their analyses of science. Marcuse suggests the
possibility of a new science that embraces the "friendly and helpful
qualities in nature overlooked by the domineering attitude toward
nature"37 while Habermas argues that the basic technical and cognitive
structure of science is given by "the objective character of human
labor"38.
"Science and labor are part of the same struggle to wrest
human existence from a nature that is all too sparse. "39
At stake, according to Alford is that while Marcuse's discussion of
science lags far behind contemporary analyses of science and tends to
"romanticize nature", Habermas' categorization of knowledge tends to
"freeze the limits of human knowledge""^® and block new ways of
considering the relationship between humans and nature.
Alford believes that Habermas prematurely dismisses Marcuse as
making the same argument as Adorno who clearly places his hope in
aesthetics to avoid the "hegemony of conceptual thought". If, as
Marcuse suggests, a new rationality is not impossible then perhaps
Habermas (compelled to preserve rationality to prevent
dehumanization) has not sufficiently explored the sorts of social and
economic changes that might make an "aesthetic science" possible.
Prior to modern science categories of knowledge appear more loosely
delineated, so perhaps it is not necessary that a new nature-humanity
relationship be quasi-religious and mystical.
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The most clearly articulated vision of what that relationship
might be like (if other than instrumental) is given by Marcuse. As
Marcuse describes it in "Nature and Revolution’’^!, the possibility of
radical transformation of society is tied to a "new relationship between
man and nature". Canying out the original vision of Critical Theory,
Marcuse suggests that the historical character of nature makes way for
a new sensibility that reclaims, as critical, a primary and elementary
experience of nature (nature "for its own sake"). In the subversive
character of this sensibility lies the transformative character of a new
appreciation for nature. Most critical theorists agree that the power
and the ambiguity of Marcuse’s vision is that while he seeks man’s
reconciliation with nature, he also clings to science (and technology)
as the essential route to absolute freedom through the abolition of
labor (the tension of the monistic vision). In this way, by believing that
science can offer material comfort and not restrict the evolution of
man’s new relationship to nature, he stands in the tradition of the
great utopian writers such as More and Bacon. Ecophilosophers argue
that their recent resuscitation of such ideas resolves these ambiguities
by providing a concrete vision of a "new science": the revolutionary
character of the science of ecology (Murray Bookchin is referred to by
Marcuse). Yet 1 have shown how the fascination with ecology has
political repercussions that resemble the old Baconian vision.
Marcuse’s attempt to overcome the irrationality of a science that
"overwhelms the natural rationality of the world, substituting for it one
that responds to the narrower instrumental rationality of
humankind'"^^ is based on his belief that the logical and mathematical
abstraction of modem science arose in a particular historical setting
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which can be overturned with a new view of nature. The vulnerability
of this vision (as explained in my reconstruction of ecophilosophy) is
the focus of this project. One appealing aspect of Habermas' position
is that he expects much less from science than a deeent material
existence, theoretically preventing the intrusion of science into other
areas of existence which are essentially linguistic and not technical:
since language is not "fully explicable by science nor reducible to
instrumental action"43, it alone provides a means for reconeiliation
between men and women. Since he rejects the instrumentality of
science as insufficient to the greater task of restoring social relations,
he places the burden of change on human relationships, overcoming
the ambiguity in Marcuse's position.
Clearly Habermas and Marcuse offer two theoretically opposing
avenues to "the good life": Marcuse augments the original monistic
vision with a new rationality that guides a life of happiness and ease
while Habermas, in order to preserve an arena of higher values,
separates from nature a realm of language that can "light human
darkness" by speaking to the meaning of human existence. Scientific
politics is for Marcuse a life which is no longer bothered by higher
values since new scientific reason eventually renders Reason itself
unnecessary. Habermas protects the realm of "higher values" which he
considers the essential realm of humanity by separating politics out of
natural science.
I suggest that ecophilosophy shares Marcuse's belief that "(t)he
discovery of the liberating forces of nature and their vital role in the
construction of a free society becomes a new force in social change"'^'^.
While Marcuse offers a "convergence thesis" which projects the
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merger of technology and art (or work and play), ecophilosophers
suggest the joining of human and natural purposes. Both argue that
perception (for Marcuse, sensual perception) must be guided by
nature itself and not by human ambition.
"The new science is a special category of knowledge, one
that comes closest to expressing the goal of reconciliation
with nature. It responds to nature, in the hope that by so
doing nature will reveal a softer and more pleasant aspect
to humanity."^^
Yet Marcuse (as Alford suggests) never resolves this new science with
his other paramount goal: absolute freedom from nature. Alford
suggests that Marcuse's "new science" is, in effect, the scientific and
technological potential for overcoming nature so that the world
becomes an "expression of human erotic powers"'^®: reconciliation
with nature is total absorption of nature into human purposes.
Since science is the vehicle to satisfy human wants (as believed
by Bacon and More and argued by Habermas), Marcuse substitutes
traditional 'wants’ with what he considers "the genuine satisfaction of
pleasure" (so long denied to most humans by elaborate rationalization)
which science, for the first time, makes possible. In this way, science
never loses its instrumental character (the satisfaction of wants) since
it is the character of desire itself that is transformed. The critical
distinction between Habermas and ecophilosophers (who parallel
Marcuse's vision) is explanatory: how do we inspire this
transformation of desire? If, as ecophilosophers suggest, humans
work toward the total absorption of human purpose into nature, then
the very dilemma which they seek to overcome (the domination of
nature) overtakes them. Instead, autonomy demands that humans
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distinguish themselves from nature to bear the brunt of responsibility
for the quality of all life (as 1 will elucidate later, the precise character
of this distinction characterizes the more critical debate).
Habermas seeks "to prevent social relations from becoming like
our relations with the natural world"^'^ (my emphasis). Since he
wishes to maintain and strengthen the delineation between humanity
and the rest of nature, his two-fold cognitive interest theory
accomplishes this goal by attributing to these interests a constitutive
role. By arguing that the objects of experience establish the way in
which objects can be known, in conjunction with human nature,
Habermas substantiates his "quasi-transcendental" argument. Although
Habermas argues that any other orientation toward nature (that is not
instrumental) does not produce knowledge, he admits that other
experiences with nature whether aesthetic or regressive demonstrate
that much of nature remains unknown.
"Interests constitute all we may know about the world, but
they do not constitute the world itself. Yet, it is precisely
because interests do not constitute the world itself that
the world must remain unknowable." "...we can only truly
know what we have made: language."'^®
Habermas does not rule out other "experiences in nature", arguing
instead that they are not fruitful (technologically speaking).
Although the status of this qualification is the focus of my
reconstructed eco-vision (see below), important to Habermas' critique
of the Marcusian-like vision is his rejection of the attempt by modem
sociologists of science (or ecophilosophers) to limit science's
perspective (he firmly believes in the capacities of science to continue
to improve the quality of life). Rather, it is the scope of science that
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concerns Habermas; he believes that it must not be unleashed on the
realm of linguistic interaction which lies outside science. As a result,
he protects his theoretical framework from the dangers of a monistic
vision.
Does Habermas' dualistic framework encompass the variety of
ways that humans interact with each other and nature? Although 1
suggest below that serious adjustments must be made to Habermas’
framework to be politically 'correct', 1 resist Alford’s suggestion that
there are categories of experience which seem to transcend both
technical and communicative interests. Using the example of medical
anthropology, Alford proposes that Habermas' claim that only a
technical approach to nature can produce "theoretically fruitful
knowledge" prejudices the healing powers of the medical profession
over the diagnostic efficacy of something like a Navaho hand trembler.
Yet this kind of information as it confronts the scientific community
exerts pressure on the field to open the narrow confines of scientific
explanation.
Although science itself may undergo a radical shift as new
unifying theories replace old models, it is not inconsistent to argue
that this 'new nature', like those before it, remains in the context of
our technical/cognitive approach to nature. Examples such as these
from medical anthropology (much like Merchants examples of pre-
Renaissance sanctions on the use of nature) are unconvincing evidence
that cultures characterize themselves by their radically different
approaches to nature; the goal of even 'primitive' cultures is to utilize
nature to their own benefit, whether for religious or material
purposes.
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I position my own reconstruction and critique of the broad
ecophilosophical claim that a "new science" is revealed in the
framework of an ecological world view^o in this debate between
Habermas and his critics. I have already suggested that ecophilosophy
fails to satisfy the very basic criteria of Critical Theory. Although
Marcuse himself never worked out the theoretical details of his vision,
to judge the ecophilosophical 'new science' according to the original
vision of Critical Theory means that it would have to be non-regressive
in two distinct ways:
"First, it would have to avoid slipping back into pre-
rational, e.g., mythical, forms of thought. Second, it could
not regress behind the present level of technical
proficiency or else one of the conditions of a satisfactory
solution, the material prerequisites for a new society, no
longer would obtain.
Ecophilosophy is suspiciously both anti-rational and anti-technical in
its attempt to overcome the alleged domination of nature. Even
Adorno and Horkheimer are skeptical about the possibility of satisfying
these criteria in the face of the inherently dialectical character of
enlightenment thinking. The appealing feature of Habermas' response
is that he rejects the main thesis of early Critical Theory, arguing that
"while there is an intimate connection between the domination of
external and internal nature, the two processes do not follow the same
logic."^^ To overcome this limitation, Habermas introduces his
"dualistic framework", suggesting that the "logic of instrumental
rationality governs the domination of external nature, the logic of
communicative rationality governs that of internal nature"^^.
Since reification of nature is the goal in the first case and
pathology in the second case, and although the dread 'manipulation of
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nature’ is not ruled out in Habermas' framework, the possibility for
emancipation of the self is reintroduced. Yet moral progress and
technological advance are not mutually exclusive as originally
conceived by Horkheimer and Adorno; thus Whitebook suggests that
Habermas fails to meet the criteria of those who believe that a radical
critique of modern society requires a new vision: "an emancipated
society for Habermas consists in the completion, and not the
transfiguration, of the modem project"^^^ Since Habermas has
fortified the enlightenment dream with his emancipated community of
autonomous individuals that direct the scientific enterprise in order to
reach our envisioned 'good life’, he eliminates the apparent need for
the transformation of rationality itself.
I believe that the ultimate impact of these debates over the "fate
of nature" is to side-track a more critical issue. Since the fate of
nature is already being largely determined by our current normative
frameworks, our most productive work is to understand and fully
develop our present potentialities rather than looking for fundamental
shifts and transformations. The most provocative stmggle along these
lines is that of the feminist critics who, with their focus on women’s
experience, stress our traditional concepts of human action. They
suggest that although social theorists have t}q)ically distinguished
humans from nature as a collective singularity (humankind), the net
result is that we privilege a very select group of individuals to
characterize our collectivity. Ecophilosophy, although essentially
concerned with the "liberation of nature", is involved in its own
internal debate over the eharaeter of the relationship between humans
and nature. This debate (between deep ecologists and ecofeminists) is
206
didactic for the simple reason that while it reinforces the practical
limits of a universal ethic, it suggests the possibility that the
legitimation of language is subject to normative constraints. This
suggestion exposes Habermas' critical framework to the question:
what is the legitimacy of a universal pragmatics?
C. Ecophilosophy Reconsidered
The distinction between humans and nature (politics and
science) is not only theoretically compelling, it is arguably an essential
component of any social or environmental solution since it is the
potentiality of technical rationality (when held in check by
emancipated humankind) that offers all of nature the only hope of the
'good life'. Although modern society proffers an artificial distinction
between science and politics maintained by a positivist vision of the
absorption of all knowledge by scientific rationality, the autonomy of
reflection as obtained through communicative interaction (internal
and external) suggests the we might not only live comfortably but with
renewed political integrity. Not only does an emancipated view of
language offer direction for our scientific developments, it overcomes
the monistic character of a nature philosophy that epistemologically
eschews diversity despite its celebrated grounding in the diversity of
nature. It augments the perpetuation of the diversity of individual and
cultural 'linguistic histories' articulated in the commonality of
communicative interaction (if reinterpreted along the lines that
Benhabib suggests).
Any current ecophilosophical vision is on a collision course with
a conceptual framework that privileges a technical orientation to
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nature. Suppose that constitutively our only possible orientation to
nature is technical; we could conclude that since environmental
problems are neither caused nor solved by epochal transformations in
our views of nature, we must look elsewhere for resolution. Yet even if
by answering the original ecophilosophical question (humans are
inherently disposed (not historically) to manipulate nature) we are
able to deal adequately with environmental problems, our success is
immaterial since our solution collides with a basic ecophilosophical
premise that the 'collective self as we know it is inadequate. The
ecophilosophical crisis is one that necessitates human transformation;
the opportunity to be other than who we are.
If our relationship to nature is ultimately incidental to our moral
inferiority, then it is clear why ecophilosophers ground their theory in
a radical personal transformation, in this case inspired by a vision of
nature. If instead we are satisfied to utilize our technical knowledge to
come into balance with nature, we fail to satisfy the ecophilosophical
criteria of a new world. Critical theorists argue the same dilemma
(the fate of nature is inextricably tied to the fate of human nature),
believing that it is theoretically impossible to carry on any relationship
of mastery without contaminating all realms of the human psyche.
Although I have dismissed as "unfruitful" this ecophilosophical
conceptualization of our modem dilemma, using the debates around
the Habermasian framework, Benhabib's critique of Habermas further
devastates the dubious status of this eco-vision while retrieving its
most important asset. Although she agrees with Habermas that we
must replace Marx's "work model of activity" (since it fails to capture
adequately the dynamics of social change) and replace it with a
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work/linguistic one. simultaneously she rejects Habermas' "philosophy
of the subject" (which he retains from Hegel). Her framework is
helpful when assessing the utopian content of ecophilosophy (to
determine its legitimacy) since we must separate out from the general
effort two distinct visions; the holistic vision (of deep ecologists and
biocentric thinkers) and the vision of solidarity (initiated by social
ecologists and given a distinct flavor by ecofeminists). In line with
Benhabib's critique of Critical Theory, the pivotal element that
distinguishes ecofeminism from deep ecology is the philosophy of
action implicit in each that privileges either collective singularity or
plurality (as that which motivates social change). At stake then (for
legitimacy) is the convergence of ecophilosophy with a satisfactory
philosophy of action.
Consider Ricoeur's "circle of symbolic action": ideologies and
utopias are essential to each other in the work of transforming society:
therefore, their interdependence implies that while utopias stress
ingrained power structures, the identity forming aspect of ideology
sets the boundaries for a successful utopian vision. This dialectical
interpretation of a utopian vision fortifies my suggestion that the
holistic eco-vision rescues nature from its instrumental fate without
providing a provocative analysis of our political condition; thus its net
value to social theory is negative as it preserves the current,
unsatisfactory separation between science and politics. Since social
ecology stresses existing conditions while preserving a redeeming
political focus as a utopian vision, it succeeds over deep ecology and
rightly serves as the focus of any theoretical revisions in
ecophilosophy.
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Although Habermas' position teeters on the edge of
transcendentalism (mirroring Kant's cognitive faculties), its
redeeming feature is that it funnels theoretical efforts into the fruitful
area of psychodynamics (or personal narratives). But it does this
without giving up the possibility of critique (the dilemma of
hermenuetics)
. Particularly suggestive is the pivotal claim that
Habermas makes about our condition: "we can truly know only that
which we have made". Citing this as evidence of the gap between
humans and the rest of nature and indicative of the epistemological
character of language, Habermas revitalizes Marx's revolutionary
insight that labor is that which mediates men (women) and nature.
"...Marx wanted to achieve something qualitatively new:
mastery by the whole of society of society's mastery over
nature. This mastery would certainly still depend on the
functions of instrumental reason. But since it would
'finalize' these functions, and subject them to truly human
aims, the mastery of society would undertake its own self-
correction; society's mastery over nature would thereby be
freed from the curse of being simultaneous a mastery over
men, and thus perpetuating the reign of blind natur^
history.
Marx reconceptualizes the interpenetration of nature and society (as it
takes place in nature) as the total reality comprising both moments.
The particularly fruitful aspect of Marx's concept of nature to the
ecophilosophical debate is its dialectical quality: "(It is) 'dogmatic
enough to exclude from the theoretical construction anything Marx
called mysticism or ideology; at the same time (it is) conceived
undogmatically and broad-mindedly enough to prevent nature itself
from receiving a metaphysical consecration or indeed ossifying into a
final ontological principle. "56
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As Schmidt points out, Marx's attack is broad. He rejects any
notion of "nature in-itself in the absence of human mediation
(Spinoza); he criticizes the attribution by German idealism that
consciousness can obtain an independent character; and he rejects
the Hegelian synthesis of subject and object calling it "metaphysically
transversed". Marx:
"Once the essentiality of man and of nature, man as a
natural being and nature as a human reality, has become
evident in practice, and sensuously, the quest for an alien
being, a being above nature and man (a quest which is an
avowal of the inessentiality of nature and man) becomes
impossible in practice.
Marx offers a view of nature that challenges the Baconian image of
immediately accessible nature by conceptualizing the interpenetration
of nature and society. Marx knows that although it is absolutely
impossible to transcend the laws of nature, the form in which these
laws express themselves changes under varying historical conditions.
("History creates knowledge through human practice."^®). Humans
change nature and by doing so change themselves.
The intrigue of Marx's position (to this discussion) is the
implicit consequence of his suggestion that all human change is
necessarily tied to the utilization of nature: self-realization is a
reflection of a self-created world (by acting on nature we overcome
alienation). For this reason Marx attacks so vehemently the core of
capitalism; the inherent commoditization of labor that determines
human alienation ("The laborer is alienated from work because it is
external to the worker and does not belong to his essential being. "®^).
Furthermore, the alien power over one who loses control over his
labor is man himself (the capacity to deny someone the possibility of
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authentic work is to deprive them of the possibility of personal
emancipation). Marx hopes that since man is not only a natural being.
but distinguishes himself as a human natural being (one that can
consciously use the laws of nature to his advantage), a unified science
of nature and of man would reform both society and nature.
Since the fate of Marx's vision depends upon transcending
capitalism through the successes of this science, the apparent
conquest by capitalism and the intrusive character of science have
paled the initial enthusiasm for Marx's analysis. Habermas
reconceptualizes Marx's initial insight, arguing for reform through
linguistic emancipation, recognizing the transformative power of
dialogue. (Since we may know that which we create, the autonomy of
language as a human creation inspires a new vision.) Reforming
Habermas' universal framework by distilling its most divisive element,
Benhabib envisions a plurality of language that:
"...proceeds from the assumption that there is no single
spot in the social structure that privileges those who
occupy it with a vision of the social totality.
Benhabib believes that, correctly formulated, communicative ethics
"can mediate between the standpoint of the "generalized" and the
"concrete" other(s) by synthesizing justice with care, autonomy with
connectedness."®^ This re-conceptualization of Habermas' vision
serves to separate even more closely the elements of the broad eco-
vision; it is ecofeminism that distinguishes itself from social ecology as
the instructive view.
The debate around Lawrence Kohlberg's universal ethical model
and Carol Gilligan's contextual ethic demonstrates the break between
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Habermas' vision and that of many feminists. Universalist moral
theories are (as Benhabib describes) "substitutionalist", meaning that
the universal claim is built from the results of the experiences of a
specific group (often white, male adults). The ideal of autonomy which
dominates universal moral reasoning (such as that of Kohlberg),
Benhabib argues, is the image of the "disembedded and disembodied
male ego". Since this vision dominates moral philosophy, the
domestic and intimate sphere (of most women's lives) is relegated to
an ahistorical, unchanging and immutable events category which never
qualifies it as moral discourse.
Benhabib's relational-interactive theory of identity which
assumes that, "every act of self-reference expresses simultaneously the
uniqueness and difference of the self as well as the commonality
among selves"®^ opposes the nonrelational theory of the self (in the
tradition of social contract theories) which denies that the 'personal'
has any bearing on moral judgment. Since these "private" aspects of
both women and men's lives are denied access to the domain of moral
discourse, not only does the character of such discourse remain
stunted, but as a result of the dominance of this traditional theory
(Kohlberg and Rawls), the oppression of women (and men) continues
by the exclusion of a major component of our lives from moral
consideration.
Benhabib's analysis conforms with the ecofeminist ethical ideal,
suggesting that the potential autonomy of language (distinct from
technical and cognitive productivity), underlies the feminist eco-
vision. This marriage (between Habermas' analysis®^ and feminist
discernment) fortifies the ecofeminist contention that a contextualist
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etilic correctly distinguishes their theory from biocentrism. Yet the
question remains; how does an ecofeminist vision distinguish itself
from other feminist work? Why does it concern itself with the "fate of
nature" at all? Certainly the utopian potentiality of personal narrative
if shown to be epistemologically other than and equally fruitful as
material productivity, is enough to redirect social theory along the
lines that inspire the ecofeminist ethics despite the fate that this new
ecofeminist vision would not be grounded in nature but in an
emancipated linguistic relationship.
Yet clearly ecofeminists distinguish their theory. Warren argues
from the perspective of four dominant feminist trends (the liberal, the
traditional Marxist, the radical and the socialist) that ecofeminism is
rightly the central theme of any feminist theory. Since (according to
ecofeminists) the oppression of women is inseparable from the
oppression of nature, feminism (if it is to redeem women) is forced to
take the connection seriously. Although she rejects traditional Marxist
feminist theory as gender-blind (the failure to take seriously gender as
a constitutive category of social reality), she dismisses even the radical
feminists for their preoccupation with the separation between nature
and culture that she believes retains an essentially flawed theme of the
dominant "conceptual framework": that women are closer to nature.
She notes that the work of theorists such as Gilligan (and Kathryn P.
Addelson) have undermined the "patriarchal conceptual framework"
with a new interpretation of women's moral thinking, crippling liberal
feminist theory and bolstering the work of ecofeminism. Yet Warren
argues that this growing awareness of the distinct character of
women's experience, best interpreted by the work of "socialist
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feminists" (feminists that come through the critical tradition) "does
not explicitly address the systematic oppression of nature, it fails to
give an account of one the four interlocking pillars upon with the
structure of patriarchy rests - sexism, racism, classism, and
naturism"®^.
As 1 have suggested, ecofeminists, such as Warren (in line with
the spirit of ecophilosophy itself) never adequately define their notion
of "the systematic oppression of nature" or (as I have characterized it)
the "domination of nature". Although this is a serious flaw in all of
ecophilosophy, it is particularly damaging to ecofeminists since it
undermines their attempt to articulate a valid contextual ethic. The
universal character of what 1 elucidate as the ecophilosophical
interpretation of the domination of nature categorically opposes the
ecofeminist vision of an ethic that maintains difference and takes
narrative seriously. Since I have argued that ecofeminist must re-
examine what they mean by 'nature' and its 'oppression', they can
profit from the insights of (what Warren labels) the socialist feminists
that stand in the tradition of a Marxist analysis of nature. The
reinterpretation of Marx to include a symbolic element of production
redeems the reductionist character of traditional Marxism.
Augmented by a Marxist analysis of nature, ecofeminism might
collapse into feminist critical theory. Yet the ecofeminist rhetoric
clearly expresses an underlying motivation. What inspires the
ecofeminist characterization of the human condition? Does their
insight offer anything new to a feminist critique? Although they claim
to be inspired by a theoretical gap in feminist theory, the more
seductive component of ecofeminism is its intuition about the
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transformative character of nature. Ecofeminists, one might say, are
nature lovers by experience and feminists by theory. Again Karen
Warren:
"...many feminists and environmental ethicists have begun
to take narrative seriously. Narrative provides a way to
express a variety of ethical attitudes, such as the difference
in attitudes toward a rock when one is "making it to the
top" and when one thinks of oneself as "friends with" or
"caring about" the rock one climbs. Narrative also gives
voice to a felt sensitivity often lacking in traditional
analytical ethical discourse, e.g. of seeing oneself "in
relationship with" the non-human environment."®^
Are these experiences of any theoretical import? What is the
character of these kinds of narratives? What could it possibly mean to
"befriend" a rock?
Although it is easy for many to dismiss this talk as privatized
babble, a more intriguing suggestion is that since nature inspires such
internal dialogue, the conversations themselves capture an
unarticulated awareness of the dialogical character of nature itself
(nature seeking to know itself). Although Gilligan (and others) have
explored the character of women's "moral experience", the character
of women’s "nature experience" has been, up to now, relegated to
mysticism or idiosyncratic behavior. As I have suggested, Habermas
relegates nature to the category of technical and cognitive enterprise,
seemingly rejecting a concept of nature in the context of subjectivity:
human beings in dialogue with nature. The potentiality of this arena of
rationality takes us back to our discussion of the narrow character of
Habermas' framework and to McCarthy's suggestion that such an
expanded understanding of nature might "have consequences for our
sense of obligation to nature and for the norms governing our
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interaction with nature that we regard as justifiable"®®. Yet McCarthy
(and others) pose their quarrel with Habermas in the context of his
^rifv^^'sal framework. What is the fate of this knowledge if understood
as constitutive of the kind of social arrangement that feminist desire?
Ecofeminism characterizes the human experience as unified: all
systems of oppression (classism, racism, sexism, naturism) are
interconnected: we must heed our place as "co-members of an
ecological community"; a feminist vision reawakens universal,
underplayed values (care, friendship). Yet (of interest to this analysis)
these themes are cast alongside equally vigorous claims that portray
the human condition as essentially "intersubjective"; we must replace
the "logic of domination" with the diversity of human experience; our
"ecological condition" is fundamentally about the relationship between
the diversity in nature and its long-term health and viability; we must
risk an "ecofeminist view" in favor of a diversity of voices. While the
paradoxical character of these claims has undermined the validity of
ecofeminism, it captures the dialectical quality of our distinctly human
experience (when more clearly articulated).
Although it is beyond the scope of this project to pursue in any
great detail, the theoretically meaningful character of this vision,
superficially at least, I believe it supports and refines the Habermasian
vision. I have already stated that my inquiries into ecofeminism do not
indicate that 1 (in anyway) support its fundamental premise (that the
"domination of nature" embodies the domination of women thereby
justifying patriarchal society) since 1 have already rejected the
ecophilosophical understanding of the "domination of nature as
essentially pre-critical. Furthermore, I make no claims about the
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fundamental character of patriarchy. Rather, the critical insight
offered by Habermas that the epistemological domination of scientific
rationality (not its character) has prevented legitimating an equally
valid form of thinking (the dialogical character of nature), theoretically
blocking an independent insight into a meaningful world, is potentially
augmented by a critical appraisal of the relational character of women
(and men) to nature.
This suggestion that ecofeminism captures the dialectics of
duality also addresses the problem of duality in Habermas' concept of
reason by suggesting that while a resolution of the epistemological
problem of the character of knowledge is unlikely (in the near future),
energy spent exploring a dual rationality is advantageous. Although it
is hard for some to imagine that communicative interaction could ever
be as productive and world-changing as science and technology, or
that the two worlds could exist side-by-side without competition and
rivalry (since typically dualism creates a tension of this or that and
rarely a world of this and this), the appeal of this vision is its ability to
more adequate capture present human experience. Nearly every
human being confronts two realities: that of the 'expert' and that of
the 'personal' (or that of the profane and that of the sacred); thus the
possibility that theory might empower the later without abolishing the
former is encouraging.
Language, as Luce Irigaray has pointed out, when characterized
as universal, is suspect because of its historically determined state;
therefore we may conclude from her analysis that the absence of the
female voice is both political and epistemological (the restriction of
that voice to the realm of the personal due to the valorization of the
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public /private split, narrowing the framework of legitimate rational
interactions). Since the fluidity of language allows it to capture any
view or experience, the work of feminists (such as Irigaray) to work
out a language that is "adequate for the body, sex and the imagination
of the woman"^'^ complements the ecofeminists' intuition that the
unique epistemological status of women's experiences in nature is as
constitutive of our existence as is our acknowledged dependence upon
nature (as that which determines our survival). While our comfort is
determined by our technical utilization and harmonization with nature,
our happiness is fixed by the intersubjective dialogue that occurs
between humans and the rest of nature. The work of feminist
epistemology is to unearth human potentialities yet unappreciated and
underdeveloped. It is in this service that an ecofeminist project could
be of value, articulating the dialogical character of "nature experience".
The experience of women is particularly valid since women have
traditionally defined themselves using the criteria of a communicative
competence. (The responsibility for relationship success, so
contingent upon one's ability to communicate, has traditionally been
placed on women.) The explorations that many women embark upon
to understand and resolve their relationship conflicts (in light of the
limited skills offered by a technological society) have been shown to
entail alternative forms of competence (and insight). The fate of this
knowledge (without the outlet given to other forms of creative insight)
is of utmost importance. Although such knowledge does not begin to
encompass the vastness of communicative competence (the ultimate
goal), it offers insight into the character of such knowledge.
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The ambiguous conclusion is t±iat it is possible to recognize
universal truths in the context of personal narratives despite the
contextual foundation of such knowledge. As Gilligan (and others)
have shown, the character of these "universal truths" is their
testimony to contextuality. Since the test of insight is changed action
(analogous to the scientific hypothesis), rational explanations can be
made for the interaction between dialogical insight and behavior
despite this kind of evidence which, lacking independent verification,
is qualitatively different from scientific evidence. Freud made
particularly helpful inroads into understanding this kind of rationality
by describing the delicate interplay between patient and analyst. The
internalization of the process resembles this alternative way of
knowing (side-stepping the bias of Freud’s view of women).
Feminists are restructuring the character of knowledge from a
variety of vantage points.®® Despite my rejection of the initial
ecofeminist analysis, the epistemological impact of their eco-vision
justifies an autonomous realm of investigation (the narrative quality of
"nature experience"). Ecofeminists can distinguish themselves (from
other ecophilosophical and feminist activity) by arguing that a new
ecofeminist vision is to be grounded in personal narratives derivative
from experiences in 'nature'.®^ By attacking the split between the
generalized and the concrete other, they position themselves within
feminist critique, but distinguish themselves by their belief that
experiences in nature (so far undervalued by our preoccupation with
scientific rationality) contribute to the healing of society. Let us
examine more closely the character of ecofeminism to reveal the
particularly suggestive point of departure within the theory.
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D. Ecofeminism and Nature
The explanatory goal of ecofeminism is to render explicit the
historical, symbolic and theoretical connections between the
(assumed) domination of women and domination of nature. Warren
outlines the patriarchal, conceptual framework that sanctions such
oppression;
"Women are identified with nature and the realm of the
physical; men are identified with "human" and the realm of
the mental. Whatever is identified with nature and the
realm of the physical is inferior to ("below") whatever is
identified with "human" and the realm of the mental (or,
conversely, the latter is thought of as superior to ("above")
the former). Thus, women are inferior to ("below") men
(or, conversely, men are superior to ("above") women). For
any A and B, if A is superior to B, then A is justified in
subordinating B. Thus, men are justified in subordinating
women (and nature)."”^®
Warren concludes that since sexism is intimately linked to "naturism"
(as described above), feminism is (fundamentally) a movement to end
naturism.
Ecofeminists like Warren make an additional unsupported claim
that is of particular importance to my reconstruction. The argument
for a contextual ethic distinguishes the ecofeminists from biocentered
thinkers like the deep ecologists, yet ecofeminists fail to demonstrate
that this ethic necessarily follows from if one is to overcome their
primary concern that the domination of nature is linked to the
domination of women. Although I have already considered the
problems circumscribing the concept of the "domination of nature to
which ecofeminism is vulnerable (the "domination of nature is a social
ideology, encompassing both men and women), the emancipatory
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potential of an ethic (which, as Warren describes, "denies abstract
individualism, makes a central place for relational values, presupposes
and maintains difference, and takes narrative seriously") is worthy of
attention. Not only does is supersede the deep ecologist’s biocentric
ethic, but in the context of ecofeminism it hints at the resolution of
the tension between a postmodern "language games" theory and the
quasi-transcendentalism of Habermas' communicative competence.
To make this argument requires extensive work, particularly
given the skimpy analysis by ecofeminists. In the scope of this last
chapter, I can not commit myself to working out a completed version,
but I can offer some suggestive images. Critical to both the
Habermasian vision (Benhabib) and the ecofeminist vision (Warren) is
the power of narrative. As I have suggested, this insight is also an
element of Gilligan's work to produce an alternative ethical model
(consistent with those of others who are interested in alternative
feminist epistemologies). This fascination with narrative also
characterizes much of "postmodern" philosophy (Rorty, the
deconstructionists, Michael Foucault and the like). Yet since the
epistemological status of narrative is suspect, these theorists prefer to
reject epistemological concerns completely, supposing to have
overturned attempts such as those of Habermas to redeem the modern
belief in rationality.
Much of this controversy turns on the status of the 'self . Since
it is the character of the self that determines the character of
knowledge (without a clearly articulated 'self, there is no problem of
knowledge), some have rejected the concept of the self entirely (they
have deconstructed the self). Although Habermas preserves the self as
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the critical element of a collective agency of acUon, the universality of
Habermas' theory appears to supersede its emphasis on narrative (as
exemplified by a Freudian account). Is it possible to reject the
Hegelian concept of a collective singularity of selves (Benhabib) in
order to preserve the integrity of a personal narrative and maintain
the quasi-transcendental character of communicative interaction?
While the quasi-transcendental position assumes the two-fold
character of nature (it is nature that constrains the output of scientific
inquiry and. in a different way, determines the linguistic possibilities
for social integration), it is the dialectical character of each of these
forms of nature (unity contains plurality) that reintegrates a seemingly
fragmented nature.
It would seem that no matter what the character of our activity,
it is always in the context of the "other": seientists struggle against
experimental results, politicians against voting results, men and
women against their own 'selves'. For this reason, feminist critics are
essentially concerned over the character and fate of the "other" since
the dominant philosophical frameworks dismiss some activities (in
particular traditional female activities) as not representative of the
universal human attempt to come to terms with the "generalized
other". In line with this analysis, great effort is being placed on
validating alternative perspectives as equally engaged in the creative
attempt to understand the world, augmented by the feminist position
that the presence of a clear distinction between "the world" and "my
world" drives the machinery of oppression. Benhabib (in the context
of her analysis of Gilligan's critique of moral discourse) assesses these
universalizing strategies:
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I am not suggesting that such conceptions of the good life
(those of the dominant moral theorists) either can or
should he universalized ... our affective-emotional
constitution, as well as our concrete history as moral
agents, ought to be considered accessible to moral
communication, reflection and transformation. Inner
nature, no less than the public sphere of justice, has a
historical dimension. In it are intertwined the history of
the self and the history of the collective. To condemn it to
silence is, as Gilligan has suggested, not to hear that other
voice in moral theory."'^i
Reflecting this concern is a growing body of work that validates
women's experiences and modes of thinking.
In a larger context, the importance of such work is its impact on
the structure of social relations and the emancipation from all men
and women from destructive, oppressive relationships (including
those that are cultural, racial, sexual and/or gender-based). In this
context, we can reinterpret the ecofeminist critique as paralleling that
described above by Benhabib. Although we have privileged our
scientific enterprise as indicative of the emancipatory character of
nature, providing us the tools we need to overcome our "ecological
crisis", (since such information lies outside the realm of political
discourse), we lack the perspective from which to evaluate our
condition. An ecofeminist critique suggests that we need to validate a
new realm of intercourse (women (and men's) dialogical relationships
with nature), as equally compelling evidence by which to gage our
political future.
The feminist character of this critique is its rejection of the
"nonrelational theory of the self, claiming instead (as so aptly
characterized by Benhabib) that "(e)very act of self-reference
expresses simultaneously the uniqueness and difference of the self as
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well as the commonality among selves"72. This means that there is no
"ecological perspective or consciousness" since each unique (and
historically formed) relationship to nature determines how we see
nature, what we want from nature and how we justify our actions. We
can move toward a collective voice only in the context of the diversity
of many voices; thus our negotiating process must move from diversity
to unity and back again. To deny that separateness rules a successfully
unified outcome is to relegate as unimportant or uninteresting a
variety of experience and knowledge (linguistically determined). Like
Gilligan's attack on Kohlberg's universal moral theory, the ecofeminists
correctly target deep ecology for its universal character. Yet
ecofeminists themselves must now relinquish their own universal
characterization of the domination of nature and focus attention on the
concrete ethical transformations that occur in nature as experienced
by women.
Why women? Are women closer to nature? Although 1 refrain
from making such a claim because of its ambiguous reputation, it
seems empirically true that women are more comfortable with the
individuality of their experiences in nature as opposed to the more
universal rhetoric of nature lovers such as Thoreau and Leopold.
Clearly nature, as experienced by women, is absent in large part from
typical historical accounts of nature ethics (see Worster and Nash).
Ecofeminists (such as Merchant and Griffin) attempt to amend this
record by reconceptualizing the history of nature as potentially
redeemed by a renewed interest in organicism (historically associated
with a female perspective). Although conceived as an assault on
scientific rationality, the pre-critical character of these anal}^es
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denies t±iem the persuasive quality of a narrative investigation
grounded in a reformed Marxist commentary on nature.
What can we learn from women's experiences in nature?
Although this remains largely undetermined'^^^ ^ is possible to provide
a bare sketch of this kind of insight by turning to the narratives
themselves. Typically, ecophilosophers (also interested in nature
experiences) read these narratives from a universal standpoint,
arguing that they record the ecological character of nature (nature per
se) rather than understanding them as elements of a political dialogue
that denies any privileged perspective. Instead, (as any consciousness-
raising movement will attest) individual experience is the backbone of
genuine empowerment only in a process that privileges friendship and
solidarity. As Benhabib explains:
"The community of needs and solidarity is created in the
interstices of society by those new social movements,
which on the one hand fight to extend the universalist
promise of objective spirit-justice and entitlements-and on
the other seek to combine the logic of justice with that of
friendship.
Although from an objectivating standpoint we do not learn anything
about nature from narrative, this fact disenfranchises such insights
only if we require a universal perspective from which to judge
personal experience.
With what attitude, then, do we read these narratives? From the
perspective of the individual woman's (or man's) experience, taking
narrative seriously reinforces (for each individual) its integrity and
validity. From the prospect of theorists working out a feminist analysis
that serves the important function of critique, these narratives
corroborate their theoretical conjecture that only by hearing other
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voices, "do we have a hope of moving to a more integrated vision of
ourselves and of our fellow humans as generalized as well as "concrete"
others"75. And finally, from the perspective of the environmental
movement itself, these narratives record the diversity of voices within
the framework of an identifiably collective, political effort.
As suggestive of the validity of such a research project, let us
consider, in the light of these various perspectives, two examples of
this kind of narrative. First the narratives themselves; an excerpt
from Karen Warren's journal® (active spokeswoman for ecofeminism):
"August 16, 1983. Northfield, Minnesota. 1 just finished a
paper on environmental ethics about rights of nonhumans.
I am not pleased with it. I don't seem to have the
language, the tools, to say what 1 want to say and still have
the paper count as philosophy.
August 18, 1983. Tofte, Minnesota. Two days later. Today
was my first experience rock climbing. I chose a
somewhat private spot for my first climb. 1 tackled "the
chimney" with athletic determination, focusing my energy
on "making it to the top". By mid-way I was exhausted and
anxious. I couldn't see what to do next, I made a move and
fell. There I was, dangling mid-air above the rocky ground
below. Once I knew I was safe, that the belay rope had
held me, I began to tremble, with fear, with relief. With
renewed determination, I finished the climb to the top.
August 19, 1983. Tofte, Minnesota. My second day of
climbing, a different spot. This time I rappelled down
about 200 feet from the top of the Palisades to just a few
feet above the water level of Lake Superior. I could see no
one--not my belayer, not the other climbers, no one. I
unhooked slowly from the rappel rope and took a deep
cleansing breath. I looked all around me-really looked—
and listened. I heard a cacophony of voices—birds, trickles
of water on the rock before me, waves lapping against the
rocks below. I closed my eyes and began to feel the rock
with my hands-the cracks and crannies, the raised lichen
and mosses, the almost imperceptible nubs that might
provide a resting place for my fingers and toes when I
began to climb. At that moment I was bathed in serenity.
1 began to talk to the rock in an almost inaudible, child-
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like way, as if the rock were my friend. I felt an
overwhelming sense of gratitude for what it offered me-a
chance to know myself differently, to appreciate
unforeseen miracles like the tiny flowers growing in the
even tinier cracks in the rock's surface, and to come toknow a sense of being in relationship with the natural
environment. It felt as if the rock and 1 were silent
conversational partners in a long-standing /riendship. 1
realized then that 1 had come to care about this cliff which
was so different from me, so unmovable and invincible,
independent and seemingly indifferent to my presence. I
wanted to be with the rock as I climbed-not to conquer it,
control it, or forcefully impose my will on it, but simply to
*
work respectfully with it. And as I climbed, that is what 1
felt. I felt myself caring for this rock and feeling thankful
for the opportunity to know it—and myself—in this way."
(Warren's italics )
Next the reflections of Alaskan woman, Vernita Zilys'^'^ (active
spokeswoman for the plight of the Native Alaskan culture);
"(The) concept of perspectives came to me one day as I
stooped under a hot sun to seek out yet another handful of
elusive blueberries, at a little spot some 13 miles up the
coast from my home village of Unalakleet. With me was
Jean Maxwell, a woman with whom 1 have enjoyed many
conversations about the lifestyle 1 have come to re-
appreciate... As we gathered berries in the stillness that is
Egavik, my mind began its usual meandering about the
work we were striving to complete, about Egavik itself; 1
thought how, after a week spent cushioned in Egavik's
peace, even Unalakleet's relatively small volume of noise
jarred my ears. 1 thought how Egavik must resemble the
way things were before my ancestors' lives were changed
forever by that first airplane, by that first missionary, by
that first recognition of an alien tongue ...1 thought of the
maps I had seen distributed with the Environmental
Impact Statements for Norton Sound and other areas, and
suddenly, 1 heard a jet making its milkrun over the pole
'way overhead, and 1 slowly began to feel invisible, like an
impersonal dot on the huge map that is required to do
justice to the vastness that is Alaska. 1 looked down at the
berries I had just picked, Egavik blueberries, dusty-looking
and dark, and then 1 looked around at the tundra, the
willows that lined the slough, the gravelly point of land
with our tents sitting on it, and beyond that to the far-off
ripples on the shiny surface of Norton Sound. I looked
again at the berry bushes that surrounded us, and ^.t a
single berry in my hand, and 1 thought in amazement, "It's
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purely a matter of perspectives, isn't it?"... When I look at a
map of Alaska, my eyes go automatically to the
northwestern coast, and they search until they find
Unalakleet, and after that day in Egavik, they go up an inch
or so, and find almost the exact spot where 1 stood with
that blueberry in my hand,"
Although it is clear from the outset what Vemita and Karen are writing
about, it is often assumed that their experiences are so privatized that
they have no constitutive value. What is the merit of transformative
experience in nature?
Consider first the value of these narratives from the individual
point of view. Typically, experiences such as these are dismissed as
theoretically uninteresting at best (at worst, as sentimentality), forcing
both Karen and Vemita into the uncomfortable position of having to
reinterpret their insights into language that fits accepted patterns.
This shift disenfranchises their initial intuition since it is not possible
to capture precisely, in a different voice, their original understanding.
Vemita characterizes her dilemma this way:
"1 recognize the value of my own perspective. But it is not
enough for only me to see Alaska's map in terms of
blueberry bushes, silver salmon for supper, clean air,
familial togetherness, and the dangers that confront my
way of life."
The fact that Vemita's insight has no political significance (or Karen's
any philosophical significance) undermines their personal experience
(or voice), disempowering their attempts to redirect political results
or philosophical theory (since only a select perspective is deemed
legitimate). We lose the authenticity of both Karen and Vemita's
experience, or as Habermas characterizes it, we lose the tmthfulness
contained in their experience; clearly the price to pay for narrowing
the constraints of political or philosophical discourse is too great.
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By reconceptualizing social interaction as an integrated vision
driven by a diversity of insights, Benhabib (and others) gain the
complementary insight offered by these two experiences. The
seemingly apolitical experience of Karen that she then uses to
motivate her philosophical agenda complements the original insight by
Vemita that without a voice, she risks the life of her people. In more
general terms, in an integrated vision of social change, an apparently
frivolous, individual experience (if not rejected but validated) has the
potential of impacting and empowering the oppressed. Certainly
differences in perspective result from the "different narrative histories
in which selves are embedded"'^® (our identities are constituted by our
own historical narratives), yet it is vital from the perspective of social
theory that we "think their unity" rather than dismissing the vision of
a unified perspective as impossible or undermining unity entirely by
trivializing a coherent view (or by privileging one perspective over the
others). Individual narrative is grist for the social theorist's mill.
What is the message for eco-theory? The risk is too great to
abnegate the community of solidarity and friendship to a vision of
natural rights. Vemita's political plight is apt to be railroaded by any
universal eco-vision. Ecofeminists are poised at the edge of an
immensely productive project that could conceptualize as of yet
untapped insight: the possibility of recording individual experiences
in nature that together articulate a renewed eco-vision. To assume
that it is the task of the social theorist (the ecophilosopher) to solidify
individual experiences without risking any is to assume the quasi-
transcendental position appropriated by Habermas. Linguistic
competence, as with technical insight, assumes traces of objectivity.
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that we may obtain a kind of certainty through particular instances of
investigation. Only by this claim may we insist on any eco-vision.
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^^Benhabib, Feminism as Critique
, pg. 95.
^®These come from her paper; Karen Warren. "The Power and Promise of Ecological
Feminism".
77prom Vemita Zilys, "A Matter of Perspectives" deUvered to the 34th Annual
International Science Conference . Fairbanks, AK, September. 1982.
78Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia , pg. 349.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although I have shifted away from my original endorsement of
the Habermasian scheme, in these concluding remarks I consider
whether or not I have irredeemably abandoned his methodology.
Habermas believes that interest in the control of nature is common to
all humans and is solved in instrumental rationality, but that in the
social and political sphere, diverse interests need to be resolved by
communicative rationality. Conflict over environmental issues appears
to transcend this clear cut boundary since these social questions are
defined by their conflicting interests in the control of nature. The
confrontations between Native groups and environmentalists capture
this unique situation, tempting one to ask how such oppositions might
be resolved even if one were to overcome the current power
imbalances. According to Habermas, using a universal pragmatics, we
should be able to reconcile the most rational view and to answer the
most vital question; Which attempt to "control nature" is legitimate
and thus more ethical?
The seal hunt serves as an example of this sort of conflict where
the debate appears to turn on the ethical treatment of nature. Natives
argue that killing seals is simply a means of support and cultural
sustenance, not unlike the use of animals for food and support by all
cultures. They argue that they have demonstrated historically their
sensitivity to animal population limitations, having never hunted a
species to extinction. The environmentalists counter that hunting
young seals is cruel and unnecessary behavior, putting subtle stresses
on the oceanic ecosystem that might prevent seal populations from
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overcoming hunting pressures as the market for seal pelts expands in
a global economy.
In a Habermasian fashion, one could argue that overcoming this
conflict does not require that nature (the seals) participate in the
resolution since from the start the dialogue between Natives and
environmentalists presupposes a mutual interest in controlling nature.
At stake is the character of this control and it is this shared human
condition that unifies seemingly opposing perspectives. So that by
characterizing the dilemma as one in which nature is the victim, the
environmentalists (ecophilosophers) undermine attempts at
reconciliation. Although we can give nature a voice in any kind of
dialogue (the legal world is an example), the voice that we hear
remains necessarily political determined by our unavoidable
dependence upon controlling nature.
It is for this reason that I rejected as fallacious the concerns of
critics such as Whitebook or Ottman over the fate of nature and chose
to focus my criticisms on the Habermasian status of individuals in the
communicative community. It is possible to argue that I contradict
myself by arguing that a general theme characterizes a flawed
ecophilosophy and, at the same time, insisting that we must preserve
the individuality of voices in a feminist communicative community.
Habermas consistently argues for both a shared interest in controlling
nature and a universal pragmatics. I advance this two-fold
characterization of nature by arguing that ecophilosophers overcome
this distinction thereby undermining the socially relevant capacity of
their theory. Habermas correctly delineates our shared technical
dependence upon utilizing nature, but I argue that he misses the
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productive potentiality of individual dialogues with nature. These
dialogues, when accepted, radically change the on-going social and
political discussion on how we should best utilize nature by shifting it
away from a search for a universal voice, forcing theory to include
heretofore illegitimate perspectives (women. Native Americans).
Ultimately the question remains how any kind of Habermasian
dialogue could ever reconcile the diversity of interests that would be
brought to a cross-cultural conversation about the desired relationship
between human beings and nature. The level of abstraction that is so
characteristically Habermasian (the redemptive potentiality of
communicative interaction) plagues any attempt to answer specific
questions. This kind of abstraction is also the very problem that 1
attribute to the ecophilosophical rendition of a nature philosophy, that
ecophilosophy lacks any kind of relevant political agenda. The task
then is to construct a dialogical situation that overcomes difference
while maintaining individuality. This is the point at which an eco-
vision (a more enlightened dialogue about our relationship to nature)
and the feminist recommendations for a communicative community
based in solidarity rather than sameness merge. Here is where the
work lies, that we may find a community of mutual support and
friendship in the midst of vastly different interests. Ultimately then,
this is vastly different from what Habermas hopes to accomplish. Still,
the Habermasian scheme lingers as a reminder that the goal of our
political dialogues is to shape and not to transcend our shared
dependence upon a technological relationship to nature.
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